Making Sense of Britain’s Digital Targeting Web

Over two decades after the UK’s drive for Network Enabled Capability (NEC), joint low-latency targeting is seemingly within reach: a web of lethal, cross-cued sensors and weapons, augmented by artificial intelligence. But there are hurdles ahead. The near and long-term development of the UK’s Digital Targeting Web (DTW) is ambitious and holds promise; however, its development and subsequent introduction to Defence depends on more than just modern technology.

Strategic Purpose and Framing

Britain’s DTW is not a single system or technology but is instead a broad conceptual framing that unifies discrete targeting capabilities across the services and wider defence enterprise. Its purpose is to integrate, not merely to refine the procurement of a product or series of products. The MOD’s vision is for DTW to enable a ‘full spectrum, cross domain approach to joint targeting’ by using both ‘kinetic’ (for example artillery or air launched and loitering munitions) and ‘non-kinetic’ (for example cyber, electronic warfare or information operations) against physical and non-physical targets. Discussions among government officials have aimed to redefine these initiatives less as a ‘web’ and more as the creation of integrated targeting workflows.

As the DTW is neither a project nor a programme, it therefore lacks both an end state and discrete outcomes. The current focus appears to be on improving deliberate targeting capabilities across Defence with the intention of using these improvements as a ‘forcing function’ for integrating data flows across the services and wider defence enterprise. Indeed, in a briefing to defence industry companies, government officials described their objective as simply an ‘increase [in] targeting scale, pace and precision by 2030’. It remains unclear what the outcomes will be to meet the SDR’s commitment ‘to deliver a digital targeting web in 2027.’

Such an amorphous vision can be a double-edged sword: while eschewing an end state permits the flexible and continuous integration and improvement of capabilities in a fast-paced innovation environment, the lack of discrete outcomes inhibits one’s ability to judge progress. Absent overall measurable objectives, there will be difficulty determining how successful the DTW is besides simply being ‘more’ integrated than before.

The problem of measuring integration is not unique to the DTW and has plagued the defence sector for years. However, treating ‘flexibility’ and ‘iterative-ness’ as fundamentally incompatible with quantifiable metrics is likely to frustrate all DTW stakeholders, both internal and external.

Governance and Institutions

The governance of the DTW is intimately connected to ongoing Defence Reform as ‘the foundation for being able to implement the [Strategic] Defence Review.’ As command hierarchies are restructured and adapted to accommodate the new prominent role of the Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ), so targeting authorities across the MOD will change. The Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC), formerly UK Strategic Command, has been made responsible for DTW outcomes and will be leading its implementation. However, this is in an orchestrating capacity, not commanding, with limited authority to compel. Meanwhile, the recently formed National Armaments Director (NAD) Group is responsible for DTW’s technical delivery, with Defence Digital taking a prominent role. Each single service is made accountable for refining their own targeting capabilities, bound within respective domains, with the aforementioned enterprise bodies supporting and integrating these capabilities.

A key inhibitor to the success of the ‘digital backbone’ has been the lack of organisational and financial authorities held by Defence Digital, the entity responsible for the rollout, enablement and integration of the backbone. Defence Reform seeks to change these deficiencies, including the elevation of Defence Digital to the NAD Group. Yet it remains in doubt whether the DTW authorities possess the power – in terms of budgets and authority hierarchy. Without these it will remain difficult to cohere the Armed Services, CSOC, the NAD Group and various industrial partners to the DTW. Furthermore, the distribution of integrating governing authority between CSOC and the NAD Group increases the likelihood of a conflicted approach due to incongruous visions and competing agendas.

To their credit, government officials recognise the current governance model is imperfect and have expressed a willingness to review and amend. The initial ‘decentralised approach’ to establishing the DTW is has been made critical to meeting the 2027 ambitions of the SDR, although it risks entrenching single service approaches. Further efforts may be necessary to ensure coherence and standardisation, perhaps taking the form of directives orders from MSHQ on behalf of the CDS.

Commercial

For initiatives like the DTW, technology itself is rarely the deciding factor to success or failure. Instead, processes around the procurement and adoption of the technologies from the commercial sector will decide the success or failure of the rollout and integration of capabilities. The DTW teams have committed to publishing their commercial model in the near future but have given indications about their strategy for engaging with industry.

The key word for understanding the MOD’s vision is flexibility. The department has struggled as a customer for industry in the past, often over-prioritising requirements for procurement while simultaneously lacking the knowledge about the technical and operational realities of what they need. To mitigate this problem, DTW teams are attempting a much more close-knit relationship with industry in the design, development and implementation of DTW capabilities.

The ‘decentralised’ design of the DTW will rely on industry experts to shape the DTW, especially in leading standard creation and setting. Their new unified test and reference centre is intended to work as a single point for all digital standards, easing the ability for industry partners to sell capabilities that can be integrated across defence. This approach appears to be an improvement to past MOD efforts, but does present its own risks, namely the need to avoid vendor-driven distortions within DTW programmes in a manner that would undermine open competition and capability coherence.

More doubts emerge when looking at the funding model for the DTW. Dedicated funding for DTW teams to spend will not be available until 2027 – the same time that the initial DTW capability is due. Therefore, interested contractors will have to leverage existing contracts across MOD or otherwise invest their time with the DTW teams in the hope of receiving funding (and backpay) when money becomes available. While DTW authorities do have greater flexibility in how their funds will be spent than traditional programmes, partly due to the rates of technology change, the delay to funding incentivises large firms that have the capital to sustain themselves until 2027. This inhibits SMEs’ ability to join programmes such as DTW unless they subcontract to a prime, have funders with very deep pockets, or have relevant existing contracts with MOD. Many of these issues cannot be blamed on DTW stakeholders but stem from longstanding defence procurement issues. Defence Reform is attempting to overhaul procurement to mitigate such challenges, but it is safe to say that MOD will not have full resolution before the DTW is due in 2027.

Infrastructure and Architecture

Government officials have been explicit in clarifying that the DTW is not ‘an’ infrastructure, although they have acknowledged that it will have significant dependencies upon existing digital infrastructure. Despite conversations about challenging the current classification protocols, the DTW will be reliant upon MOD’s secret-level cloud for large-scale storage and interrogation of operational data. Secret cloud is expected to reach full capability soon, although it is worth noting that this capability has appeared to have already missed two deadlines.

Other parts of MOD’s ‘Digital Backbone’ are another story, including those perhaps most relevant to future DTW integration. The deficiencies of this initiative are well known, especially with the Next Generation Communication Network (NGCN), which has face delays and criticisms due to being poorly defined, fragmented and insufficiently focused on enabling combat capabilities. But many of these challenges stemmed from the nature of MOD’s digital estate. Fragmented and held back by legacy systems it is – crucially – largely opaque to government officials and operators. Put simply, MOD lacks an understanding of what its digital enterprise looks like.

Despite designating a design authority and creating a standards and reference architecture, the DTW team appear to be deliberately avoiding reliance upon a central design architecture at this stage of their work, again juxtaposing flexibility against concrete, measurable steps. Without a definitive and forceful architecture, the DTW can theoretically iterate more quickly to keep pace with modern digital innovation, especially as the ‘outcome-driven’ model incentivises a more bottom-up approach to creating battlefield effects. However, questions remain about MOD’s ability to succeed with a bottom-up model of integration. The Ministry’s track record with such initiatives has been uneven, with particular concerns raised about its handling of complex system integration.

Technology

Across the services and wider MOD’s significant digital estate, the vast majority of technologies needed for integrated, digitalised targeting capabilities already exist, including software suites, data fabrics and AI-enabled data aggregators. However, these technologies exist largely in siloes, providing the very rationale for the creation of the DTW.

In terms of further technology directions, MOD has signalled prioritising security and resilience, in terms of cryptography, data-centric security, redundancy and cross-classification data transfers. MOD also recognises that its technological capabilities must be scalable for a dynamic battlefield, requiring flexibility and resilience in personnel numbers, supply chains and commercial models.

Relevant to broader DTW efforts are Project ASGARD, WINTERMUTE trials and joint exercises like Project Convergence, which have each highlighted advanced battlefield connectivity at the tactical and operational levels. They have built on and learnt lessons from previous efforts such as RAF Nexus, RN Strike Net and Project MORPHEUS, the latter of which sits within the broader Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETacCIS) programmes. Together, this has the potential to bring the UK ever closer to being able to conduct Multi-Domain Operations within NATO.

What Next?

The Government has committed to a minimum viable product for the DTW by the end of 2026, with full operational capability by the end of 2027. To achieve this timeline, the critical milestones from MOD will almost certainly require:

1. Single service contribution to DTW through advancements in their targeting capabilities.
2. Clear strategic direction and policy from Military Strategic Headquarters to guide, cohere and, when necessary, compel the authorities of the disparate targeting functions.
3. Industry confidence, which will come from clear Government financial commitment.

The success of the DTW in terms of capability will be determined on the next iteration of NATO’s largest multinational exercise: STEADFAST DEFENDER 2027. The demonstration of viable integrated targeting capabilities will be a considerable challenge for Defence and will likely prove a watershed moment for determining the success of Defence Reform.

© RUSI, 2025.

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