



Differentiating Africa

Report of the Fifth Tswalu Dialogue, 27 April – 30 April 2006*

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The Tswalu Dialogue was established in 2002 as a premier African forum to discuss issues of concern to continental development and security.

The theme for 2006 braided together local and external concerns in identifying strategies for stability, recovery and development, and learning from past successes and failures. Many external strategies for African engagement take sweeping views of Africa, rather than the more differentiated perspectives that are demanded by the varying situations of African states. This event considered the means required to reinforce the success of those African states which have successfully pursued reforms and identifies the lessons from their recovery, examined the past record of Western policy engagement with Africa, considered some of the lessons from Asia and elsewhere within this context, and established what can be done about those African countries considered to be weak, failing or failed states. Finally, it considered strategies for successful reform.

The Dialogue focused both on *Differentiation* and *Changing Track* by recognising differences between states, on what can be done to help African states change track onto a better trajectory, and what needs to be done to avoid changing track downwards. The response, both global and regional, has generally been merely to reiterate the standard mantras of African reform which have much to offer other parts of the continent, but which are of limited if any relevance to parts of the continent in which the basic conditions for effective statehood have not been met, and which (at least in some cases) are unlikely ever to be met. Is it not time for a hard-headed, blue-skies look at what can reasonably be expected of Africa's failed states, and at how both their own neighbours and the international community as a whole should respond to the challenge that they present? The Dialogue offered an opportunity for sharper concentration on the increasing levels of divergence in African trajectories, and the different policy responses that these now call for, both within Africa, and from the external world. Much of the policy literature continues to ignore these differences, yet we can no longer plausibly talk about 'Africa' as though it were a single lump. The Dialogue considered the following hypothesis overall: Should we not instead craft approaches geared, first, to different groups of states; and, second, to the specific circumstances of states within each group, which may vary significantly from one another.

* This report was drafted by a team comprising Dianna Games, Dr Jeffrey Herbst, Dr Terence McNamee, Dr Greg Mills, Michael Spicer and Admiral Steve Stead. Please note that the Dialogue is held according to RUSI rules: the content of the formal papers and the event itself may be cited (unless otherwise indicated), but the discussions remain strictly *non-attributable*.

The following **policy conclusions** aimed at reinforcing reform and economic development in Africa could be drawn from the 2006 Dialogue: -

Differentiation means:

- Developing sets of external engagement strategies which are cognisant of different categories in African states which can be measured best in terms of their governance and economic performance indicators.
- The need to go beyond the standard mantras of African reform – state reconstruction, democracy, sound economic management and so forth – and instead policy based on different state circumstances.
- Perceptions of African identity should not obscure – and interfere with – the need for nuanced, country-sensitive external engagement strategies (and thus perceptions of) Africa. Africans have to be willing to differentiate and, if necessary, disassociate from each other in the same way Europe has done.
- Realising, in addition, that policy options – both internal and external – will be shaped by a combination of factors, including geography and weather, natural resource base, education and skills realities and requirements, urban/rural breakdowns and the rates of urbanisation, and other factors including levels of housing provision and need.
- Identifying the specific reasons why each African country has not been on the international investor radar.

An **Enabling Environment** is a necessary if insufficient component of success, meaning the need for:

- The right conditions for economic development mean creating the right conditions for the market place, including the establishment of the rule of law (which offered predictability to investors), appropriate and improving skills' bases, and the eradication of uncompetitive (and costly) monopolies.
- The need to strengthen private sector lobbies, moving away from political connections to more regular apolitical conduits.
- Building growth coalitions between government and business built around clear national development strategies.
- A meritocratic performance- (and not privilege-) based culture and practices.
- Domestic financial regimes and markets.
- Recognising the political constraints on economic reform.

Specificity means:

- Distinguishing between what Africa can do itself and what the international community can do in partnership with Africa.
- Tailoring policy to move beyond sweeping policy fundamentals towards country and sector-sensitive policy prescriptions.
- Being aware that there are multiple paths to good governance, though only one set of indicators.
- Identifying country and sector skills gaps and needs.
- Paying civil servants properly according to their performance.
- Employing technology appropriate to individual country absorptive capacity including, for example, in customs clearance.

Alignment is required between:

- Between continental and national priorities, on the one hand, and human and financial resource allocation to achieve this on the other.
- Diaspora needs and expectations, and engagement strategies.
- National development strategies with sectors of national and regional comparative advantage in a global economic context. Countries need to identify what they can do best in a global economy and spend money to facilitate this, whether this be on infrastructure or on the soft aspects of policy including skills.

Finally, **Policy Recommendations** include:

- **Strengthen links with the diaspora**, including the creation of the special investment vehicles.
- **Create an African Efficiency Index** including the following: the time taken to move things across borders; transport costs; container turnaround time and costs; wharfage costs; the costs of opening and closing businesses; the ease of hiring and firing; visa costs and time taken; ease of issuing work permits.
- **Mobilise domestic capital** through expanding the range of financial instruments.
- **Employ technology to reduce customs and border formalities** and costs on a case-by-case basis.
- Set a **timetable and work plan to achieve a continent-wide free trade area by 2012.**

The papers presented at the Dialogue and highlights of the discussion are detailed below.

28 APRIL 2006:

Session One: The Global Picture – A Year on from the Africa Commission Presentations

Matthew Uttley pointed out that analysis of the impact of global trends on the African development agenda needs to be understood against differing conceptions of 'salience', 'impact', 'success' and 'failure'. He argued that differing perspectives have their roots in the dialectic between 'neo-liberal' and 'neo-realist' paradigms. Employing a SWOT framework he demonstrated the variables employed by 'neo-liberals' to illustrate inherent strengths and opportunities seized by the international community in the Africa development programme, and the policy critiques (weaknesses) and implementation threats identified by 'neo-realists'.

Richard Cobbold identified the reasons why the UK and other states have traditionally under-related Africa issues when analysing international security and development challenges. He cautioned against the US and UK tendency to focus on 'hard' rather than 'soft' security issues and agendas, and reviewed the potential spectrum of western military involvement. In reflecting on external influences, he identified the growing concerns emerging about China's agenda in the continent. Finally, he outlined the impact of the 'information age', the 'tyranny of real time' communications and decision-making, the media, and changing conceptions of war and conflict resolution on western thinking about its potential role in the continent. In reviewing these developments he raised a cautionary note: if the West and African states fail to address the development and security challenges then there is a risk that weak governance will provide spaces for terrorist organisations to flourish.

Jack Spence reminded delegates that levels of external interest in African development issues are inherently influenced by non-African priorities, illustrated by the UK's relative disengagement following the July 2005 London bombings and the western media's spasmodic publicity of African 'failure'. After reviewing the changed nature of external interest in light of the global war on terror, he developed thoughts on the Africa 'enabling environment' for development and the need to align indigenous culture with external initiatives. He observed that the African development agenda will inevitably result in winners and losers and that think-tanks have an important role to play in ensuring Africa's salience for Western policy-makers.

Asher Susser outlined fundamental issues and developments occurring in the Middle East, identifying three key trends. The first is the balance of power and influence as between Arab and non-Arab states in the region. Second, related to this, the trend is that Turkey, Israel and Iran have increasing salience compared to traditional hegemons (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia). The third is the growing influence of Shia Islam at the expense of traditional Sunni dominance in light of the Iraq intervention. He evaluated the implications of the developments and the potential implications for other fragile states.

Pointers

A number of delegates speculated on the possible impact of a growth in investment from non-state actors attempting to export Islamic-based education to Africa, and the potential effects. The discussion reflected on how the Gulf states might respond and potential reactions in the context of the global war on terror. Discussion broadened to cover the importance of a range of non-state actors for African political developments.

Discussion focused on the relative balance between 'tradition' and 'modernity' when considering African development agendas. The importance of acknowledging the critical role of 'tradition' was highlighted in the Somaliland and South Africa case studies, and delegates reflected on how this model might be applied elsewhere.

A number of observations were made about how China's role and influence in Africa should be interpreted. The discussion generated two perspectives. The first is that China should be viewed as a state meeting its resource requirements adopting a similar approach to other states in the developed and developing world. The second is that China's attempts at wider influence in the region may impede multilateral co-operation. This suggests the need for more detailed assessment of China's approach, the prospects for drawing China into closer multi-lateral initiatives and whether

its role in Africa should be viewed by the US/EU in zero-sum terms. The discussion broadened to address the role of other great powers in the region, notably Russia's position on resource questions.

A number of delegates questioned use of the term 'failed states' in the African context. They outlined potentially more useful concepts, including 'damaged' states (in terms of their political psychology), and advocated the need for more refined concepts and language when analysing the region.

The role and significance of United Nations' initiatives was debated. It was acknowledged that differing perspectives remain on the UN's relevance to Africa and its relative salience in relation to other multi-lateral forums. Discussion also focused on whether civil rights issues, 'good governance' and social reform programmes becoming less salient in US/European perspectives and policies towards Africa.

Middle East themes were considered relevant in terms of how lessons from Israel and Palestine might be applied to the African context. The key lesson identified from the Israel/Palestine case is that conflict resolution is unlikely to be effective in situations where external players want peace more than internal protagonists (who strive for a particular kind of peace). A second important, related issue was to recognise the constraints on external powers, including the United States, in influencing regional events – a key lesson for Africa's big states attempting to shape events both in their own regions and elsewhere in the continent.

Session Two: Differentiating Africa

Presentations

Jeffrey Herbst outlined a number of key correlates that explain African countries' ranking in per capita income over the past three decades. The overriding conclusion was that big countries (in population terms) generally perform badly (with the exception of South Africa) whilst most of the countries that have performed well are small. Small states were typically more open to markets and perhaps easier to govern because they had fewer ethnic divisions and therefore leaders had to devote fewer resources to conflict management. There was therefore not likely to be a correlation between the power hierarchy of African countries and those that were economically successful. He noted that there was particular onus on South Africa, as the continent's only successful big country, to lead by example and champion good governance strategies in other African states.

Michael Finley presented an international banker's perspective on financial and economic options for Africa. He acknowledged that Africa as a whole simply does not register on Wall Street's radar screen, and consequently what Africa expertise exists in major international banks focuses on countries with tradable debt (bonds) outstanding. A major obstacle to more interest and activity in the African market is the general absence of financial trends – the result of drifting national economies – and a trend-free market is the worst kind of market to trade in. His key recommendation for Africa to reverse this situation is to develop economies to a point enabling issuance of sovereign 'benchmark' bonds. His key short-term recommendation is to catch the wave of global private equity overhanging uninvested capital, by organising private companies and projects of primary national need. Also advocated strongly were more obvious initiatives – building transparency, civil control of society, independent electoral and justice systems, sharing risks in new ventures – which should induce much greater FDI, and repeat investment.

Clarence Tshitereke argued that the economic outlook for Africa – with South Africa in the lead – is better than it has been in many years, largely as a consequence of the increase in commodity prices. He charted the dramatic increase in Chinese involvement in Africa over the past three years – in 2005, trade with China rose to US\$40 billion. He cautioned, however, that the major risk to Africa's continued economic improvement was the global business cycle. Will there be a slump in America and China that will severely dampen commodity prices, and thus cause a sharp economic downturn? Tshitereke reiterated the essential and fundamental role of improved governance in attracting FDI and facilitating greater African engagement with the global economy.

Pointers

In the discussion that followed, the role of China in Africa figured prominently. (It was stressed, however, that often overlooked is the growing involvement of Russia, which in some sectors, notably minerals, is more active than China.) There were conflicting views on how Africa should respond to growing Chinese involvement, with some participants arguing that the focus on Chinese

demand for raw materials is misplaced; the focus instead should be on global demand. Others highlighted the pernicious aspects of China's engagement with Africa, particularly China's willingness to extend credit lines to undesirable African leaders and regimes; its neglect of repressive and authoritarian internal policies; and its undermining of improved governance initiatives and processes being promoted by, for example, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and South Africa.

The issue of African governance, especially its wide variation from country to country and the correlation between big (bad) and small (good) raised a number of key points. One point that was emphasised is the need to differentiate between economic and political governance – too often, it was argued, the distinction melds away in discussions on the subject. (China is a case of good economic governance, poor political governance.) One possible explanation for the big-small correlation was that in big states the 'national question' often remains unresolved – that is, there are strong competing and conflicting entities (usually ethnic-based) within big states which undermine the development of good governance. It was also pointed out that even the African governance success stories, like Botswana, must be put in the context of recent global mean improvements in governance. As such, failures in African governance are even more worrying considering the overall global trend.

The central question emerging from the discussion centred around what would constitute the best enabling environment for Africa. It was suggested that Africa should be 'sector-specific' in its thinking; that is, African countries must realistically assess what they can do best. In agriculture and natural resources, African countries must devise better measures of protection, whether that comes through privatisation measures, stronger regional cooperation, or other means.

Lunch-time Address: The US Defence Review

Ryan Henry of the US Department of Defense, presented a general overview of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report – the Pentagon's comprehensive quadrennial review of its defence strategy, force structure and budgetary implications. He stressed that the 2006 QDR marked a major turning point in US defence policy – a recognition of profound change in the nature of conflict in the 21st century. Three overall conceptual findings were stressed: First, the realisation that there would be 'operational uncertainty'; Second, that others would win the global war on terror, not the US, but that the US had to provide its allies with the capacity to win that fight; Third, that an effective military was not about numbers, but rather about capabilities and the effects that these can generate.

In this Henry highlighted the change in the nature of America's adversary from state to non-state actors, the need to develop new strategies to cope with the related challenges of conducting irregular warfare and addressing the root causes of terrorism involving encouraging moderate voices of Islam, and the strong emphasis on the humanitarian and non-military components which are anticipated to play a much greater role in America's mission planning and operations in the future, which currently are framed within the overall context of the global war on terror, now recast as the Long War. 'Africa' was not singled out for special consideration as a 'region' in the 2006 QDR, although it ties in significantly with a number of its key findings.

In the subsequent discussion, a number of questions were asked about the wisdom of continuing such enormous levels of defence spending – roughly half a trillion dollars a year – and whether other US initiatives, such as those related to Africa, suffer unnecessarily as a result. Also of interest was the relationship between QDR and US emphasis on nation-building; lessons which have emerged out of the complex insurgencies the US currently finds itself embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan; and how successful the US's Global Peace Operations Initiative has proved.

Session Three: Strategies for Success Presentations

Christopher Clapham assessed the performance of African states over the past 35 years, highlighting several factors which have contributed to the widening gap between the wealthiest and poorest countries. In so doing, he echoed Jeffrey Herbst's remarks about the importance of geography and population, but stressed that there were notable exceptions, like Malawi, which is resource poor and not wealthy but nevertheless comparatively stable. Africa's success stories – prominent among them South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius – have followed a similar track of pursuing political stability whilst maintaining growth coalitions. He called for the return of qualified, capable and skilled emigrants, to re-invest their knowledge. Critical to long-term African growth is

greater acceptance of the principle of peaceful leadership transition – even if a successor is handpicked. This cannot be achieved where strategies are built around single people.

Patrick Mazimhaka presented strategies adopted by the African Union (AU) to address the challenges, domestic and international faced by the continent. He argued that the AU has achieved consensus in several areas, such as Human Security, Good Governance, Shared Vision and building partnerships. Integral to the question of human security is the AU security architecture hinged on the Peace Security Council, the Early Warning Mechanism, the African Standby Force and the Council of the Wise. Equally, the African Union Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights Commission and the Human Rights Court contribute to mechanisms to ensure human security. On Governance, he noted that the AU has adopted: the Lome Convention, which forbids "unconstitutional change of government"; principles governing elections, including a charter and monitoring activities; and the African Peer Review mechanism, designed to review and compose best practices among African states, which presently involves more than 30 countries. On globalisation, he stressed that Africa has embraced a common vision on the key issues of trade debt cancellation, infrastructure development, Agriculture, and UN Reform, and underlined the need for domestic and external 'resource mobilisation' to sustain this agenda.

Barry Desker posed the question: 'What characterised successful East Asian states?' Drawing on the lessons of the past, he drew attention to incorrect early predictions – such as the expectation that South Korea and Taiwan (resource poor nations) would not succeed – against the Philippines (resource rich) which would succeed. History has shown the inaccuracy of this prediction. What factors contributed to the growth of the former two countries? Key to their success is the presence of good governance, with applicable structures designed to apply to local conditions. The existence of a formal alliance of government, business and labour created the requisite environment for economic success. He cited the example of Singapore, where attention was paid to the international rankings for performance of various sectors, for example telecommunications, and then the necessary changes to improve performance were made. Attention was drawn to the dangers of protectionism in the long term, arguing that the state should not intervene in the market place as this has a tendency to lead to corruption and cronyism. In summary this devolves to the development of best international practises and their application to local conditions.

Pointers

The discussion that followed highlighted the need to entrench private property rights for individuals and businesses, and subject any proposed nationalisation of major institutions to the most rigorous scrutiny. Also emphasised was the imperative to encourage greater return of the 'diaspora', but equally African states should not lose sight of those who are still overseas and ensure we can capitalise on their positive attitude. The AU has performed much better than the OAU, but questions were raised over whether it has set itself unrealistic expectations? With regard to the option of increasing pressure on intransigent leaders, it was noted that states do not develop from the outside and thus initiatives should be internally driven. Care should be taken not to 'push' too hard as this could have the opposite effect, and expectations beyond the capacity of the state should not be raised.

Evening Address: Journalism in Africa

In the evening talk author and journalist Michaela Wrong assessed the current state of international reporting on Africa and journalism within African states themselves. She was highly critical on a number of counts, and, even more worryingly, suggested that things are unlikely to improve. She used a number of examples to illustrate how in recent years international media interest in Africa has plummeted, partly owing to the thinning out of Western newspapers' and broadcast media presence in Africa over the past few years. This emaciation of Western journalism in Africa is illustrated by the closing of bureaus in major regional centres, like Nairobi and Lagos, and attempts to get by with a single African bureau – in South Africa – to cover the whole of Africa, which Wrong said was wholly inadequate. Drawing on her own experience as an author of books on Africa, she observes that widespread disinterest in Africa applies equally to the publishing world in Europe, America and elsewhere. She was similarly critical of media within African states, which also seem to take little notice of events beyond their borders. South Africa came in for special criticism because, unlike nearly all other African states, it has the resources to provide comprehensive coverage of events on the continent as a whole but still chooses instead to focus narrowly on domestic matters or 'Western' news stories, and rarely events 'next door'.

The discussion that followed threw up a number of challenges to this grim picture of African journalism. A number of examples were cited – from the once-weekly Africa-dedicated version of South Africa's *Business Day* to the ten-fold rise in the number of radio stations in Tanzania during the past ten years – that not only are some states' media giving prominence to regional news stories but also individual countries are beginning to develop sophisticated and dynamic domestic media environments. It was also pointed out that there has been a marked attenuation of all foreign news stories – not just African – in many countries, notably the United States. On the positive side, the internet revolution has made possible unprecedented opportunities for researchers, students and so on to access instantly the most recent output of national media in virtually all African countries, bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of this information. Lastly, it was suggested that Western media has perhaps been too reliant on their own, Western journalists to convey African news to their readerships and viewing public, and that efforts to give greater control of their African bureaus and so forth to Africans themselves ought to be undertaken.

29 APRIL 2006:

Group One: 'Promoting African Success: Strategies for Reinforcing African Reform' Presentations

PTC Skelemani focused on the need to develop both the fundamentals for success (the rule of law, transparency, prudent and conservative and long-term fiscal policies, and a professional and apolitical civil service) but adapted for the African environment. The latter aspect includes, for example, including the need to employ traditional governance figures and structures in developing governance. He said development must be done in the interests of all domestic shareholders, not just government, and long-term plans followed to their end regardless of changes of government.

Dianna Games concentrated her presentation on the impediments for developing business in Africa. The real reward should not come from donors but from the success of economic growth. Wealth creation was not about aid, but about the steady trickle of investment and innovation. Problems in developing African business include: the weakness of the private sector lobbies; the dominance of political considerations over economic logic; a focus on short-term revenue needs over longer term planning imperatives; a focus on consumptive rather than productive investment by governments; the disconnect between governments and populations distorted by donor involvement; high transaction costs; and the variance in investor rules for locals and foreigners, with the latter often gaining preference over the latter.

Geoffrey Onegi-Obel proposed a number of strategies to reinforce African reform, focusing on dealing with the four things that represented the hopes and aspirations of Africans – jobs, housing, health and education. He said poverty alleviation was not interesting to Africans because it was not about those aspirations and yet Africa's benchmarks were set around the Millennium Development Goals. In a class of non-performers, Botswana was a star performer. What Africa needs to do is raise its benchmark to put it in line with those of emerging market benchmarks, he suggested.

Juma Kapuya asked whether Africans had lost the ability to initiate ideas and plans. Outlining Tanzania's progress from independence and the reform efforts of successive presidents, he said the fact that aid still played a large role in the economy more than 40 years after independence was a cause for concern. He said it was also a concern that the majority of the population was still marginalised from economic opportunities that resulted from those reforms. The government had not, he confessed, invested sufficiently in human resource development but had realised that this is the more important resource for the nation.

Pointers

The question and answer session dwelled on what governments could do to facilitate greater private sector growth and development – but were not doing. Issues about the significant obstacles to trade, particularly intra-African trade, were raised and the importance of regional free trade as a stimulant to economic growth was emphasised. It was suggested that African governments did not necessarily need more information about what the problems were as these were well documented, but required the political will to implement solutions. Examples of how governments could significantly ease obstacles for business were raised. The suspicion and often hostility towards the private sector was identified as a problem hindering improvements to the investment climate. The distortion of market forces by aid was highlighted, as were potential strategies to harness the wealth and skills of the diaspora. Finally, the prospect of developing an African Efficiency Index, both to identify the areas of necessary policy action and to benchmark African economies as well as to provide a focus for business lobbying, was mooted.

Group Two: Dealing with Insecurity: Terrorism, Weak States, & Bad Governance Presentations

Bill Rollo drew on his extensive experience in UN and NATO operations in laying out a number of key principles that should guide international military interventions in Africa. He stressed at the outset that intervention must be regarded as a beginning, not an end; regime change cannot be seen as an end-state. Seven imperatives were identified: early effect is essential, as there is an urgent requirement to shape the population's response to the intervention force, in order to set the conditions for future success; essential services must be restored as soon as possible; security was a pre-condition, but this could not be an absolute: political and economic action must take place concurrently; law, in the shape of police, judiciary and proper detention facilities, was essential to order – soldiers were not policemen, but provided the environment in which policemen could operate; disarmament and demobilisation would not work without rehabilitation; sound intelligence and thorough planning were conditions for success but not guarantors against failure; and formal, well-resourced bodies dedicated to addressing post-intervention issues, such as the UK's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, need to be established.

Bob Houdek sought to dispel certain misconceptions about terrorism and insecurity in Africa. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Africa; it dates back to the 1970s, and there are clear links between events in the 1970s and 1980s and the infamous attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. He argued that today's terrorists do not, as is commonly believed, find it easy to reside, even temporarily, in failing or weak states because of the serious frictions their presence creates with local populations. Indeed he suggested that the US government believes that Al Qaida terrorists who are currently in Somalia seeking a safe are seriously threatened by locals hostile to their presence. Africa itself, according to Houdek, is a poor recruiting ground for Al Qa'ida (with the possible exception of a small minority of increasingly radicalised South African muslims) because of the relative lack of education and 'worldliness' of ordinary Africans. Contemporary terrorists, as illustrated by 9/11 and the 7 July London bombers, are typically drawn from the more educated segments of society.

Amama Mbabazi reflected on terrorism as a contested concept and gave an overview of Uganda's recent experience of internal terrorism – that is, Ugandans killing other Ugandans. Terrorism is of particular concern to Uganda, owing to its membership of the Organisation of Islamic States, and its two major counter-terrorist challenges: fighting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces, both responsible for horrific atrocities against Ugandans in recent years. He outlined three major terrorism issues in Africa – state sponsorship of terrorism; dependence of terrorist group on weak and poorly-governed states for sanctuary; and the international linkages which sustain terrorist movements. Addressing these issues within the Ugandan context, four measures were identified to ameliorate and eventually defeat terrorism: continue consensus-building on a single international definition of terrorism; redouble governance programmes and ensure states have the capacity to maintain control over their territory; and improve international cooperation in tackling terrorism, as exemplified by Sudan's decision to allow Ugandan forces essentially free reign in the south of Sudan to root out LRA forces, whilst simultaneously building capacity of African states to deal with the problem without recourse to international assistance in the form of the UN, whose ability to deal with the re-located LRA in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been severely limited.

Pointers

The discussion that followed focused on four key themes: the relationship between good governance and the ability to fight terrorism; contrasting definitions of terrorism; enablers for successful armed interventions and peacekeeping missions; and the increasing prominence of other forms of insecurity.

In addressing these themes, some participants used the example of the Niger Delta, where poor governance has created a vacuum in which terrorists are becoming increasingly active, and where the development of a full-blown insurgency is not inconceivable. Looking more broadly at the issue of governance, participants remarked that the critical issue was that of political leadership and failure to provide good leadership was a first order problem in Africa. Without it governance cannot be improved and consequently states will be unable to address the various forms of insecurity that afflict African societies. Insecurity, others argued, was a broad problem on the continent and largely the result of poor state capacity. In short, without a functioning state system, insecurity (and

terrorism) will continue to haunt Africa. In this context the rise in the number of democratic elections and adherence to term-limits provides grounds for optimism.

Terrorism as a contested concept was borne out by the discussion, but there was agreement that we need to move out of the definitional morass and accept that whether we are fighting terrorists, insurgents or 'freedom fighters' the response thus far has been inadequate. The participants agreed that the international community must come to grips with a fundamental question: can you negotiate with today's main global terrorist threat, Al Qa'ida? There was no consensus, but there were forceful arguments that there are grounds for engaging with specific elements of the Al Qa'ida movement if no more than to isolate them from the core component thereof. Others differed with this view, making the point that a distinction needs to be drawn between the aims and objectives of international terrorism and that of domestic terrorism such as seen in much of Africa. Whereas the latter was rooted in socio-economic and political conditions, the purpose of the former was in opposition to the core values of the Western value system and that engagement would achieve little purpose.

Despite the substantial emphasis on terrorism, questions were raised over its significance in relation to other forms of insecurity – such as water, health or economic insecurity. It was suggested that international terrorism (as apposed to domestic evidence of sub-national terrorism) is relatively unimportant compared in Africa to these other threats and those of the proliferation of small arms and the like. One related recommendation was that we should seek to build within Africa a cooperative paradigm of security.

The efficacy of the African standby force in counter-terrorist operations was considered throughout, although also highlighted was the tendency to over-concentrate on the ASF which was only one component in a much wider portfolio of possible responses to conflict management on the continent. Its activity is restricted to the 'hot war' phase and as such is in some ways of secondary importance to the need to build domestic stability and domestic capacity in Africa. The latter, it was argued, emphasised the importance of police forces, the rule of law and other components of the criminal justice system. Finally, some participants argued that conflict prevention should be where the AU placed most emphasis, but currently finds itself unable to act effectively.

Lunch Address

Nick Stern reflected on the African Commission process 12 months on and assessed its delivery. In the discussion that followed, a number of issues were raised. Aid effectiveness was improved both by lessons learnt and better standards of governance. It was uncertain whether Africa would remain a central agenda item at the next G8 summit. It was also uncertain whether a reduction in agriculture subsidies in Europe and North America would benefit the majority of Africans.

30 APRIL 2006:

Summary Session: Perspectives on Reinforcing Success and Dealing with Failure

Paula Thornhill focused her reflections on approaching African security issues from the perspective of a strategist rather than a regional expert. From the perspective of the former, as Africans wrestle with the myriad issues facing their continent, she argued it might be useful to keep the following questions in mind: In any given situation, what are the questions/issues being addresses? What are the imbedded assumptions decision-makers are bringing to these issues? What is their understanding of the strategic environment in which these issues are being addressed? What is their strategy to maximize the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses in the formulation of strategies to address these issues? What is the strategic 'frame of mind' decision-makers bring to a particular issue? And, finally, how does this strategy fit into long-term visions for Africa?

Michael Spicer addressed firstly the differentiation argument which proceedings had settled. Whilst thinking continentally on big common issues, actions had to be locally and specifically focused. Strategy for change required political will first, then a focus on what was required to release the energies of the private sector. In this regard, Barry Desker's argument on East Asia was compelling as was the Singaporean and the Botswana experience in respect of a good governance framework. The debate on aid raged on unsettled with two broad approaches ultimately focusing on more and less aid respectively. Finally, Spicer considered some measures that business could take to promote reform both directly and indirectly, including the creation of an African Efficiency Index.

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The discussion that followed the summary session underlined the urgent need to close the communications gap which persists between the business world and the political world, and identify – with much greater precision – what external actors can realistically do to encourage pro-growth constituencies within African countries. Improving the quality of leadership was singled out as one of the continent’s most pressing challenges. Also highlighted were the disastrous consequences that can result from commercial interventions in Africa if their potential trickle-down effects – especially for wider employment – are not recognised or understood beforehand. Lastly, there was a consensus on the growing value of distance learning programmes, which enable African scholars and students to exploit technology and the skills of African expatriates to develop and improve - through information exchange and teaching or via traditional collaborations – African social, business and scientific institutions

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APPENDIX

Participants

Amama Mbabazi (Hon Mr), Secretary-General NRM, Minister of Defence, Uganda
Antonio Rosario (Mr), Head: Africa, Intelligence Service, Mozambique
Asher Susser (Professor), Director: Dayan Centre, University of Tel Aviv, Israel
Barry Desker (Professor), Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore
Basildon Peta (Mr), *Independent Newspaper Group*, Zimbabwe
Bill Rollo (Major General), British Army, UK
Bob Houdek (Ambassador), US National Intelligence Council
Carlton Fulford (General), ACSS, US
Christopher Clapham (Professor), Cambridge University, UK
Clarence Tshitereke (Dr.), Director: International Relations and Trade, Presidency, SA
David Rattray (Mr), Fugitive's Drift, South Africa
David Williams (Mr), Associate Deputy Editor: *Financial Mail*, South Africa
Dianna Games (Ms), Africa@Work, South Africa
Francis Mbilizi (Mr), Chair: National Lottery, Malawi
Geoffrey Onegi-Obel (Dr), Senior Presidential Adviser, Uganda
Greg Mills (Dr), The Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa
Iqbal Jhazbay (Mr), UNISA, South Africa
Jack Spence (Professor), King's College London, UK
Jakkie Cilliers (Dr), Executive Director: Institute for Security Studies, SA
Jeffrey Herbst (Professor and Provost), Miami University, US
Jonathan Oppenheimer (Mr), De Beers Chairman's Office, South Africa
Juma Kapuya (Hon. Professor), Minister of Defence and National Service, Tanzania
Leila Jack (Ms), The Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa
Lucio de Amorim (Ambassador), Brazilian Ambassador to South Africa
Lynda Chalker (Baroness), Africa Matters, UK
Matthew Uttley (Professor), King's College, London
Michael Finley (Mr), private economic consultant, US
Michael Spicer (Mr), CEO: Business Leadership SA, South Africa
Michela Wrong (Ms), Author, UK
Nick Stern (Prof. Sir), Treasury, UK
PTC Skelemani (Hon Mr), Min. for Presidential Affairs & Public Admin., Botswana
Patrick Mazimhaka (HE Mr), Deputy Chairman, African Union
Patricia Lawrence (Ms), Head: UNISA Foundation, South Africa
Paul Moorcraft (Dr), Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London
Paula Thornhill (Brigadier-General), Pentagon, US
Philibert Magere (Colonel), Tanzania
Richard Cobbold (Admiral), Director: RUSI, UK
Ryan Henry (Hon Mr), Department of Defence, US
Steve Stead (Rear-Admiral), SANDF, South Africa
Suresh Goel (Mr), Consul-General of India in Johannesburg, India,
Terence McNamee (Dr), Director: Publications, RUSI, UK/Canada
Thabo Leshilo (Mr), Editor: *The Sowetan*, South Africa
Torben Brylle (Ambassador), Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa
Victor Bernardo (Hon Mr), Deputy Minister of Planning and Development, Mozambique
Werner Boehler (Dr), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Germany
Witney Schneidman (Dr), Sullivan Foundation, US
Yusuf Gabobe (Mr), Editor: *The Somaliland Times*, Somaliland

PROGRAMME

Thursday 27 April 2006

Arrival; settling in

17h30-18h30 Drinks

18h30-20h00 Introduction, Greg Mills; Welcome, Jonathan Oppenheimer

20h00: After-Dinner Talk: David Rattray, 'The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift: Turning Points in African History?' (Chair: Jonathan Oppenheimer)

Friday 28 April Motse

07h00-onwards Breakfast

09h00 **Session One: *The Global Picture – A Year on from the Africa Commission*** (Chair: Lynda Chalker)

This session should provide an overview of key global political, economic and security developments over the past 12 months, and how they have related to Africa.

Presenters: Matthew Uttley, Richard Cobbold, Jack Spence, Asher Susser

10h45 Tea

11h00 **Session Two: *Differentiating Africa*** (Chair: Barry Desker)

Presenters: Jeffrey Herbst, Michael Finley, Clarence Tshitereke

Questions:

This session looks at the following:

1. Is it possible to categorise African states? If so, what are the categories?
2. What are the lessons from those states which have been among a reformers/performers group?
3. What are the lessons from those countries which have not only failed to develop, but have slipped further behind?
4. What challenges does this pose for the external community as it seeks to not only defend against the export of 'bads' from Africa (terrorism, migrants/refugees, health issues), but instead to promote the 'goods' (economic growth, trade, counter-terrorism)?

13h15 Group Photo; Lunch; Talk – Ryan Henry, 'The US Quadrennial Defence Review'.

14h30 **Session Three: *Strategies for Success*** (Chair: Carlton Fulford)

Presenters: Christopher Clapham, Barry Desker, Patrick Mazimhaka

Questions:

1. What is the record of 25 years of externally driven policy prescription, initially in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes, and carrying through into the post-Cold War governance/democracy agenda? Where has it made a positive difference, where has it not, and why?
2. What are the resources – human, technical, policy, financial – that are required to engage successfully with the contemporary era of globalisation?
3. What are the lessons of those countries which have developed through industrialisation – notably in Asia – and is this likely in Africa?
4. Are there countries which have enjoyed sustained economic growth without large-scale export manufacturing and industrialisation, such as through agricultural improvements?
5. What role for aid and other external means for development?
6. What can be done to get countries to change track onto a better trajectory, and what needs to be done to avoid changing track downwards?

20h00 After-Dinner Talk (Chaired by Thabo Leshilo): Michela Wrong: 'Reflections on journalism in Africa'.

Saturday 29 April Motse

07h00-onwards Breakfast

Break-away into two groups: Session to run from 08h30-13h00 (with 10h30-11h00 tea-break)

Motse Group One: Chaired by Barry Desker (Boma)

Topic: 'Promoting African Success: Strategies for Reinforcing African Reform'

Presenters: PTC Skelemani, Geoffrey Onegi-Obel, Juma Kapuya, Dianna Games

Questions:

1. Is it possible to develop strategies to reward African performers?
2. How might such categories be devised and applied?
3. What can be done by Africa to put the conditions in place for business to prosper? Indeed, if Africa is to grow employment through growing its manufacturing and services sectors, what interventions do African states – and the international community – need to make in encouraging this process; and how might Africa compete against other emerging competitors including China, Brazil and India in this regard?
4. Is there a role for aid in growing African business?

Motse Group Two: Chaired by Jakkie Cilliers (Motse Hall)

Topic: 'Dealing with Insecurity: Terrorism, Weak States, & Bad Governance'

Presenters: Bob Houdek, William Rollo, Amama Mbabazi

Questions:

1. What are the 'insecurities' facing Africa?
2. Where do these interests intersect with those of the West?
3. What have we learnt from recent history (Iraq/Afghanistan) in trying to deal with terrorism; and in trying to remedy weak/failed states?
4. Is there a link between failed states, terrorism and governance? If so, what is it?
5. What is the division of labour between what the external world can do for Africa and what Africa must do for itself in terms of providing security?

13h30 Lunch

14h00 Keynote Lunchtime Talk: Nick Stern: '12 Months On: Reflecting on the Africa Commission'
(Chair: Lynda Chalker)

Afternoon Free/Game Drives/ Walk or Drive to Dune for Supper

20h30 Talk on Stars by Tswalu Staff

Retire to Motse for After-Dinner Drinks

Sunday 30 April Lekhaba

07h00-onwards Breakfast

08h15 Depart for Lekhaba (Chair: Nick Stern)

09h30 **Summary Session: *Perspectives on Reinforcing Success and Dealing with Failure***

Presenters: Michael Spicer, Iqbal Jhazbay, Paula Thornhill

Questions:

1. What can Africa learn from the success of other states and of its own in dealing with the opportunities posed by globalisation?
2. What can Africa learn from its failures; and the West of its failure to deal with African collapse and stagnation?
3. What role is there for international partnership in resolving security concerns of governance, terrorism and state-failure?
4. What role is there for business in improving African economic performance and socio-economic stability?

11h00 Conclusion

11h30 Brunch at Waterhole

13h00/14h00 Depart