Key Takeaways from the Europe Energy Security and Dual-Use Roundtable

The roundtable was part of the Energy and Security Programme. It brought together representatives from NATO, EU institutions, defence and energy industries, and think-tank and academic experts. The discussions were off the record and unattributable.

The discussion pointed to a single overarching conclusion: Europe's challenge is no longer defining dual use in abstract terms but operationalising it. Participants repeatedly returned to the same issue: almost any infrastructure, technology or material can be considered dual use. The concept is so broad that it risks becoming meaningless for policymakers. Instead, what matters is determining under what conditions an asset supports military requirements, who decides that transition, and how industry is expected to respond.

Participants noted that not all dual-use infrastructure functions in the same way. The discussion distinguished between assets whose operational priority changes during crises and those that retain their civilian function while simultaneously providing defence capabilities.

The Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) was highlighted as an example of the first category. During peacetime, the network primarily supplies civilian aviation fuel, but in times of crisis or conflict its operational priority shifts towards supporting NATO military operations. The infrastructure itself does not change, but its primary user and operational purpose do.

Offshore wind farms (OWFs), by contrast, were identified as a fundamentally different category of dual-use infrastructure. Their primary function remains renewable power generation in support of the energy transition. Their defence value derives from their ability to simultaneously host additional capabilities, including radar, communications systems, sensors and maritime domain awareness technologies, while continuing to generate electricity. Rather than changing their purpose during crises, OWFs become multifunctional platforms that support both civilian and military objectives.

Participants noted that this distinction raises important governance questions. While some offshore wind projects are already owned or partially operated by armed forces or defence organisations, most remain commercially owned civilian infrastructure. As offshore wind deployment expands across Europe, clearer governance frameworks will be needed to determine ownership models, access to infrastructure and operational data, responsibility for protection, and the conditions under which these assets can support defence and resilience objectives without compromising their primary energy function.

In general, participants stated that the concept of dual use should not be defined solely based on technology. Instead, definitions should reflect operational function, ownership, management procedures, and crisis scenarios. A distinction was also made between national and international infrastructure, as well as between facilities located on military bases and those outside them, since each raises different issues regarding funding, command and control responsibilities, and the setting of operational priorities.

Critical raw materials (CRM) formed another major pillar of the discussion. Participants identified CRMs as one of the clearest intersections between the energy transition and defence. Participants agreed that graphite, lithium, rare earth elements (REEs) and permanent magnets represent the clearest overlap between energy transition and defence industrial mobilisation. While defence demand remains relatively small compared to electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy, military requirements are strategically essential. This creates a structural market failure: commercial investment naturally follows the much larger civilian market unless governments intervene through subsidies, offtake guarantees or industrial policy.

In this context, participants discussed the roles of NATO and the EU. NATO sets military capability requirements through the defence planning process, while the EU, through the Multiannual Financial Framework and other financial instruments, provides many of the funding mechanisms needed to support industry. However, participants noted that these processes are often incompatible because they operate on different timelines and under different funding rules. Better coordination between NATO planning and EU funding was considered a critical factor in translating strategic priorities into tangible industrial capabilities.