Silicon Sandstorms: AI, Power, and the New Tech Front in the Gulf

Visitors communicates with a 'conversational robot' during the third edition of the Global AI Summit (GAIN) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 12, 2024.

Artificial Intelligence: Visitors communicates with a 'conversational robot' during the third edition of the Global AI Summit (GAIN) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 12, 2024. Image: Xinhua / Alamy Stock Photo.


In an era where AI capability is becoming synonymous with geopolitical power, Trump’s Middle East strategy signals a bold, and risky, bet on technological statecraft.

With his second term, Donald Trump is wasting no time in redrawing the global technological and strategic map. His high-profile tour to the Middle East combined old-school power politics and a new-age tech offensive. In Riyadh, he presided over a $142 billion arms package with Saudi Arabia, underscoring traditional security ties, but the centrepiece of his visit was something far more future-tech focused: artificial intelligence. From massive chips deals and cloud infrastructure commitments to the launch of state-backed AI champions, the trip marked a deliberate US push to entrench itself at the heart of the Gulf’s digital transformation.

The scale of the announcements was staggering. In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia unveiled Humain, a new national AI champion backed by the Public Investment Fund and boasting an initial procurement of a least 18,000 Nvidia Blackwell chips. In tandem, AMD inked a $10 billion infrastructure partnership, while Amazon Web Services committed $5 billion to build a dedicated AI zone in the Kingdom. Across the Gulf in the UAE, Abu Dhabi’s G42 firm, already a regional AI heavyweight, struck deals to import up to 500,000 Nvidia H100 chips annually, facilitated by eased US export restrictions. Qatar, not to be outdone, sealed the largest-ever Boeing deal in its history, signalling its own intention to remain central in US commercial and strategic interest.

This flurry of high-end tech deals represents more than just a set of business deals, it reflects a deliberate recalibration of US strategy, from export controls and tech denial under Biden, to a geoeconomic offensive that arms allies with cutting-edge capability. But in empowering Gulf monarchies with the tools of advanced AI, Washington is not just outcompeting China, it is taking significant long-term risks. These technologies could be repurposed for surveillance, repression or military use and their diffusion may ultimately undermine the very norms and alliances the US seeks to uphold.

A Pivot from Denial to Diffusion

The Biden administration’s approach to AI and semiconductor policy was defined by strategic denial. Export controls against China, pressure on allies to restrict technology flows and a concerted push to multilateralise guardrails on AI development were the cornerstones of its international tech policy. Trump’s second term, by contrast, has begun with an aggressive pivot by easing export restrictions, dismantling tiered licencing systems, and facilitating US firms’ access to fast-growing, but politically sensitive, markets.

For US tech giants such as Nvidia, AMD and AWS, this is a bonanza. The Middle East, flush with oil revenues and motivated by existential concerns about a post-hydrocarbon future, offers massive capital, centralised decision-making and near limitless ambitions. For Trump, it offers a twofold win: economic benefits for US firms and a geopolitical wedge against China’s growing tech presence in the Gulf.

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In effect, the US is helping Gulf allies build end-to-end AI ecosystems that could rival Western digital economies in scale and sophistication

Yet this shift has not come without criticism. Some US lawmakers have expressed concern that the export of frontier AI capabilities to Gulf states risks undermining long-term American technological advantage, and could open the door to indirect Chinese access, particularly given UAE’s historically ambivalent alignment and G42’s past ties with Chinese entities. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has dismissed such fears as ‘naïve’, arguing that the benefits of closer alignment with trusted Gulf partners outweigh the risks. But the tension between commercial expansion and national security remains unresolved.

The Middle East as an AI Battleground

For Gulf nations, AI has become a core strategic priority. As the energy transition accelerates, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar see AI as a foundational pillar of their post-oil economies. But beyond diversification lies ambition, to become global AI hubs that can shape future norms, control regional data ecosystems, and project soft power through technological leadership.

Trumps’ visit validated those ambitions. The deals inked were not just about chip sales, they included infrastructure, cloud sovereignty, and data centre construction. In effect, the US is helping Gulf allies build end-to-end AI ecosystems that could rival Western digital economies in scale and sophistication.

At the heart of these efforts is a drive toward AI sovereignty, the ability of states to control their own compute power, training data and cloud infrastructure without reliance on foreign platforms. For the Gulf states, this is not only a matter of economic futureproofing but also of strategic autonomy. Building massive domestic data centres, securing dedicated chip pipelines, and localising cloud operations are steps toward reducing dependence on external providers and shaping their own digital destinies.

This emerging Middle Easter tech bloc, however, is not emerging in isolation. China has invested heavily in Gulf digital infrastructure, including Huawei’s cloud services, smart city initiatives, and surveillance technologies. Trump’s AI diplomacy aims to displace that influence, but the contest is far from over. In many Gulf capitals, the preference remains for balancing, not choosing, between Washington and Beijing.

Risks of a Fragmented Digital Order

The geopolitical consequences of this AI arms race are profound. The first is the growing fragmentation of the global digital order. Rather than a cohesive rules-based system for emerging technologies, the world is increasingly defined by bilateral tech pacts, regional standards, and selective access to innovation.

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Trump’s Middles East tour reinforced this trend. His administration’s approach to AI governance is unilateral and transactional, favouring deals over diplomacy and power over principles. The implication is that access to American technology no longer depends on shared values or regulatory alignment, but on strategic loyalty, and, often, the ability to pay.

The second consequence is the diffusion of dual-use technologies without robust oversight. Blackwell chips and massive data centres are not neutral tools, they are accelerants of surveillance, military AI development, and influence operations should their owners choose to direct them to do so. In the absence of international guardrails, their unchecked proliferation could fuel authoritarian entrenchment and regional instability.

Finally, this strategy could undercut the very alliances it seeks to strengthen. European and Indo-Pacific allies, many of whom were pressured under Biden to adopt restrictive AI governance frameworks and align with US-led semiconductor controls, may bristle at what looks like a double standard. Why are Washington’s Gulf partners receiving the world’s most advanced AI tools with minimal conditions, while other face scrutiny and constraint?

Toward a New Tech Grand Strategy

The deeper question raised by Trump’s Middle East AI offensive is whether the US has a coherent grand strategy for technology. The postwar American order was built on more than just dominance, it was rooted in norms, institutions and alliances. In the AI age, those foundations are eroding. In their place, the Trump administration appears to be constructing a world of high-tech spheres of influence, in which economic opportunity trumps normative convergence.

If this is the new reality, then allies and adversaries alike will adapt accordingly. China, having watched Washington’s AI diplomacy unfold in the Gulf, is unlikely to sit idle. It is already offering open-weight AI models to partners seeking alternatives to US restrictions and could double-down on providing infrastructure-as-a-service via Huawei Cloud and other digital silk road assets. Beijing may seek to undercut American firms in regions where cost and political alignment make it an attractive alternative, particularly in parts of Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The US may have secured a tactical lead in the Gulf, but the strategic competition with China over global AI alignment remains wide open.

Europe may seek to chart a more independent digital path, wary of both American tech exceptionalism and Chinese surveillance exports. The Global South will continue to navigate a fragmented landscape, forced to make choices between competing standards, platforms and providers.

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Companies like Nvidia, AMD, and AWS were not peripheral to these agreements, they were main instruments

For the Gulf, the coming years will bring both opportunity and scrutiny. Their partnership with Washington on AI may accelerate economic transformation and geopolitical relevance, but it will also invite deeper debates over surveillance, data control and the militarisation of AI. Whether they emerge as responsible stewards of this new digital power, or as flashpoints in a wider tech conflict, will depend as much on domestic governance as on external alignment.

What also stands out from the Middle East tour is how central US tech firms have become to the execution of foreign policy. Companies like Nvidia, AMD, and AWS were not peripheral to these agreements, they were main instruments. Their infrastructure, chips, and cloud services are now tools of statecraft, blurring the lines between commercial enterprise and geopolitical actor.

But it was not just corporations in the room. High-profile tech leaders and billionaires, including OpenAI’s Sam Altman, Tesla and Space X’s Elon Musk and Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, all joined Trump on tour, reflecting a broader shift in who wields influence over international technology strategy. These individuals, through their platforms, capital, and personal networks, are increasingly operating as de facto diplomats, brokering access, shaping narratives, and influencing which nations get fast-tracked into the AI-powered future. As national security priorities become increasingly entangled with private-sector capabilities and personalities, the strategic influence of these actors, and the degree of transparency and oversight they are subject to, will be a critical issue in the years ahead.

Last week marked a significant evolution in how technological influence is being wielded in global affairs. By supporting the rapid expansion of AI capabilities in Gulf states, Washington is both accelerating regional ambitions and reshaping the geopolitical contours of advanced technology. These deals reflect a growing recognition that access to cutting-edge infrastructure, chips, data centres, cloud capacity, is becoming a central axis of strategic alignment.

Yet this approach also brings complexity. The diffusion of high-end AI tools into politically diverse and strategically independent environments raises important questions about long-term interoperability, trust and governance. Managing the balance between commercial opportunity, strategic influence, and technological safeguards will be a persistent challenge, not just for the US, but for its partners as well.

As the global race for AI leadership intensifies, what unfolds in the Gulf may prove a bellwether for the broader digital order, a test case for how major powers engage in technology statecraft in an increasingly multipolar and often fragmented world.

© RUSI, 2025.

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WRITTEN BY

Dr Tobias Feakin

Senior Associate Fellow

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