FCAS: France and Germany’s Fight for a Future Fighter

FCAS was always ambitious. The Franco-German-Spanish 6th generation fighter jet programme project was set around multiple pillars. Amongst these are a New Generation Fighter (NGF – a 6th generation fighter), an associated powerplant, Remote Carriers (a type of autonomous collaborative platform) and an advanced multi-domain Command and Control system dubbed Combat Cloud.

Given this scope and technological ambition, combining expertise, production capability and budgets in a multinational programme made sense. Yet, as the project is scheduled to progress to its next phase, the French and German positions on workshare expectations and capability requirements to NGF appear to diverge to a breaking point.

NGF’s stalling shows the limited political capital in Paris and Berlin to impose a political directive on its industrial landscape. But both nations must be realistic about the way forward, as options for sovereign 6th generation fighter programmes are limited. Germany’s fiscal power is confronted by limited industrial capability to develop a next generation fighter from scratch. Meanwhile, France has the sovereign capability on developing a fighter jet yet must navigate significant financial restrictions.

Should Berlin and Paris indeed break on NGF, both sides must be certain that alternatives provide net benefits over salvaging FCAS through political direction.

From Aachen to Munich – the Long and Winding Road of FCAS’s Faltering

From its conception in 2017 and elaboration in 2019, FCAS was primarily a political project alongside a joint new main battle tank (MGCS, Main Ground Combat System). Defence budgets were limited, and Franco-German relations seemed in need of a reset. Thus, a suite of programmes that would benefit both nations’ industrial bases appeared politically opportune.

With Spain as an additional partner, the project’s first phase kicked off in 2020, setting out a series of programmatic pillars, with associated development and procurement management leads and industrial workshare. In 2022, the programme progressed to Phase 1B to cover concepting and technological development work. Progress already required an intervention from the highest political level to agree the workshare and access to each other’s existing intellectual property, in an exchange between German and French companies. But as work continued, C-suite leaders of the involved companies, Airbus and Dassault, voiced their dissatisfaction with the work of the partners on the programme, publicly.

In 2025, FCAS was scheduled to progress to a more advanced development phase. But Dassault and Airbus felt uncomfortable with progressing to Phase 2, and did not submit the required bids to do so. Working level and high-level ministerial steering boards found no solutions to this ongoing conflict in the summer or autumn of 2025, instead escalating the problem, again, to the highest political level.

A promised joint statement by Christmas 2025 failed to materialize; the Munich Security Conference brought no conclusion, and the most recent attempt in mid-April 2026 appears to have fallen short of a resolution to the dispute. Both Airbus and Dassault openly discuss alternative options for a 6th generation fighter, generating speculation on the death of the programme.

Notably, the political foundations that had previously driven FCAS have shifted. In France, Macron is politically weak and has limited influence over Dassault, which leads NGF development and is particularly outspoken on workshare demands. Meanwhile Merz is governing with an emboldened CSU, his party’s Bavarian fraction. Bavaria hosts most of Germany’s combat air industry, and the CSU is therefore well placed to lobby for that industry in the federal government. Indeed, that industry’s political importance has increased due to the ongoing struggles of the German automotive sector.

German Union statements, calling for FCAS to end, underline increasing industrial pressure to stand up to French pressures in the programme. Merz also commands a far larger defence budget than previous German governments, emboldening industry and the government to take risks and attempt to replicate some of the industrial capability thus far delivered by Dassault within FCAS.

Meanwhile, MGCS has also faced changing dynamics. Success and failure in FCAS can only be understood when seen in combination with the land programme. While MGCS had been perceived as a necessity to preserve the German land domain industry, this industry is experiencing its strongest growth in decades. Whereas German politicians have previously seen compromise on FCAS to progress MGCS, this is no longer needed to keep German heavy armour expertise alive.

Given this growing confidence in Germany, what may a suitable alternative look like?

Going it Alone?

For now, a soft exit is proposed by various actors. By going separate ways on NGF but maintaining cohesion on FCAS’ remaining architecture, the political costs of a divorce are, allegedly, reduced. However, a split on NGF will likely result in further segregation. It is questionable whether divergence on NGF will ultimately permit joint development of a powerplant. Furthermore, maintaining NGF associated effort on uncrewed systems, avionics and software pillars appears unlikely in detail. Notably, a level of collaborative interoperability and systems sharing via open-systems architecture should be endeavoured.

It seems unlikely that France or Germany can carry out 6th programmes within their current sovereign capabilities. France’s industrial base retains a sovereign development capability on the fighter airframe and engine. But the step change from 4th to 6th generation technology will still pose significant challenges and risks. France has navigated these challenges in the past through bilateral arrangements on technology sharing for sub-systems and components without having to onboard an equal partner. France’s main issue, arguably, is its fiscal situation which significantly constrains its ability to project long-term funding and accept risks.

Meanwhile, Germany has increased defence spending significantly. Larger budgets and disillusionment with FCAS may support German ambition for a sovereign national programme. In November 2025, Germany revealed the Combat Fighter System Nucleus (CFSN). Though details are sparse, it is understood that German industry coordinates via CFSN to maintain a national work structure for a post-FCAS scenario.

Expanding this work into a full-fledged national programme bears significant risks despite bourgeoning confidence among Germany’s defence primes. Financially, Germany’s current defence budget lasts approximately the duration of the current government’s legislature. The development and procurement cycle of a 6th generation programme will be much longer. For now, Germany has not been able to finance its defence spending from reliable income sources but debt, calling into question the level of funding available to the Luftwaffe beyond the next five to ten years.

Furthermore, Germany’s industrial base lacks the experience and expertise to support a sovereign combat air capability on its own, having never developed and procured a national fighter jet and associated engine outside of multinational initiatives since 1945. Even Spain’s likely inclusion in a German programme would not offset this critical issue.

Should the German government be unwilling to force industry into costly compromises with the French, lack of clarity on long-term financing and industrial limitations mean it must pursue another multinational programme. While a new partnership would be subject to lengthy negotiations and agreements over workshare, capability and timelines should be timed to coincide with phasing out work on FCAS.

German Options for Future Collaboration

Germany appears to be aware of this and there is speculation whether discussions are already held with a variety of potential alternative partners, including participation in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) or a partnership with Sweden.

GCAP is managed by the UK, Italy and Japan. In recent months, German-Italian relations publicly warmed and German participation was taken into consideration in some quarters. Germany, Italy and the UK are no strangers to the tumultuous nature of collaborative work, given shared history on Panavia Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon. A direct financial injection could be a welcome addition, given current challenges in GCAP funding. .

This would not come for free, as German’s defence industry is unlikely to accept anything less than an equal share and significant agency over technical requirements – and if so it must then reach much further into the existing GCAP arrangement than other potential candidates. Breaking open existing agreements for re-negotiation would threaten the programme – at a time when concerns regarding present work pace and national priorities on GCAP are being voiced.

In this scenario, industrial capabilities in GCAP nations would be at risk. It may preclude the further onboarding of Saudi Arabia, if Germany’s traditional hesitancy over exports to the region is maintained. Under what conditions Germany would want to trade one capability and workshare battleground for another, and under what conditions GCAP members might accept Germany, remains unanswered. In theory, multinational cooperation with the UK, Italy and Japan promises significant burden-sharing, but pooling of expertise, production capacity and cooperation could risk postponing – if not derailing – Europe’s only remaining 6th generation programme.

Ongoing work on Eurofighter EK could be the springboard for further collaboration with Sweden. Swedish manufacturer Saab is open to collaboration on a future fighter jet – though this does not necessarily mean a joint programme with Germany. Yet, interfacing on a 6th Generation platform vastly exceeds the current scope of German-Swedish collaboration. Given the fallout with France, German industry may turn particularly hawkish in establishing a major workshare to prevent a repeated deadlock. Sweden will be understandably protective of its own design and construction capabilities. A potential complication to this collaborative work is that neither country has a direct answer on developing a new powerplant. Within NATO, this expertise is found primarily in the US, UK and in France.

Equally, friction could stem from culture. Sweden’s design philosophy and integrated approach fuses industry, the armed forces and the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV). In contrast, the German approach has traditionally been procedural and compartmentalised. A culture clash is not an insurmountable obstacle but far from insignificant when establishing certainty on and across the development of a 6th generation platform.

In addition, Germany’s operational requirements traditionally differ from Sweden’s. Given publicly available concepts, respective 6th generation designs contrast and may not align on useful loads, performance and power output requirements. Sweden’s historic preference for a compact platform used from a dispersed posture could clash with Germany’s centralised approach that relies on Main Operating Bases. Convergence and disagreements on a fighter platform, uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), avionics, software and interoperability must be navigated to prevent later friction. This does not prevent the establishment of a common framework but demonstrates capability differences that must be addressed in detail which will take time and trust-building between both parties.

Conclusion

Any joined armament programme requires hard compromises for the involved parties. Berlin and Paris appear to have run out of road on FCAS, highlighting the danger of launching defence-industrial programmes primarily on political grounds. Amidst compounding frustration, Berlin and Paris must weigh the risks of a formal schism without first establishing a concrete and viable alternative that will yield future capability and offers fewer, or less hurtful compromises than what is already on the table.

© RUSI, 2026.

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