Is the Flotilla the Spark to the Third Intifada?

By Katherine Opoka for RUSI.org

'Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.'  - Moshe Dayan

Israel's controversial actions against aid convoys to Gaza have resulted in protests and international condemnation with even their staunchest ally, the United States, claiming the blockade on Gaza is 'unsustainable and must be changed'. With tensions escalating within the international community, the Occupied Territories and even Israel, questions arise as to the implications the flotilla attack will have on the future of Middle East politics: will hindsight reveal the spark of the Third Intifada was in fact 30 May 2010? It was in such a manner that on 8 December 1987 a car accident triggered the First Intifada. Similarly, the controversial visit of right-wing leader Ariel Sharon on 28 September 2000 sparked the Second or Al-Aqsa Intifada. Both incidents triggered a much longer string of events; they represented a single spark that impacted a region seeped in a tradition of bloody conflict.

Shorty after Israeli commandos boarded the Mavi Marmara, Hamas began firing Qassam rockets from Gaza. Of the four rockets fired, only three landed in the Western Negev region near Sderot and Ashkelon area and there were no damages or injuries reported. In response to the rocket attack, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched an operation targeting a rocket launching crew in northern Gaza.  Three militants were killed, and the event has already triggered Palestinian outrage over excessive force by the IAF. On 7 June, the Israeli navy attacked a small boat carrying six members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, a militant group with ties to Fatah, killing four. The Israelis claim the men on board the boat were terrorists attempting to launch an attack within Israel. On the same day, Israeli-Arabs took part in mass demonstrations across the country. Angry Palestinians hurled rocks at police forces positioned near the Old City gates in Jerusalem, and in the northern town of Umm al-Fahm protestors were arrested as demonstrations turned violent. The sudden acceleration of tensions present in all three incidents is reminiscent of the early days of the First and Al-Aqsa Intifadas.  As such, fears of a third uprising weigh heavy in the minds of Israeli leaders, as the chance of a significantly more costly and militarised conflict seems inevitable. 

 Why Attack Flotilla: Failure of Israel's Defence Policy

Prior to the controversial attacks on the flotilla, the Israeli government had repeatedly warned that any attempt to breach the blockade would be overpowered.  The unwillingness of the Israelis to accede to international pressure reflects sixty years of an Israeli National Security Concept based upon a policy of deterrence. The Ben-Gurion era defence policy has been called into question in the past (through the Meridor Commission, the Winograd reports and the Lipkin-Shahak Committee report), however Israel has remained reluctant to further develop and revise existing policies. Such actions could create limitations in future conflicts or provide a standard for the media or international community to judge them. It is this unwillingness to reassess their defence policy that will continue to threaten Israel's national security if they continue to launch pre-emptive strikes. 

Recent events in Lebanon in 2000 and 2006 and the First and Al-Aqsa Intifadas exposed a crisis in Israel's National Security Concept, threatening to render the political and military policies designed to guarantee security irrelevant.  For example, in 2006, while the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched the ground invasion and the IAF conducted a devastating aerial bombardment, Hizbollah stood firm - continuing to progressively erode Israel's deterrence credibility. Iran also refused to allow Israel to intimidate them, instead progressing with their nuclear programme in an attempt to end Israel's regional (yet undeclared) monopoly on nuclear weapons.  Whilst the failures in Lebanon resulted in domestic tensions, especially in the Occupied Territories, the nuclear ambitions of Tehran presented Israel with tough decisions due to the international dilemmas a possible attack on Iran could cause.  However, Israel remains committed to deterring Iran's rising stature, evidentiary in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent statement that, 'Israel expects the international community to act swiftly and decisively to thwart this danger. But we will always reserve the right to self-defense.'  Netanyahu's rhetoric continues to hint at the possibility of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran if the international community fails to curb the growing threat.

 International Isolationism

On 4 June 2010, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbollah, called for the formation of a 'Freedom Flotilla II' to break the siege of Gaza.  He stated, 'There is a real opportunity today to achieve what the Freedom Flotilla aimed to do... and that is to break the siege on our brothers and sisters in Gaza....' Following Nasrallah's announcement, Iran pledged to send a Revolutionary Guard naval unit to escort humanitarian aid convoys seeking to breach the Israeli blockade of Gaza.  The possibility of a second multinational flotilla supported by Hizbollah and Iran requires a careful review of Israel's failing defence policies. By committing themselves to preventing ships from breaking the blockade, Israel now suffers the dilemma of backing down and losing face in the international system, or continuing to respond aggressively towards the second flotilla, leading inevitably to conflict.

While international tensions over Israeli force posture rise, what began as a spark of the Third Intifada has grown exponentially and could become a regional or international conflict.  The greatest concern facing Israel is their rapidly deteriorating relations with Turkey.  The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to publically condemn Israel's actions of 30 May, increasing support for Turkey in the Arab world as Erdogan calls the Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara 'murder by a state'.  Turkey is also spearheading the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution denouncing Israel's actions.  Yet, despite possible UN condemnation, the Israeli Government remains committed to defending military action taken onboard the Mavi Marmara and the Rachel Corrie, claiming they have the right to intercept all Gaza bound ships under international law.  In their attempt to establish a positive counter-narrative of the Israeli response to the 'armada of hate', the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has declared the Turkish draft resolution circulated on 1 June at the UNSC to be unjust.  According to the MFA, under maritime law, when a maritime blockade is in effect, no boats can enter the blockaded area.  The MFA adds that any vessel attempting to violate the maritime blockade may be captured or even attacked under international law.

Additionally, Israel has launched a public relations campaign to label the flotilla as a threat to their national security. As Netanyahu stated, 'This was not a love boat.  This was a hate boat.  These weren't pacifists.  These weren't peace activists.  These were violent supporters of terrorism.'   Yet, in the eyes of the international community, Israel has become a pariah; enforcing a hostile blockade on Gaza and relying on an outdated policy of defense, which fails to acknowledge the changing reality of current conflicts. The pre-emptive nature of Israeli force could cost Israel dearly, for despite the questionable legitimacy of its actions, Israel needs to maintain political relations with all states involved. At this stage, losing US and Turkish support would be extremely detrimental to Israeli interests.  This is particularly the case if Israel wishes to pursue UNSC sanctions against Iran's nuclear programme as they will need to improve their ties with Turkey, currently a non-permanent member of the UNSC.

 A Third Uprising

The potential for an international crisis stemming from recent Israeli action exists, yet a Third Intifada or a crisis between Lebanon, Iran and Israel is not wholly unexpected.  There have been numerous indications that the Arab-Israeli conflict is far from over, as tensions continue to simmer in the West Bank, Gaza and the southern Lebanese border.  While Israel clings to outdated policies focusing on military solutions to political problems, the probability of conflict has always been high.  However, time will tell if the flotilla becomes the actual trigger or spark.  It now becomes imperative for Israel to re-evaluate their force posture and recommit to a lasting and viable peace with their Arab neighbours.