Congo's Fragile Truce? Foreign Interference and Conflict Minerals in the DRC

The DRC has been persistently plagued by poverty, weak governance, and conflict. Contemporary misfortunes can be traced to brutal colonial exploitation by King Leopold II of Belgium, as well as the corrupt regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and subsequent Congo wars.

Since gaining independence in 1960, the country has continuously endured foreign interference, internal division, and leadership failures. Incumbent President Félix Tshisekedi inherited a state marred by corruption, authoritarianism, and entrenched clientelism, but has been subsequently accused of similar transgressions since his controversial re-election in 2023.

The March 23 Movement (M23) was first established in 2012 after a group of Congolese military officers – all ethnic Tutsis and former rebel combatants – defected from the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the national army, over disagreements over a peace agreement.

Though defeated in 2013, the M23 re-emerged in 2021 with renewed force, ambition and external support, with their rapid expansion in recent months credited to extensive Rwandan military support. The current resurgence marks a grim return to conflict for eastern DRC. More than 7,000 people have been killed 1.2 million displaced, and sexual violence and summary executions, including of children, have been reported.

The conflict in eastern DRC has implications worldwide, as the area’s mineral wealth includes vast reserves of cobalt, coltan, lithium, tin and gold – all critical to global supply chains for smartphones, electric vehicle batteries and green technologies.

M23 and DRC announced a temporary ceasefire during talks in Qatar in late April, bringing hope for an end to the violence. However, numerous prior failed attempts point to a complex situation, with the M23 movement itself the product of a failed peace deal.

Local, National and Regional Incentives, Historically Rooted

Ideologically, M23 has characterised itself as championing the popular grievances of the much persecuted Banyamulenge community, ethnic Tutsis with historic roots in eastern DRC, such as land ownership and other injustices. In its current formation, M23 has aligned with the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a political movement led by former electoral commission chief Corneille Nangaa, signalling that the group has graduated to a national agenda, which calls for the downfall of Tshisekedi.

Other narratives suggest M23 lack any substantive political mandate, but use their positioning as the 'guardian' of ethnic Tutsis as a convenient cloak of legitimacy for advancing the geopolitical and economic ambitions of neighbouring Rwanda. In 2014, Banyamulenge Chief Zachée Muhamiriza echoed this, commenting, 'some people in Rwanda would like to use the Banyamulenge community like a ladder to come and intervene in Congo.'

Certainly, Kigali's role in providing military support to the insurgency is increasingly evident. Approximately 4,000 Rwandan soldiers are reportedly fighting alongside rebels, and Rwandan technology has enabled the grounding of Congolese air assets, contributing to M23's military dominance.

Rwanda is not the only regional actor implicated in the conflict – Uganda and Burundi have also faced allegations of political and military interference – but Kigali’s significance is reflected in the pivotal role played by Rwandan President Paul Kagame in the current peace talks. Meetings between M23 and DRC officials reportedly only got underway after Qatar brokered a surprise sit-down between Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame.

The tendency of commentators to simplify the characterisation of M23 as either a localised movement or the proxy of a predatory neighbour can be counterproductive. For a sustainable peace deal, mediators will need to address the root causes of conflict, including the ever-present 'resource curse', in other words the paradoxical relationship between immense natural wealth and persistent issues with poverty, governance and conflict.

Resources Worth Dying For?

M23 now controls several strategic economic hubs and trade routes in Nord- and Sud-Kivu, where much of DRC's mineral deposits are found. The rebels have installed illicit taxation regimes to support military actions and civic administration requirements, such as after their seizure of the mining town Rubaya. The group reportedly earns nearly $1 million monthly from taxing mineral activities, demonstrating links between global supply chains and local conflict dynamics. M23 has also expanded revenue collection by taxing flows of other valuable resources, including charcoal and timber, from Virunga National Park in Nord-Kivu.

Framing M23’s rent-seeking as driven by acquisitive organised crime risks over-simplifying the deep-rooted complexities of conflict dynamics and weak governance in the region. Illicit taxation is the norm in eastern DRC, whether controlled by licit or illicit actors, and motivations for M23 may encompass fundraising for political, as well as military, ambitions, given the fiscal realities of governing an area long-neglected by Kinshasa.

Economic self-interest in capturing the export market for Congolese minerals certainly appears central to Rwanda’s motives. Gold was Rwanda’s number one export before the current insurgency, with most thought to be illicitly sourced from the DRC. At least 120 tonnes of coltan are reportedly smuggled monthly from Rubaya to Rwanda, and laundered into legitimate supply chains, resulting in tax revenues flowing to Rwandan, not DRC, coffers. In the new deals-based world order, experts suggest the M23 insurgency may be the opening salvo in a new regional scramble for Africa’s resources.

Conflicts of Interest, Conflict Minerals

Amidst seismic geopolitical shifts, increasing evidence suggests transition minerals will help define global diplomacy and trade relations. The Chinese dominance of this sector in DRC is leaving other geopolitical powers scrambling for leverage as they respond to the conflict, many of whom have stricter regulatory standards and ethical norms which aim to keep mineral supply chains free from conflict risk.

The US is recalibrating its relationship with the DRC, lured by possibilities of direct access to transition minerals, with a US-DRC minerals-for-security deal and other proposals around infrastructure and traceability mooted. In February, sanctions were announced on James Kabarebe, the Rwandan government liaison to M23, and the US is playing an increasingly heavyweight role in peace negotiations.

The EU has also imposed sanctions on M23 leaders, Rwandan military commanders, and other Rwandan entities, like the Gasabo Gold Refinery, accused of laundering minerals looted from Congolese soil. While this marks a significant shift, it coexists awkwardly with ongoing EU-DRC and EU-Rwanda mineral trade agreements, resulting in calls to suspend the latter.

The UK’s response included boycotting Rwandan events, limiting trade, pausing non-poverty related assistance, suspending defence training and reviewing all Rwanda Defence Force export contracts.

Despite such measures, and Kigali’s denouncement of them as ‘punitive’, the international response to conflict in the DRC has been characterised for so long as indifferent that there are fears this vacuum could be exploited by Russia, likely through Wagner, Africa Corps or affiliated entities.

Whilst the US, UK and EU responses provide potential counterweights to other geopolitical influences in the region, and EU-headquartered companies with contaminated supply chains are already facing reputational exposure, local civil society has warned that without universally robust enforcement of sanctions and traceability mechanisms, global asymmetries in practice will mean that DRC’s minerals will continue to fuel violence.

Multilateral Failures and Diplomatic (Mis)Adventure

Diplomatic responses to the conflict have long been criticised for indifference and hypocrisy, with Rwanda leveraging its status as the ‘darling’ of Western development, despite evidence of human rights abuses, extraterritorial political assassinations, and now military aggression in eastern DRC.

The planned withdrawal of the UN’s Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) despite a recently announced extension amid deteriorating security, leaves a dangerous vacuum. This reflects a broader pattern of multilateral disengagement, with the East African Community Regional Force – discredited by accusations of collusion with M23 – exiting in late 2023, and the Southern African Development Community Mission force also recently announcing its withdrawal.

Diplomatic mediation has fared no better, with African-led attempts at finding lasting solutions to DRC insecurity also stumbling, including the Luanda roadmap and Nairobi process.

Qatar has since stepped into the void, building on their strategic relationship with Rwanda. The countries enjoy increasing ties across various sectors including defence, finance, aviation and logistics. Notably, Qatar Airways owns 49% of the Rwandan flag-carrier and a 60% stake in a new airport south of Kigali, being touted as the new regional cargo hub for Central Africa.

When viewed alongside Qatar’s agreements with DRC to construct flagship airports in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, the incentives for protecting its long-term investment are clear, as well as the political influence required to galvanise cooperation between Kagame and Tshisekedi. The bilateral trade and investment opportunities driving US peace-making efforts also reflect a belief that peace could also be lucrative for American interests. In this way, commodity flows out of eastern DRC have the power to shape peace just as much as they drive conflict.

The DRC has long been a global stage for regional and international self-interest. While regional and global actors publicly advocate for peace, external interests in Congolese minerals often run counter to stability, creating the complex and fragile circumstances the region finds itself in today. The guns may be temporarily silenced but the task for forging peace in eastern DRC has never been greater: a better understanding is required of the complex political and economic dynamics involved, with all potential levers explored to assuage the layers of grievance and forgotten tragedy.

© RUSI, 2025.

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