Can Pakistan Play a Role in Regime Change in Afghanistan?

Following Pakistan's strike on Kabul on 9 October 2025 and Afghanistan’s launch of coordinated retaliatory attacks on Pakistani border security posts across the Durand line, there followed a direct war on 11-12 October between the two countries.

At the time of writing, Afghanistan and Pakistan have halted bilateral trade and transit operations for more than two months. Even with the mediation of Qatar and Turkey, as well as a recent mediation hosted by Saudi Arabia, the two countries are not on a path to rapprochement, evidenced by a surge in attacks by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Pakistan. According to The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), TTP have carried out over 630 attacks in Pakistan from January 2021 to September 2025.

Islamabad demands security guarantees from Kabul to prevent TTP attacks inside Pakistan, while the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) claims this is a matter of Pakistan’s internal affairs. Qatar and Turkey's mediation has secured a fragile ceasefire, but a discussion is circulating on media platforms that Pakistan is considering pursuing a regime change policy in Afghanistan. Pakistan and political opponents of the Taliban have made regular secret contacts, notably between Pakistan and the National Resistance Front (NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the previous Jihadi commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, a veteran of conflict with the Taliban’s first regime.

The TTP's military campaign, carried out amid strained Pakistani-Afghan relations, continues to strike against Pakistani security forces. The main question arising is whether Pakistan, on its own, has the leverage to change the current Afghan Taliban regime? Answering this question can be examined within the context of a historical review of political dynamics in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the evolving regional geopolitical realities on the ground.

The Historical Dominant Nature of Pakistan's Afghan Policy

Pakistan supported the US strategy to counter the USSR in Afghanistan, and, most importantly, influenced the US’s supporting role toward Afghan Mujahideen factions. The USSR’s involvement in Afghanistan allowed Pakistan, in substance, to become a destabilising actor in Afghanistan. After the USSR withdrawal, and again after the US disengagement from Afghanistan, Pakistan attempted to dominate Afghanistan’s fate through Afghan Mujahideen factions.

Pakistan sabotaged the ‘national reconciliation’ process, initiated by USSR-backed ex-president Dr Najibullah Ahmadzai’s government in 1987 until his government collapsed in 1992, through pro-Pakistan Afghan Mujahideen factions in Afghanistan. Pakistan provided them with military aid and regular training for the Mujahideen fighters across the tribal areas of the Durand line. After the pro-Moscow government fell into the hands of Mujahideen factions, they were forced to wage a civil war in Kabul, ultimately leading to the destruction of Kabul’s city private and public infrastructure, properties, and the loss of many innocent lives, rather than forming an inclusive government.

In the aftermath of the rise of the Taliban in 1996, and Pakistan's support to the Taliban in the fight against the Northern Alliance, Pakistan saw its core strategic policy objectives in Afghanistan asserted. In particular, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) acted as a ‘destroyer’, in closed-door settings, influencing Afghanistan's future through the 1990s.

Post 9/11, Pakistan attracted US attention again, becoming an essential regional non-NATO ally of the US war in Afghanistan. Pakistan played a double-standard game against the US, its allies, and the Western-backed Afghan government in the War on Terror. During the following two decades, Afghan presidents Hamid Karzai and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani often criticised Pakistan’s intention and goodwill toward ensuring permanent peace and stability in Afghanistan. Even the US President Donald Trump, in his first term, frankly criticised Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terror, calling Pakistan ‘a liar and deceitful’ when receiving billions of dollars in foreign aid from the US. India was instead considered the key component in Trump’s South Asia strategy for peace and security in the region, which included giving India a larger economic role in Afghanistan.

Still, Pakistan facilitated talks between the Afghan Taliban and the US, hosted by Qatar in Doha in 2018. However, over two decades, and despite frequent demands by the Western-backed Afghan government, Pakistan never pushed to facilitate an inter-Afghan peace process between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government.

Surprisingly, the fall of the US-backed Afghan government in 2021 was widely celebrated among political, religious and military circles in Islamabad. Pakistan's then-PM Imran Khan described the Taliban’s victory as Afghans breaking the ‘shackles of slavery.’ This celebration had several driving motivations. Firstly, Pakistan could now destroy the Afghan National Army (ANA), trained and equipped by US-NATO forces, and the modern government system, through the Taliban. Secondly, Pakistan interpreted the Taliban’s victory as a victory for Pakistan, evicting India from its influential role in Afghanistan. Thirdly, Pakistan viewed the political change in Kabul as a strategic achievement, guiding the future of Afghanistan directly.

In summary, Pakistan – in contradiction to the notion of Afghan strategic autonomy – remains an interventionist state, seeking to influence Afghanistan’s internal affairs to ensure its strategic interests in Afghanistan and the region.

Pakistan's Unchanged Afghan Policy and the Shifting Regional Approach

Pakistan is historically known as an ‘interventionist actor’ in Afghanistan’s tragedy. Anti-Pakistan sentiment has grown among the Afghan masses in the past two decades, while its Afghan policy remains unchanged. From this basis, as a state, there is little chance for Pakistan to unilaterally and independently initiate regime change in Afghanistan.

More importantly, the current ground realities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region differ from those of the 1990s era. In Afghanistan, former warlord factions, which could serve as proxies, are not able to fight due to a lack of domestic public support and the absence of external political, military, and financial backing. Their war tactics and strategy are not comparable to those of the Taliban, which is characterised by a unified, cohesive ideological and military approach. Additionally, among Afghans, there is strong political opposition to the Taliban regime’s policies. Still, much of the Afghan nation and political elites condemned in the strongest terms Pakistan's recent attacks on Afghanistan.

Moreover, Pashtun political leaders – such as former President Hamid Karzai, forcibly-ousted President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and other renowned political figures and groups – are not interested in toppling the Taliban regime through military means. Even the former Mujahideen faction leaders, such as Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who once played a strong role in the 1990s civil war against the Northern Alliance in Kabul to secure political power, are now frequently prioritising national dialogue over a military approach.

Other non-Pashtun leaders – who were key actors of the civil war of the 1990s, held the greatest share of power in the US-backed Afghan republic government in the last two decades, and who also insist on national dialogue – are not in a position to fight against the Taliban regime. Together, these demonstrate that Afghans are in favour of a peaceful solution to the country's political conflict.

In Pakistan, the internal landscape remains bleak. Pakistan's civil and military institutions are struggling with fragile political, dire economic, and worsening security situations. These may block Pakistan’s powerful authorities, such as the army and ISI, from interfering in Afghanistan’s political affairs. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan's relations are poorly affected by the Pahalgam attack, and the three-day war fought in May 2025 resulted in a marked decline in relations between India and Pakistan. In this context, Pakistan may wish to avoid being encircled in animosity from both its Northern and Southern neighbours, and instead focus on addressing the rising TTP and Baloch separatist groups' military resistance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan states of Pakistan.

The geopolitical interests of neighbouring and regional countries have shifted significantly since the 1990s era, notably in relation to Afghanistan. Russia, India, Iran and Tajikistan, who were foes of the Taliban during their first term and supported the Northern Alliance against them, are now becoming more amicable to the IEA through diplomatic engagement. They are viewed as engaging with the IEA through diplomatic and economic cooperation, rather than employing isolation, or infiltrating Afghanistan through proxy or military interference.

The comprehensive regional consensus insists on ensuring a stable and peaceful Afghanistan – benefitting Pakistan, whose soil does not become a safe haven for terror groups to launch threatening attacks against it. Regime change in Afghanistan appears to be in no one's interest. Destabilising Afghanistan adds risk to the regional security setting, with potential global repercussions, including consequences for Pakistan’s close ally, China, which would face threats to its Belt and Road Initiative projects in the region.

Pakistan should recognise the changing regional and global geopolitical shifts, driven by economic integration through cooperation in trade, energy, investment, technology and multilateral initiatives. Pakistan, therefore, must align its Afghan policy with the desires of the Afghan people and the international community to help restore Afghanistan's economy and security through economic cooperation and mutual support, rather than being perceived as undermining global peace and security.

© Masom Jan Masomy, 2026, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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