Security Cooperation Among the Arctic NATO Allies

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent introduction of Western sanctions against Russia brought most Russian-Western interactions in the Arctic to a halt. Western companies pulled out their investments in Russia, trade was sanctioned, political and diplomatic interaction significantly curbed, and the movement of people between Russia and the Western Arctic states was drastically reduced. In the security domain, Western concern with the Russian military assets in the Arctic became more acute, as Russia was seen as a country willing to use military force against a neighbour. This Russian aggression also prompted Finland and Sweden to join NATO at record speed.

What Formats and Forums Exist for Arctic Allies to Collaborate and Develop their Relationships?

The main framework is obviously NATO. Despite the tragic backdrop of war in Europe, the NATO enlargement strengthened North European security as it removed previous formal impediments to defence cooperation in the Nordic and Baltic regions. Various initiatives for Nordic defence integration were quickly initiated, and in NATO the Arctic 7-format (A7) became more vibrant. It had existed also prior to accession of Finland and Sweden, but with their membership the discussions could be deeper and more directly related to ongoing processes in NATO.

Parallel to these developments, Canada revised its Arctic policy. From being historically rather reluctant to discuss Arctic topics in NATO, insisting for instance on using terms like ‘European Arctic’ or the ‘High North’ to delimitate the Supreme Commander of Europe’s (SACEUR) Joint Operations Area (JOA) from Canada’s own Arctic regions, Ottawa has gradually changed its position. In the latest Canadian defence and defence industrial strategies, Canada position itself as a defender of NATO's western and northern flanks.

Denmark, which also for long was reluctant to discuss the Arctic in NATO, and which over the last decades prioritised international operations and the Baltic Sea region, decided to engage more in the Arctic after President Donald Trump began talking about buying Greenland during his first presidency.

While non-papers on the Arctic from Arctic allies had been launched prior to Finland and Sweden becoming NATO-members, one of the first results of the ‘new’ A7 was a NATO non-paper, circulated in 2024. It was followed up with another non-paper in 2025. The documents themselves are not public, but the objective of writing them was most likely to take ownership of NATO policies in the Arctic and define the basic parameters for how the organization should perceive the region.

The A7 meets in various formats. State leaders have met in the margins of NATO Summits, and defence and foreign ministers’ on the margins of their regular meetings, such as at the May 2026 NATO Foreign Minsters’ meeting in Helsingborg, Sweden. Furthermore, there are regular A7 Foreign Ministry Policy Directors’ meetings, and in NATO HQ, the Permanent Representatives of the A7 also interact regularly. The latter is important both for the day-to-day coordination, but also because they themselves can facilitate implementation and follow-up what is being discussed.

Topics discussed in the A7 typically range from formulations in NATO Summit Communiques, Political guidance for NATO’s defence planning, and other authoritative documents enhancing NATO’s deterrence and defence agenda. At times the group may also engage in broader agendas such as the implications and implementation of the military burden shift from the US to Europe.

Defence Architecture for the High North and Beyond

On the military side of NATO, the establishment in 2019 of NATO Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC NF) is important because it brings most of NATO’s Arctic activity under one command. The command is also staffed with many officers from the Arctic states, thus serving as an integration hub for the states in question, as well as other allies who operate in the Arctic, such as the UK and the Netherlands. JFC NF is also responsible for NATO’s Regional Plan Northwest, which covers the north Atlantic Ocean, the Arctic and the Nordic region. Allied operations and exercises in the High North are therefore often related to this plan in one way or the other.

The diplomatic row between the US and the Kingdom of Denmark over Greenland in 2025-26 has deliberately been kept out of the A7 format, as it is being addressed in the trilateral working group between the US, Denmark and Greenland. Nonetheless, discussions without American presence were necessary when President Trump’s Greenland rhetoric was at its most explicit. In March 2026 a Nordic-Canadian summit was held in Oslo, and a significant part of the joint statement of the Summit was dedicated to Arctic security. A commitment to ‘rule of law, human rights, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states’ can be seen in context of US’ territorial pressures against both Canada and Greenland. Nonetheless, topics such as collective defence, Ukraine, and the green transition were also in the statement indicating a broader agenda than the Arctic and NATO only. The Nordic and Canadian Prime Ministers have also met from time to time, for instance in Iceland in 2023. The following year the Foreign Ministers engaged in a Canada-Nordic Strategic Dialogue in New York and in Iqualit. Despite this, a more regular or formalized Arctic 6 format appears not to be desired by anyone, as all six allies strongly prioritise to ‘keep the US in’ NATO, to paraphrase Lord Ismay. Meeting frequently without the US is probably not the best model to achieve that.

Although the A7 has become a much more vibrant as of lately, for the Nordic allies the Nordic 5 (N5) remains a format in which sensitive and trusted exchanges take place. The Nordics share a long history of mutual trust, shared values, culture and global outlook. Despite also having close engagement within the neighbours of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8), the political similarities are considered stronger among the N5. This format does not limit itself to Arctic topics of course, but in the context of NATO, the focus is primarily the European Arctic and NATO’s Regional Plan Northwest which covers the Nordic states. However, compared to the A7 meetings, N5 tend to not be utilised as systematically as it could when it comes to security policies. This format may be enhanced in the future.

Outside the NATO-framework, the Nordic countries have also engaged each other through Nordic Defence Cooperation (Nordefco) since 2008. Initially established to achieve financial gains through common procurements, Nordefco primarily became a format for joint exercises and operational and political cooperation in the following decade. Nordefco was reinvigorated after Finland and Sweden joined the alliance and is now used, for example, to coordinate Nordic responses to NATO’s capability targets. Nordefco is not directly related to the Arctic as such, but more broadly the northern European defence posture, which include the northern Nordics as well.

While A7 primarily has been a political and foreign ministry format, the Arctic 7 defence ministries have since 2024 established a parallel format for exchanges, the Arctic Security Policy Roundtable (ASPR). Under a rotating annual presidency, the representatives of the seven defence ministries (plus representatives from Greenland and the Faroe Islands) usually meet twice a year, alternating between digital and physical meetings. The ASPR typically discuss how to enhance the defence cooperation among the seven Allies, how to improve information sharing, strategic communication, and coordinate positions towards processes and meetings in NATO. The ASPR provides the policy framework for two other formats within the defence sector.

The first is the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), which was established in 2010. It is co-chaired by the US European Command and the Norwegian Defence Staff. Russia also participated here until NATO 2014. ASFR meets twice a year, once physically and once on VTC. In 2025 they met in Norway, in 2026 in Iceland, and in 2027 the meeting will take place in Canada. They usually aim to meet in Arctic cities. Some non-Arctic NATO allies (UK, FRA, NLD, GER) participate as observers. NATO JFC NF has also been represented at the meetings for the last couple of years.

Closely linked to the ASFR is the Arctic Chiefs of Defence (ACHOD), who have met on a regular basis since 2012. Initially the Russian Chief of Defence (CHOD) participated, but not after NATO suspended the mil-to-mil cooperation in 2014, following Russia’s initial aggression against Ukraine. The ACHODs typically meet in the margins of NATO CHODs meeting or at other occasions when they are all present.

The main objective of all these three formats is to share situational awareness of the Arctic, discuss the security situation more broadly, learn about the situation in the parts of the Arctic outside SACEUR’s JOA in the Arctic (such as the Bering Strait), agree on terms for cooperation and coordination, etc.

A Closer Union

There is an ambition to tie these three tracks even more closely together, so that they can contribute to concrete solutions of shared interest. To this end, a roadmap identifying challenges, gaps and solutions is being developed. Importantly, none of these formats engage in the military operational activity. They remain strictly focussed on the frameworks and principled questions.

Yet another assembly is The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF). It is described as ‘an independent, informal, operationally-driven organization, not bound by treaty, to foster safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.’ As its focus is on non-military security, and because it is associated with the Arctic Council, Russia is still a member. The eight members meet twice a year and are supported by a permanent Secretariat and Working Groups. Among the strategic goals of the ACGF are to:

• Strengthen multilateral cooperation and coordination within the Arctic maritime domain, and existing and future multilateral agreements.
• Seek common solutions to maritime issues related to the agencies fulfilling the functions of coast guards within the region.
• Facilitate safe and secure maritime activity in the Arctic region, with sustainable development to be promoted as appropriate.

After the American Administration’s interest in Greenland and the following political debacle, European NATO Allies proposed to establish the Arctic Sentry, a so-called ‘multi-domain activity’. Presumably they wanted to take a pro-active initiative to counter any American claims of a security ‘vacuum’ in and around Greenland and simultaneously make NATO more relevant in the Arctic. The Arctic Sentry is led by JFC NF and is thus far primarily a chapeau for ongoing military activities in the region. But it may over time become a hub for enhanced allied coordination of operations and exercises in the Arctic, as well as experimentation and transformation.

A recent American initiative to enhance collaboration between multiple US commands engaged in the Arctic may also strengthen NATO. The concept, called Nordic Bridge, ties together US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), US European Command and SACEUR. It ‘will help make sure the other commands work together to make sure they aren’t sending a “disproportionate amount of force” to the region — or failing to send anyone at all’, according to General Gregory Guillot, Commander of US NORTHCOM. Both this initiative and Arctic Sentry demonstrate to the political level that security in the Arctic is on the agenda and taken seriously by the various miliary branches.

A trilateral cooperation which has grown significantly in importance over the last five years or so, is NORUKUS, short for Norway, the UK and the US. This cooperation was initiated by these allies’ Special Operations Forces but has since grown to include Air forces, Navies and other relevant services and domains focusing primarily on concept and capability development in the North Atlantic, the High North and the Arctic. Concepts such as the British Atlantic Bastion, Shield and Strike are associated with these efforts, aimed at building a future network of sensors, uncrewed systems, space and subsea technology. There is a lot of focus on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) but the activities are not restricted to this. Policies, concepts and activities are coordinated on both senior civilian and military levels to efficiently adapt to the changing security environment in the north. Deterrence has become an on-going reflexive effort, where shaping, compelling and influencing has become as important as signalling and posturing. This requires careful coordination and calibration of the various efforts.

Taken together, the Arctic Seven, plus allies such as the UK, have significantly stepped up their effort to provide security in the European Arctic over the last years. As described here, there are numerous formats on different levels: political, diplomatic, military, and civil servants. Some of the arenas primarily serve a convening function, while others are more institutionalised, with regular meetings and execution of agreed projects. They are, nonetheless, all based on a shared need for enhanced situational awareness, and a desire to modernise indication and warning systems and to better coordinate activity, plans and responses.

In addition to this, several allies have, over the last decade or so, increased their operations, training and exercising in the region – activities which have not necessarily originated from the various formats discussed here. This can be based upon national priorities, bilateral cooperation, or the revised NATO plans.

An anticipated reduction of the American military footprint in Europe may nonetheless also impact this activity. For instance, decreased presence of the US Navy or Air Force in the European Arctic cannot be ruled out. This could impact the level of US training and exercising in the region. However, the US also have a national Homeland Defence interest in the Arctic: from forces in Alaska, to NORAD with Canada, Ilulissat in Greenland, and intelligence cooperation with the Nordics. This is primarily resulting from the Russian ballistic missile threat, but also includes concerns related to future closer Sino-Russian military collaboration, as seen already in the Bering Strait. The shared NATO A7 interest in security and defence collaboration is therefore likely to remain irrespective of how the future NATO will look like.

© Karsten Friis, 2026, published by RUSI with permission of the authors.

This article was made possible through generous and open conversations with staff at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Defence Staff. Their support is highly appreciated. The research was funded by the Norwegian Research Council, through the project POPSARC 344073. Any potential errors are my own.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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