Israel's Arab Parties After the Election: Unprecedented Representation

President Isaac Herzog has announced that 67 members of Knesset had recommended Gadi Eisenkot, compared with 46 who recommended Benjamin Netanyahu. On 8 November, he formally entrusted Eisenkot with the task of forming a government. Eisenkot now has 28 days, with a possible two-week extension, to negotiate an arrangement capable of securing parliamentary support. His 48-seat bloc remains short of the 61 votes required for a majority, while Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 seats.

After the 27 October election, the two Arab-led political lists managed to win 19 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, the largest contingent that they have ever had in the Israeli parliament. Alongside the four-party opposition coalition that Eisenkot controls and that has 48 seats, they can be seen as a potential foundation for a majority government of 67 seats. Yet the arithmetic is considerably simpler than the political reality. The Arab parties’ recommendations were therefore decisive in giving Eisenkot the mandate, but they did not resolve the disagreements within his own camp or establish the terms on which Arab-led political parties would support a government.

19 Seats, Two Different Parties

Understanding the significance of the 19 seats requires looking beyond the combined number. While the Arab political presence in the new Knesset comprises both Ra’am that received eight seats and the Joint List that received 11 seats, they are not politically substitutable entities. Their differences reflect separate political traditions and have different views of Their differences reflect distinct political traditions and divergent approaches to the Palestinian question, political representation, and participation in Israel's parliamentary and governing institutions.

Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, is rooted in the Southern Islamic Movement and has pursued a strategy of pragmatic engagement with Israeli political institutions. Its central argument is that Arab citizens should use their parliamentary representation to secure resources, improve public services and address urgent problems in Arab communities. Its participation in the Bennett–Lapid government in 2021 was a significant milestone: for the first time, an independent Arab political entity joined the Israeli governmental coalition. At the time, Abbas explained the move to join the coalition as one aimed exclusively at advancing the interests and needs of the Arab society inside Israel. This approach reflects the belief that participation in governing coalitions provides an effective route to influencing policy and securing practical gains for Arab citizens. Rather than relying solely on opposition politics.

The Joint List represents a different political framework. It brings together three parties: Hadash, Ta’al and Balad, whose cooperation should not be mistaken for complete ideological uniformity. Hadash is a party with a socialist and communist history that has a unique focus on Arab–Jewish cooperation, calling on Israel to return all of the occupied territories and focusing on social equality. Ta’al, headed by Ahmad Tibi, has an element of parliamentary pragmatism along with a strong focus on the political rights of Palestinians and the situation of Arab citizens. Balad can be seen as a more nationalistic Arab political movement seeking to establish Israel as a ‘state of all its citizens’ rather than a state of the Jewish nation. This common platform enables them to work together in areas of equality, representation, anti-discrimination and statehood of Palestinians, although not necessarily in the same order of priorities.

In the current government-formation landscape, these differences between the two Arab parties are visible. Ra’am recommended Eisenkot, while attempting to retain its capability to be involved in political negotiations and possibly make an impact on the government from the inside. However, the Joint List has stated clearly that it would be ready to back a government from the outside, without becoming a part of its coalition. Its chairman, Yousef Jabareen, explained the decision in an interview with The Guardian: ‘The conditions that [Eisenkot] speaks of are more relevant for parties who would be in the coalition. We are not planning to be in the coalition . . . for very clear reasons.’

Jabareen described the recommendation of Eisenkot as a response to Arab voters’ demand for political change, while emphasising the disagreements that remained. Ahmad Tibi, meanwhile, made clear that the Joint List wished to help bring about a change of government by replacing Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition, while retaining its position outside the governing coalition.

The Political Conditions for Cooperation

The difference between Ra'am and the Joint List does not end with coalition support from within or from the outside; when the discussion turns to 7 October, Hamas and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the distinction becomes more consequential. These are not marginal issues in Israeli politics after the Hamas-led deadly attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza. Eisenkot has explicitly defined what potential partners will look like. Before the election, Eisenkot said that parties seeking to join his government would have to recognise Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, accept the principles of the Declaration of Independence, support universal military or national service, and recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation whose military and governing capabilities must be dismantled. He also stated that Ra’am would not be part of a government he led. For Ra'am – which is seeking ways to participate in the coalition – these conditions signal the need to formulate a clear and sharp position. However, for Arab politicians, some of these conditions are not straightforward to embrace. Questions relating to Israel's identity, military or national service, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remain politically sensitive and are interpreted differently across the Arab political spectrum.

Abbas declined to give an explicit yes-or-no answer. Instead, he said: ‘Leave me this space to be a bridge. To also influence the other side.’ He continued: ‘We are a bridge. Don’t turn us into supporters of terrorism and traitors.’ Abbas said that making an explicit declaration could endanger him and his family, describing the matter as ‘a matter of life or death’. At the same time, he stated that Ra’am was ‘against any terrorist activity and violence of any kind, against any human being’, and reiterated his support for reconciliation and peace between the two peoples. He also called for Hamas and other armed organisations to be disarmed.

These statements need to be understood with precision. Condemning the killing of civilians, opposing political violence, supporting the disarmament of Hamas and formally designating Hamas as a terrorist organisation are related but distinct positions. Abbas has taken the stance of being against violence and advocating for disarmament, but he has not chosen the official labelling as was asked of him by Eisenkot. This makes the political situation complicated for a possible alliance, but these stances cannot be equated. This shows the contradiction of Ra’am too as the party aims to keep itself a legal part of the Israeli political system and, at the same time, maintain its relations with the Palestinian community without making the declarations that may risk the party.

The Joint List has approached these questions differently. In contrast to Ra'am, which tried to keep the option of political engagement open for itself and dealt with some of the questions regarding Hamas and disarmament, Ahmad Tibi addressed the coalition terms of Eisenkot “do not apply to us, because we will not be part of the government. We want to be part of the change and the hope. We want to improve the situation of the public and our society regarding violence and crime, home demolitions, infrastructure…”, He stressed that the Joint List had been consistently advocating the political resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and that peace, rather than war, is the only sustainable path towards it.

For Eisenkot, the Joint List confirmed that it does not seek to join him, thus there is a difference between accepting responsibility as a coalition member and supporting the government as an outsider when it comes to certain questions in parliament. The case of Ra’am is different as its involvement in the Bennett–Lapid government in the past indicates that it is ready to accept responsibilities, while its current positions on Hamas and the Palestinian issue raise questions about whether it could satisfy Eisenkot’s conditions.

The Scenarios Facing Eisenkot

The practical importance of representation of the Arab parties is not limited to the issue of the appointment of the next prime minister alone. The votes cast by them can be crucial for shaping and stabilising the government, electing officials in parliament, assigning committees, passing laws and distributing the state budget. A minority government with outside backing of Ra'am and the Joint List can theoretically use the 48 seats held by Eisenkot's group along with the 19 Arab seats to form a potential basis of 67 seats. However, this will depend on the agreement over the conditions under which the Arab parties will back the government, reject the policies of the government and what sort of guarantees will be obtained by them. It will also depend on the ability of Eisenkot to overcome the opposition of his allies. For instance, Avigdor Liberman has repeatedly been against a government dependent on the support of Arab parties, leading to the ongoing political uncertainty.

Other scenarios remain on the table. Eisenkot could seek support from some ultra-Orthodox factions, although disagreements over military conscription and religious exemptions would make such an arrangement difficult. There is a chance for a broad unified government with Likud, but this would require going back on campaign promises and questions about Netanyahu's leadership would crop up. Now the test lies in the extent to which the promises made to the Israeli public by the various parties during the election campaign can be kept, and which of them can be compromised on.

As for the Arab parties, whether they are willing to partner with Eisenkot’s bloc or support from the outside, the broader question is how and in which terms and limits the Arab parties will translate their electoral strength into actual political influence on policy, legislation and government decisions.

The 19 seats won by Ra’am and the Joint List therefore represent both a historic electoral achievement and a test of Israel’s political system. For Ra’am, the challenge is whether its strategy of pragmatic participation can produce tangible results and in which terms. For the Joint List, the challenge is whether external parliamentary support can translate into policy influence without requiring it to join a government whose positions on the occupation and the war in Gaza it opposes. Within the Joint List, Hadash, Ta’al and Balad must also maintain a common political framework while managing their different approaches and priorities.

The key question for Eisenkot and his partners is their ability to go beyond the 67 recommendations including the political backing from the Arab leaders whose support has enabled Eisenkot to gain the first mandate to form a coalition. The longevity of any agreement would be based not just on numbers in parliament after the elections, but also on the ability of the parties involved to agree on meaningful commonality in respect of governance, security and public policy aspects. If not, the Arab parties may prove decisive in replacing Netanyahu, but have only limited influence over the political direction of the government that follows.

Herzog’s decision has thrown that issue into the heart of establishing a government. Arab parties have exhibited their electoral clout and capability to change the parliamentary equilibrium. Whether that influence will lead to a new political cooperation arrangement or remain restricted to an immediate struggle for government formation will depend not just on steps taken by Ra’am and the Joint List, but also on the readiness of other political parties to accept the democratic value of the voters they represent.

© RUSI, 2026.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.