Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict and the Question of Cross-Border Terrorism

As the second round negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Istanbul stalled, then broke down, a permanent solution to the crisis appears far out of reach. Talks since 19 October have been marked by deadlock and uncertainty, but the future of a permanent and sustainable peace agreement looks no brighter. Pakistan and Afghanistan do not have any further scheduled negotiations, although future talks remain on the table. But even as all parties seek to pursue this objective, thousands of kilometres from Istanbul, the Af-Pak region is marred by armed clashes between Pakistan and Afghan Taliban regime’s ally, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Such turmoil is not unfamiliar to either country, particularly in their border region, but this time Pakistan’s government appears to have run out of patience with militant attacks on its territory, with demands for immediate, decisive action intensifying in Islamabad. Across the border, Afghanistan denies the accusation that it is harbouring the militants terrorising Pakistan’s neighbouring province. With the backdrop of these staunch national positions, negotiations are struggling to resolve the underlying conflict centring around the TTP: one’s ally and the other’s enemy.

Recent Escalations

Ever since the Afghan Taliban came to power in 2021, Pakistan has been demanding that they withdraw their support for TTP and stop providing them safe haven to plan attacks and evade capture. Meanwhile, the TTP has stepped up its attacks. In 2025 alone, TTP carried out 600 attacks on Pakistani territory, mainly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, killing both security personnel and civilians. Islamabad is also concerned about potential TTP collusion with other militant groups in the wider region, such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The TTP has declared their unwillingness to cease hostilities at anything less than the surrender of authority by the Pakistani state in former FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas; now part of KP).

The Afghan Taliban regime’s refusal to take action against the TTP within Afghanistan contributed to this recent escalation of fighting. As attacks increased and frustration grew, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul on 9 October, targeting the residence of TTP leader and Afghan Taliban ally Noor Wali Mehsud. Unlike routine border skirmishes, this was an unprecedented attack in the heart of Afghanistan, signalling a policy shift by Pakistan; it was willing to confront the Afghan regime head on to address its ‘TTP problem’.

Following the airstrike, Afghanistan carried out ground attacks on the border, killing and injuring several border security officials. Tensions were further inflamed after videos of maimed bodies of Pakistani security officials surfaced on the internet. Against this backdrop, Qatar brokered a temporary ceasefire between the countries on 19 October in Doha. The two parties then continued negotiations in Turkey, albeit with scepticism about their ability to lead to a successful resolution.

Pakistani demands include that the Afghan regime crack down on TTP training camps, refuse to support TTP activities that result in attacks in Pakistan, and potentially create and operate under a joint counter-terrorism framework. No headway has been made on these demands, not only because the Afghan Taliban’s decision-making is fragmented (the Afghan delegation receives instructions from both Kandahar and Kabul simultaneously), but also due to their reluctance to withdraw support for the TTP. Detailed analysis of why the talks broke down remain outside the remit of this piece, but are well explored by local experts, such as here and here.

What is the TTP Problem and Why Does it Persist?

TTP, whose name translates to the ‘Taliban Movement of Pakistan’, is primarily composed of Pashtun militants on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The group was formed in the aftermath of the 2007 Lal Masjid security operation in Islamabad, with the merger of several anti-Pakistan religious extremist militant groups. The TTP demands that the Pakistani state must abdicate its authority in parts of the KP province and allow TTP to impose Taliban-style Sharia. They have close ethnic, religious and cultural ties with the Afghan Taliban and have fought within their ranks in the past. While certain factions within the Afghan Taliban have been backed by Pakistan in the past, the TTP and Pakistan have always maintained an adversarial relationship.

Since 2007, Pakistan has conducted a number of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against the group, some with moderate success, but has failed to eliminate the threat from the TTP. This failure is due to a host of reasons, including heavy-handed operations without adequate post-conflict population rehabilitation, thereby exacerbating local grievances. Pakistan’s history of incoherent policies towards the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are another major cause. Lacking a decisive strategy, Pakistan has repeatedly struck agreements with the TTP and their allied groups, only for violence to erupt again after a short time. Often choosing to negotiate when in a position of weakness, Pakistan’s cyclical capitulation emboldens the TTP, leading to a return to fighting in a matter of months.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has also varied over this time, with the Pakistani establishment hoping that the Taliban’s rise to power would help them counter the TTP, given Pakistan’s long-standing support for Afghan Taliban factions, especially the Haqqani network. However, regardless of the latter’s complex relationship with Kandahar, all factions within the Afghan Taliban are currently unanimous in their adversarial posture towards Pakistan. TTP and the Afghan Taliban also share a long history of fighting together for common causes and have even pledged allegiance to the same leaders. Attacks on Pakistan escalated after the Taliban came to power as the TTP grew bolder and was able to organize, train, plan, and flee across the border without restrictions. The presence of other violent extremist organizations operating in the region further complicates matters. The TTP is known to work with Al-Qaeda occasionally, while Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) currently operates largely independently. Pressure on the TTP from the Afghan Taliban, however, may push TTP to align with ISKP – a group openly challenging the regime in Afghanistan.

The Danger of Repeating Past Mistakes

As negotiations falter in Turkey amidst a fragile ceasefire, Pakistan and Afghanistan are struggling to find common ground on the TTP issue. Meanwhile, TTP has not ceased attacks on Pakistan, with fighting ongoing in Kurram district of former FATA, resulting in deaths of security personnel and TTP fighters. Any renewed accommodation with the TTP would thus not mark a strategic stabilisation, but a repetition of past mistakes with predictably disastrous consequences.

Despite their apparent policy shift, worry remains that Pakistan’s establishment could repeat its cycle of capitulation to the TTP, perhaps even permitting them some level of local autonomy. This idea is not unprecedented, as the Pakistani establishment has considered such interim solutions in the past, such as the Swat agreement of 2009, when Pakistan allowed the so-called Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, a TTP off-shoot and ally, to impose Taliban-style Shariah in Malakand Division. This move, a classic example of capitulation, massively damaged Pakistan's COIN strategy, emboldened militant terrorists, and ushered a new era of fear and lawlessness in the region. It yielded no peace dividends as fighting resumed soon after and the ultimate price was paid by civilians and security personnel in the region.

More importantly, such inconsistency in policies has cultivated severe trust deficit among the local population, who have borne the brunt of terrorism that was at times emboldened by the cycle of capitulation. Moreover, thousands of civilians who were displaced from their hometowns during COIN operations have not been adequately rehabilitated or compensated for their losses. The youth in these administratively neglected regions of the country has grown up in a constant state of unrest made worse by limited availability of resources and avenues for socioeconomic progress. The war-weary population cannot commit to further indecisive military operations which may or may not address the terrorism in the region but will most definitely result in displacement and loss of life, property, and any hope for prosperity. These concerns have been amplified by locals and experts who follow these issues time and again.

The Path Forward for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations

The current crisis leaves both Pakistan and Afghanistan with limited options. If the leadership in Pakistan abandons its pattern of capitulating to terrorist organizations, any effort to pursue a successful, targeted military operation against the TTP will require the government to build the trust of the affected populations. At the same time, the Afghan regime will have to decide whether they will work with Pakistan to pursue the objective of ridding the region of violent extremism.

If Afghanistan does not crack down on the TTP safe havens within its territory, it will not be possible to address the infiltration of terrorists. While this is a challenging moment with little hope for an agreement, it can be converted into an opportunity to quell terrorism and regression across the region. All countries involved in the negotiations process and regional partners may incentivise the Taliban to abandon their support for violent extremist organizations and join in the effort of collective regional progress, including allowing education and avenues for progress for girls and women, creating employment opportunities for the youth and modernising for the benefit of a war-weary population. A successful operation against the TTP, where no short-term compromises are made on the objective of countering violent extremism, will set a strong precedent against other groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISKP.

An all-out war between Pakistan and Afghanistan will be disastrous for the region. Further destabilization will embolden terrorist groups and foreign fighters being expelled from other parts of the world will once again flock to war-stricken Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if either of the countries decide to capitulate to the TTP once again, it would be a huge disservice to the people of the region and the future may not offer any further opportunities to clamp down on terrorism in the region, once and for all.

© RUSI, 2025.

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