Operational Continuity in a Contested Energy Transition

The roundtable was part of the Energy and Security Programme and the Open Climate Programme, with an emphasis on strengthening European policy and institutional engagement at the intersection of energy systems and defence resilience. 

The roundtable discussion brought together representatives from EU institutions, NATO, defence and energy industries and experts from universities and think tanks. The discussions were off the record and unattributable. 

Participants emphasised that threats under hybrid and war scenarios increasingly impact entire energy systems rather than individual assets. Disruptions may combine kinetic attacks, supply chain interference or cyberattacks, creating cascading effects across entire energy networks, fuel logistics and industrial activities. This acts as a threat multiplier, making it hard to identify causes and respond effectively, especially when multiple weaknesses are attacked simultaneously or repeatedly. 

Another issue identified by participants was energy supply as a basic dependency for both civilian functioning and military interoperability. Electricity and fuel form the backbone of defence industrial output, logistics and combat readiness. However, military systems remain heavily reliant on vulnerable civilian infrastructure, creating strategic dependencies that adversaries can exploit. This interconnection raises questions about whether defence-related assets and energy infrastructure should be more explicitly recognised within the EU's critical infrastructure frameworks. 

Experts noted that energy system resilience is less about preventing attacks than about maintaining functionality amid disruption. This places great emphasis on recovery capacity, including spare equipment, possible standardisation and trained personnel, as demonstrated by Ukraine's example of rapidly restoring damaged infrastructure under sustained attack.

The discussion highlighted that Europe's current energy system is poorly configured for today's risk environment. It was engineered primarily for efficiency rather than resilience against prolonged, multiple attacks. It lacks hardened substations, underwater cables, fuel stockpiles and fast-response capacity. Industrial bottlenecks exacerbate this by blocking rapid repairs and reserve buildup, leaving systemic weak spots for adversaries to target strategically. 

In addition, the lack of manpower was emphasised, with the Ukrainian example illustrating a shortage of engineers willing to repair energy infrastructure under attack. 

A recurring theme was the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities across institutions, regulations and sectors. Energy infrastructure development, defence planning and regulatory frameworks continue to operate under different risk assumptions and timelines. Questions remain around the definition of critical infrastructure and resilience, alongside the allocation of responsibilities between civilian and defence authorities, private businesses and operators.