Chancellor of the Exchequer Rt Hon Gordon Brown delivered a speech at RUSI concerning key policy perspectives UK national security.
The Chancellor urged a united, resolute, and long-term stance against terrorism. However, a tough approach to combat terror using new powers also demanded stringent accountability to Parliament.
Listen to the speech (Windows Media)
Key points from the speech (RUSI Commentary)
On 7 July and after the British people stood as one, our emergency services, our police, our security services, our armed forces, the pride of our country. With Britain led by London standing firm and steadfast in the face of violence, our very calmness reverberated around the world.
Though trains and buses were destroyed, our national resolve - the spirit of Britain - was indestructible. And though lives were ended, our belief in our common destiny shone through. As British-born suicide bombers maimed and killed fellow British citizens on our own streets, the worst of Britain was put to shame by the best of Britain.
To quote George Orwell, writing in the thirties, at democracy's darkest hour in Europe, when the threat was fascism, "the thing that I saw in your face no power can disinherit, no bomb that ever burst shatters the crystal spirit".
As 7 July solemnly and starkly reminds us, the first responsibility of a government is to protect its citizens, keep people safe and ensure their security.
And as Chancellor I have found that an increasingly important part of the role of a Finance Minister is to address issues of international terrorism. For as I have seen since 11 September and more recently after July 7th assumptions we took for granted have been turned on their head.
In effect the Treasury itself had to become a department for security. For as Chancellor I have found myself immersed in measures designed to cut off the sources of terrorist finance. And I have discovered that this will require an international operation using modern methods of forensic accounting as imaginative and pathbreaking in our times as the achievement of the enigma codebreakers at Bletchley Park more than half a century ago.
And I have found that it is not just the Treasury that is a department of security. So too is almost every other department.
We used to think national security was about Home Office policy, international security about defence policy and foreign affairs. Now we find that national and international action for security is inextricably linked and security issues dominate decisions in transport, energy, immigration and extend to social security and health, and of course in the Treasury so that coordinating the way we address international terrorism will be a central feature of the coming spending review.
The reason is clear. Addressing the reality, causes and roots of international terrorism is one of the greatest new challenge of our times.
Of course all the great challenges of globalisation are important, but upon meeting and overcoming the challenge of global terrorism all else we value depends.
So it is right to begin a series of speeches I make about how the Britain of the future will meet and master the global challenges ahead by addressing this question: pre-eminent to our foreign, defence and law and order policies; at the core of the very security and safety of our country; and vital to the prosperity and future of our country.
I want a Britain now and in the future that, fully aware of the increased threats the world faces, plays its full part in the defeat of global terrorist violence. I want to see a Britain that, because of both its international actions and its domestic vigilance, is more secure, more safe, more strong.
So I want to speak today about a Britain ever stronger in its security, finding even greater strength in our shared resolve as a nation to defeat terrorist violence and to isolate extremism wherever we confront it and whatever its source.
And I am determined that by agreeing a long view in our present public expenditure review we ensure: first, a robust security response which protects both the safety and liberties of our citizens; second, a determination to tackle terrorism internationally and nationally; and third, to tackle not just terrorism but the roots of terrorism - the extremism which seeks to justify it and the grievances that fuel it, fund it and give it cause - by ensuring that legitimate political concerns, such as the future of the Middle East, are addressed politically and without resort to violence - an integrated approach that will require the strength and resolution to make difficult long term choices and follow them through to ensure the police, armed forces and security services have the necessary support to address the demands of a changing world.
For nine years as Chancellor my aim has been a Britain strong in our stability. In the years ahead I want a Britain both strong in stability and strong in security, so that it can be said not just that our national stability is safe in our hands, but that our national security is safe in our hands.
While we stood as one on and after 7 July there is a danger that in the aftermath of a terrorist incident as time passes, people's sense of the scale of the threat dims, that people's guard starts to drop, their vigilance lessens and their commitment to the tough and necessary security measures - all too clear on the morning after - weakens.
And there is also a danger that we fail to stand back and reflect and to make the long-term cool headed assessment we need to have about the likely repetition of such events and to decide what, for the long term, needs to be done to strengthen our security.
Of course, we do not yet have the advantage of great historical distance from the events of 11 September or 7 July - and the fresh insights that can come from this - yet I believe that our duty looking forward is obvious for all to see.
After 7 July we asked anew whether we had in place sufficient security - national and international - to prevent future incidents. We asked why young British citizens had decided to bomb and maim their fellow British citizens.
We asked anew whether we had done enough to encourage and support the integration of people of different ethnicities and faiths into our country and suddenly dry debates about citizenship and Britishness had both a meaning and urgency for our times and for our generation. I want us today to remember why we thought it so important after 7 July to address these issues, and not only address but resolve these issues for the long term.
7 July brought home to us that we are addressing both a global phenomenon and a national one. I want to remind the country that the terrorist threat has not diminished and will not diminish until we defeat it.
And I want to suggest today that global terrorism must be fought both nationally and globally - so we will have to work to root out terrorism and its causes globally and we will have to do so in circumstances where the instruments of terror operate locally, nationally and globally, and make use of continually evolving technology.
Just as we must enhance the global response to terrorist violence, so too we must enhance the domestic response to threats to national security.
While we share one world - and we must act together globally - so much more we share one country, and must act together nationally.
There is a British way of achieving this best, seeking and building a unified national consensus around a framework that is tough in ensuring security but also by being tough in ensuring proper accountability as we sustain public support for the action that must be taken.
The changed global context
I start with how 7 July has brought home to us how the nature of the threat to our security has changed - and in three dramatic ways.
First, the global threat of terrorism. While the last thirty years have seen Britain having to cope with terrorism in Northern Ireland, recent terrorist plots are of a different scale: global conspiracies driven by extremist ideology to cause mass casualties with no warning – often involving suicide bombings and with the potential threat of chemical biological radiological and nuclear weapons. These are good reasons for defining Al-Qa'ida as the first truly global terrorist threat. Let us be clear: we face enemies that not only have a hatred of the policies we pursue, but a hatred of our very existence. And between justice and evil, humanity and barbarism, no one should be impartial neutral or disengaged but engaged resolute and solid for justice.
Second, the canvas on which terror operates does indeed cross continents. In recent years Al-Qa'ida and groups inspired by them have attacked over twenty-five countries, killed thousands of people - many of them Muslims - and have networks across almost all countries through which they seek to seduce thousands of fellow travellers.
As the security service puts it, "many of these networks are loose-knit, operating without a conventional structure and with connections across the world, bound by shared extremist views or experiences. Whilst some of these networks are centrally guided by Al-Qa'ida, others are autonomous, but both work to carry out terrorist attacks, and are influenced by radical propaganda shared over the internet."
There is a paradox about globalisation: the very opportunities it offers - the free movement of money, people, goods and information - are harnessed by terrorists and organized criminals, so that we have a situation where today 'money is raised in one country, used for training in the second, for procurement in a third and terrorist acts in a fourth', a global threat for which there is no real precedent - enemies that do not need great armies to put lives at risk, enemies without even a formal chain of command but can inspire imitators in the heart of our communities.
And while the 7 July attacks showed young British citizens may also resort to violence with little or no warning, a threat all the more serious because it has been the least visible, let us be in no doubt that three attack plans threatening Britain have been thwarted since 21July and it is now known that North African exile groups inspired by Al-Qa'ida were responsible for the Madrid attack.
A third reason why the nature of the threat is different is in technology itself, that terrorists no longer need to expose themselves by meeting together or be associated with a particular community. We know that internet and mobile telephony will be enhanced over the next few years when communications providers will transmit voices over the internet. And when suicide bombers have connections with other countries and can, in theory, use the internet or be instructed through mobile phones, we know that defeating violent extremists will require a unique combination of methods - from security measures founded on real time intelligence to argument and debate - and cannot be achieved through action in one country alone or even one continent, but only globally.
7 July has rightly led to the moderate majority in the Muslim community standing up to terrorists and supporters of terrorism who advocate violence and murder. And recent studies show the pathway to violence often starts with contact with extreme material or extremist clerics - through the internet or videotapes from abroad - paving the way for later direct contact with - and sometimes visits to - with terrorist organisations and camps.
So we must take steps to isolate extremists from the moderate majority. To root out terrorism we are rightly investing in increased military and security forces, and policing. And after yesterday’s photographs let us remember it is incumbent upon all of us to ensure discipline at all times and to root out indiscipline.
But, from 1945, the Cold War was fought with not only weapons that were military or intelligence based; it was fought through newspapers, journals, culture, the arts, literature. It was fought not just through governments but through foundations, trusts, civil society and civic organisations. Indeed we talked of a cultural Cold War - a Cold War of ideas and values - and one which the best ideas and values eventually triumphed.
And it is by power of argument, by debate and by dialogue that we will, in the long term, expose and defeat this extremist threat and we will have to argue not just against terrorism and terrorists but openly argue against the violent perversion of a peaceful religious faith.
Indeed, the very existence of the internet and the exchange of ideas across it means that instead of relying on old methods of censorship it is not only right now but necessary to take these ideas head on - a global battle for hearts and minds, and that will mean debate, discussion and dialogue through media, culture, arts, and literature. And not so much through governments, as through civil society and civic culture - in partnership with moderate Muslims and moderates everywhere - as globally we seek to isolate extremists from moderates.
We should also work with our allies and international organisations for reform and democracy; encourage interfaith cooperation such as the conferences we are involved in with Muslim thinkers; and in particular link young people here with young people in other countries.
Alongside Tony Blair and Jack Straw I have to underpin the Middle East political road map with an economic road map and will continue to visit the region to push it forward. And, as we all tackle injustices that breed resentment, we must show by the empowerment of poor countries through debt relief, aid, and support for education healthcare and economic development that globalisation comes to be seen not as a cause of injustice and poverty but a force for social justice on a global scale.
While our long-term aim must be to prevent the indoctrination of future generations of terrorists, our immediate priority is how to protect our citizens against the threat we face now. Since 11 September, many of Al-Qa'ida's leaders have been killed or captured, and its bases closed down. Afghanistan has been delivered from Taleban rule, Iraq from Saddam Hussein - with democratic elections now held in both countries. And more than ever we now know the names, the faces, the methods, the operational strategies of violent extremists as we seek to ensure there is no place on earth which will remain hidden, dark or distant enough to be their hiding place for ever.
But to take the right security and policing measures it is important to understand in specific detail how different these conspiracies and networks are from the past - like the investigation into the ricin chemical plot in Britain its significance is that it had to span 26 countries and that the 12 indicted had, between them, 120 assumed identities. And the scale of July 7th investigations has been such that 50 physical sites have had to be searched - it took two weeks before one bomb facility could be entered, 11,000 statements have been taken and 24,000 physical exhibits logged – all amounting to some 12,000 leads to follow-up.
What do we conclude from the scale and complexity of all this?
First, the starting point is a strong front line of domestic defence, fully trained and equipped troops and forces, to build on the world-class capacity of the Met, the police and the security and intelligence agencies, enhancing our front line forces - police fire emergency and medical services with equipment and training and also exercises to prepare for the worst - the very things which helped in equipping the emergency services for the heroic efforts we saw in July.
I can confirm that, since 11 September, as part of the overall increase in police numbers and funding - nearly 16,000 more officers nationally and 6,000 more in the Met - dedicated anti-terrorist resources will have doubled.
I can tell you that, by 2008, a further £75 million will be added to the Met's counter-terrorism capability and a further £135 million for regional intelligence and investigation - in total investing £230 million more nationwide.
By 2008 the size of the security service will have nearly doubled. In total we will invest £2 billion a year on counter-terrorism and resilience - twice what we did before 11 September.
And we need to continue to build on the strategy for our armed forces set out in July 2004 to develop our military capabilities in the fight against terrorism with the ability to mount operations across the world and our capacity to prevent failed states and stabilise lawless areas and support nation building - a strategy evident in our current operations in Afghanistan, where we are working together with America, and with NATO and the un to build a new democratic government.
A priority for the Spending Review will be to examine our future security needs for intelligence gathering and policing. We will review the strategic allocation of resources to meet changing requirements - for example, detecting explosives in crowded places; and, building on strong existing structures, we will examine the case for a single security budget, assessing also how in this new world we secure the best coordination in delivery and accountability - including the appointment of the relevant committees and their investigative power: at all points building trust in a tough security regime through necessary accountability.
Second, we need not only to deny a safe haven to terrorists, but ensure there is no hiding place for those who finance terrorism.
Money underpins international terrorism. Let me give the example of UK members of Al Qa'ida-linked Libyan Islamic fighting group, a group whose assets we froze last week. Our information is that documents and money were transferred from Britain to support training and attacks in Afghanistan and elsewhere through a sophisticated network including a charity and four UK property companies. And this was a network which under further investigation included an individual found guilty in Morocco of involvement in a suicide attack which killed 41 people. Once again showing the global nature of the terrorist threat.
In total I can state that, since 2001, we have frozen assets of terrorists of nearly £80 million - including for over 100 organisations with links to Al Qa'ida.
In 2005 under the British presidency the EU brought in new agreements on international money laundering controls. 2005 also established the Lander review into the system of suspicious activity reports, to be completed in March. I have just returned from the G8 Finance Ministers meeting in Moscow where we reaffirmed that the international community will continue to be vigilant in the future too.
And today I am announcing, for Britain, new measures.
First, preventing terrorist financing, where we will consult on protecting wire transfers and charities from being abused - in the same way that we acted to freeze the bank account at Finsbury Park mosque and prevent Abu Hamza abusing the mosque's legitimate status as a charity. And to ensure continued action internationally, I can confirm that at tomorrow's summit In Cape Town, Britain will formally seek the chair of the worldwide Financial Action Task Force.
Next, identifying suspicious transactions - where I want to work even more closely with the financial sector. So I am today agreeing new guidance to give clearer strategic advice to banks on what to target, so they can fulfil their responsibilities; and am setting up a new forum with them to discuss how we can achieve more together to identify, root out, and prevent the use of financial networks to advance terrorism.
And then, disrupting terrorist activity - where with new multilateral arrangements to better join-up enforcement we will strengthen our pre-emptive asset freezing regime. And we will review again in a year's time whether we need to go still further either with new legislation or a single asset freezing office.
Next, we need the best and strongest border controls and resilience to attack - enhancing protective security around our critical national infrastructure and our citizens as they go about their daily lives. This means constantly reviewing how we best safeguard our buildings and our national infrastructure - roads, railways, tunnels, bridges, water systems and utilities.
The commitment we have made to extra spending means we now have 50 per cent more border guards and security officers than in 2000. And now, rightly, many are based not in Britain, but abroad - every year we successfully stop more than 40,000 suspicious people before they even board a boat, plane or train.
But we must match our investment in people, with the laws and technology needed to respond to the new threats.
Last year Project Semaphore electronically checked the details of six million passengers - helping our border and security staff to build a picture of suspicious activity and leading to the arrest of 140 suspects.
The next step is to electronically and biometrically screen all passengers as they check in - so terrorist suspects can be identified and stopped before they board planes, trains and boats to Britain.
There are already biometrics in visas from high-risk countries, now being extended to all countries where we require visas. The next step is the introduction of biometrics into the new generation of passports.
Both the UN and G8 have called for biometrics to be introduced to travel documents to help in the fight against terrorism. We have come to see that a common theme to the planning and execution of global terrorist attacks is the bypassing of border controls by using multiple identities. This was a central lesson from the findings of the independent 9/11 Commission in America, who have since introduced of biometrics at us borders. The UN has issued a blueprint for the worldwide integration of biometrics into travel documents. Forty countries around the world intend to introduce biometric passports by the end of the year.
The UK will move towards an integrated electronic border security system, linking biometric passports and visas with electronic checks on entry and exit - helping us track and intercept terrorists and criminals, seeking to prevent them, stop illegal immigration and increasing the safety of all legitimate travellers. But at the same time - by providing one secure method of proving your identity - making the necessary security checks easier for all of us as we travel abroad for our work and leisure.
And as part of the Spending Review we will take any further steps necessary to ensure Britain's borders are secure.
Fourth, the requirements for security in identity. There is a common thread running through the new security challenges – and that is the growing importance, and the obvious vulnerability, of identity. The risk to me and you as individuals is that our identities are stolen for terrorist or other reasons and used against us and what we stand for. The risk is also that, using false identities or without proper investigation of who they are, people enter and abuse our country.
This matters in Britain when we know that as many as one in four criminals use false identities and that as many as one in five companies could be hit by identity fraud.
The economic and social cost of identity fraud is into the billions of pounds and growing, with a new estimate from the Home Office of £1.7 billion.
Just as we have been facing new threats and evolving new responses in national and international security, analogous developments in the private sector - in banking and finance - to ensure the protection of consumers identities show both the need for and the opportunity to change.
Already we have moved on from signatures to requiring, as from tomorrow, a PIN for all debit and credit card transactions. And by 2010, according to the forecasts of Bill Gates, people will, through biometrics, access their phone, email, computer, and bank - through a fingerprint touch of a screen anywhere in the world.
Already one million people have bought and use an IBM laptop which uses fingerprint recognition to control access - and for the future, manufacturers are looking at the same fingerpint recognition technology to make mobile phones and MP3 players worthless if stolen. Today Californian supermarket shoppers are paying with a finger-scan at the checkout; new schemes mean people can pay for their goods just by placing their finger on a scanner and without having to carry a card; and Japanese cash machines are asking for a finger-scan rather than a PIN.
The reason is simple: they are more secure against fraud and theft. And across the world in very different cultures most people seem happy to use biometric schemes when they see direct value in greater security, greater convenience, and lower cost.
So it is likely in future that a supermarket or bank may hold your biometrics, but at the moment those charged with the protection of your security - indeed the people who can actually protect your security - do not. As a customer you would, under the private sector initiatives being developed, have biometrics stored, but as citizen you would not.
So the issue is not whether advances in biometrics are being put to use - identity information about us to protect our security is being given voluntarily to credit card and computer companies to safeguard access to finance and computers and now being used also for employment and employee recognition. For example, biometrics are increasingly being used to control access to buildings with particular needs for security. And with passports now requiring biometrics, a necessity people understand, 80 per cent of the adult population will have to register their biometrics to ensure our borders are secure and so they can travel freely across the world. In each case safeguards must be built in to protect misuse of information.
So the question is whether we move to the next stage - to extend this system from the private sector and the borders to a national biometric scheme including an identity card.
And would most people not agree that if there are acceptable safeguards to protect civil liberties in these areas, there are advantages in a national identity scheme that could not just help us disrupt terrorists and criminals travelling on forged or stolen identities - but, more fundamentally, protect each citizen’s identity and prevent it being forged or stolen?
The advantages are clear. An identity scheme will not just make the necessary security checks easier for all of us as we travel abroad for our work and leisure, but prevent people already in the country exploiting your identity or mine, and using multiple identities for terrorist, criminal or other purposes. One of the central features of terrorists' activity is their use of multiple identities to avoid laying tracks or patterns for us to spot. One 11 September hijacker used 30 false identities to obtain credit cards and one quarter of a million dollars of debt. Since then, the problem has worsened: over the last few years, the major terrorist suspects arrested typically had up to 50 identities each.
If people cannot so easily operate under multiple identities we can potentially disrupt the modus operandi of terrorists or criminals that rely on multiple or false identities. The key point is that, if someone is in our country and is travelling on multiple identities or running bank accounts in multiple names, we should be in a position to pick this up early. The front line experience of both Sir Ian Blair, Chief of the Metropolitan Police, and Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of the Security Service, have led them to say that a national biometric scheme would help them do their job and make reliance on multiple identities very difficult.
But the key point is that we should do all in our power to prevent you or I having our identity stolen or abused, and to ensure that, for each of us, our identity is secure and protected. Some have suggested the use of biometrics in identity cards in Britain is a fundamental and unacceptable "change of relationship between state and individual." In the past securing your identity rested on you being given a National Insurance number, on being required to have a birth certificate, being required to fill in the census, and, for travel abroad, being obliged to hold a passport. So the question is not whether we have a national register identity - we have had so for years - but whether we are prepared to consider the most up to date and the most secure means to protect our identity from being stolen.
I believe it is possible in this new world of terrorist threats to build a national consensus around our proposals by showing that there are proper safeguards and proper accountability. In addition to the Data Protection Act an Independent Commissioner should have oversight of the database and how it is used - testing it against data protection laws, ensuring individuals will have the right to see the information held on them and with, in the British way, proper accountability to Parliament, including reports published and laid before Parliament. And it may be right also to consider for the future whether the Commissioner should report to Parliament, taking an overarching look across both the public and private uses of biometrics, so ensuring the proper safeguards.
The legislation coming before the Commons today already builds in important safeguards. Private companies will not be able to see the national database, nor will government departments in their routine business - only for the prevention of crime or the protection of national security. Only if they are accredited and if they have the person's consent will government departments and private companies be entitled to ask to check that person's identity against the database.
And the British way is to write in not just safeguards for the individual but to ensure accountability to Parliament, with the limits to use of the data enshrined in Parliamentary legislation - and a requirement that there can be no additions to the information held or extensions to how the database is used without returning to Parliament for approval. As Charles Clarke has said, any decision on moving from a voluntary to compulsory scheme will require explicit approval of Parliament through primary legislation.
Mechanics matter too. Building a national scheme will take years, but that is hardly a good argument for not starting now. It will be important to build upon our current proposals in two ways. First, I believe that a joint private public partnership in investigating the next stage - involving banks, financial institutions, computer companies, employers generally - can both contribute to the general security efforts of all and release substantial savings in a potential scheme. So I propose a forum of private and public sectors to examine for not just fraud but security a joint project to release the best technology and value for money. On this basis we will report regularly to Parliament on costs as well as benefits.
Second, as part of our public expenditure review, we should take the measures necessary now to bridge the gap before a complete national scheme is in place: including improving the quality of our databases together with their transparency and accountability - making it easier to intercept terrorists and criminals and to spot fraud while also ensuring people have trust in how the necessary information is protected.
Opponents of the identity scheme like to suggest that its motivation is to enhance the power of the state. In fact it starts from the rights of the individual, the right to have your identity protected and secure and to achieve that, the right to have the most modern and secure way of doing so and - as I suggest - the right to have this done so with safeguards for individuals and the accountability of the state.
Police and court powers
Fifth, the powers available to the police and the courts. When terrorists seek to launch attacks designed to cause mass casualties with no warning, and when they operate in networks spanning the globe, it is clear that the challenge of global and technologically sophisticated terrorism cannot easily be met by the policing methods of the 1990s.
As my earlier examples - from the ricin case and 7 July – show, tackling the threat we face is increasingly complex. Terrorist investigations will span many countries and different jurisdictions with different rules of engagement. This calls for better coordination between police and justice systems around the world - including on extradition.
Remember our concern when, after July, it was thought that one of the suspects who fled to Italy might not be returned quickly for investigation and trial. In the end this was resolved - and yet if the situation had been reversed, it would probably have taken a year for someone to be returned from Britain to Italy in similar circumstances. The fact that Rashid Ramda, wanted for the Paris metro bombings in 1993, was able to exploit our judicial system to delay extradition for ten years is completely unacceptable. Again, this case has finally been resolved - and we are considering setting a maximum time limit for all future extradition cases involving terrorism.
I myself first came across the scale and complexity of investigations required when I was as a Treasury Minister addressing the issuing of banning order for financial transactions of terrorists. But the police investigation - as the 7 July investigation shows - of potential terrorist activity is even more complex than that.
When a site cannot be entered for days or weeks, when a series of computer encryptions takes weeks to decipher, when a multiplicity of internet e-mail and telephone contacts needs to be investigate across national borders, when thousands of feet of video footage have to be viewed, and all of these across dozens of countries and often all continents involving all the new technologies, it is obvious to me that police investigations need more time.
But, of course, there is another aspect of the new terrorism which I have also had to consider: the need to act early to prevent possible terrorist incidents and what that means for arrests and charging.
It is obvious that where there is a threat of mass casualties in circumstances where there is no attempt at a warning the police have an extra duty to take preventive action and to intervene early. They cannot wait for the details of a conspiracy to come to fruition.
Obviously, early intervention carries with it serious implications: there is less accumulation of evidence at the point of arrest than in the days when police could more reasonably wait for the near-to-final details of a conspiracy to materialise. It is then a race against the clock to confirm that the threat was real, and then to gain enough evidence to convict - rather than have to release people about whom there are still grave concerns back into the community.
Otherwise we will continue to face the unacceptable risk that, as the independent terrorism reviewer Lord Carlile puts it: "I am satisfied beyond doubt that there have been situations in which significant conspiracies to commit terrorist acts have gone unprosecuted as a result of the time limitations placed on the control authorities following arrest."
In other words: not only were terrorists not brought to justice - more importantly they had to be released and so remain a threat.
Very few cases currently run to 14 days and we would expect an even smaller proportion to run beyond that. We are rightly proud of civil liberties. No one should be held arbitrarily without safeguards and the longer the detention the more concerns there may be about arbitrary treatment.
But the safeguards lie not in measures that make it impossible for police to complete an investigation into terrorist activities - something which would in the end harm all our civil liberties - but in ensuring that the civil liberties of a person detained are protected by our tradition of impartial judicial oversight.
And I believe that the right balance between the obvious and changed requirements for the national security of our country and our people and the civil liberties of the individual is to give the power to hold people beyond 14 days, but to require that the extension be with the explicit approval of a senior judge.
I believe that this is at the heart of how we balance for the modern world the needs of security with an affirmation of individual liberties. We do so by measures which ensure accountability and by proper oversight.
The current legislation makes it clear that the judge can agree any extension only if he is satisfied that continued detention is necessary and that the investigation is being carried out as quickly as possible. Those detained must also be able to make written representations to the judge to contest their continued detention. If the judge is not satisfied at any stage of the process, the person must be released.
Indeed it may be possible that in subsequent legislation Parliament may be prepared to consider going beyond 28 days in circumstances where oversight is proven to work. And it may be at that time that to ensure even greater accountability we might consider not just that a senior judge approve continued detention every seven days and that there be a right of appeal to high court, but also we could give the Independent Reviewer the power to look at and to report on any case which goes beyond 28 days without charges.
I believe that it is strong oversight of the process that should ensure that no one is detained any longer than absolutely necessary - and of course the Independent Reviewer of our terrorism legislation has the overall capacity to monitor the use of this power and report any concerns.
It is difficult for opponents to suggest that the terrorist threat has not changed. It is difficult also for them to say that this change is not serious enough to justify change in our laws. The question is how in making our changes to accommodate new times, we ensure proper oversight and accountability, and so get the balance right between the civil liberties of the individual and the security needs of all individuals.
By preserving the primacy of the courts backed up by rights of appeal and thus proper oversight and, in the end, Parliamentary accountability we can achieve a settlement that ensures the right balance between our liberties and our security - properly fulfilling our traditions of civil liberties while acting decisively in the security interests of the country.
Let me turn to the way we deal with people and organisations that encourage or glorify terrorism. The UN recognised the importance of this issue in a unanimous Security Council resolution last September - drawing attention to the problem of groups or individuals glorifying terrorism. Of course anyone who calls for specific actions leading to murder can and should be prosecuted under existing law - as Abu Hamza was - but we need look no further than the incidents in London with posters glorifying terrorism - which shocked the country - to see that the authorities might benefit from a clearer framework to intervene quickly when boundaries are crossed.
I think most people would agree that no one should be able to publicly celebrate and glorify what happened in London in July and walk away from the consequences, nor should they be able to form organisations to celebrate and glorify atrocities only to escape censure simply by adding a disclaimer that from the act of glorification it should not be assumed that anyone will emulate them. Indeed, if we withdraw glorification from the definition of indirect incitement or from the grounds for proscribing organisations this would send a signal that we could not reach a consensus on how serious this issue is.
None of this threatens our unshakeable commitment to freedom of speech; nor is it in any way whatever aimed at the decent law-abiding Muslim community of Britain - indeed I want to pay tribute to the way many organisations within the Muslim community condemned the protests.
We have had a great deal of success - especially since July - forging a common front against terrorism. And we should build on this - so we tackle together not just terrorism, but the roots of terrorism - the extremism which seeks to justify it, and the grievances that give it an audience.
In particular we must ensure that young Muslims have a voice in this debate and all the decisions that affect them.
It is a problem for the whole of society that British Muslims are twice as likely to be jobless, twice as likely to be on low incomes, twice as likely to live in a deprived area. I have called for a greater focus on tackling these inequalities, driving up the educational attainment of pupils from ethnic minorities and a more comprehensive new deal effort - including confronting the fact that language can be a barrier to economic opportunity as well as social integration.
But the partnership we need is not only to tackle social and economic inequalities but also to expose the extremism which condones or encourages violence in place of dialogue and debate.
We should work to involve all parts of the British Muslim faith in ensuring that young Muslims have access to authoritative interpreters of Islam of their own generation and outlook. But the challenge of integration is one which if we are to succeed must draw in the whole of society.
I have suggested that we do more to value the ideals of Britishness – our commitment to liberty, responsibility and fairness - and its symbols and institutions and in particular I suggest today we recognise and show we value the contribution of our police, emergency and security services, our military and our armed forces and the contribution of all those who fought in the great wars of the last century.
Far from failing to teach history on these great times of conflict and courage we must do more to remember them so that they will never be forgotten.
In Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday 'we remember the fallen' - and it is right and fitting to honour them.
So, after approval from Her Majesty the Queen I can announce that the Treasury will allocate £1.5 million from the proceeds from the coin celebrating the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar to help fund the memorial in Staffordshire for the men and women in our armed forces who have given their lives.
The national Veterans’ Day is designed to thank today's generation of ex-servicemen and women for their service to our country. I propose ceremonies in every constituency and locality of the country to mark national Veterans’ Day - where we present veterans with veterans medals at local ceremonies and we will consult with veterans’ groups in taking this forward. Today the Defence Secretary is announcing that we will extend veterans badges to all those who served until 1960 including all who did national service.
And to involve young people more in celebrating the contribution of our armed forces - he and I would like to pilot an expansion of our cadet forces, especially in state schools. So we have asked Ian Russell to fundraise with the private sector, with funding matched by the government.
And we should ask young people to play a leading role in future Veterans’ Day celebrations - in particular volunteering to tape and video the memories of veterans for a veterans archive - led by a prominent national figure and supported by government and hopefully lottery funding - so that we have a local and national record of pride and achievement that measures up to the contribution our armed forces have made.
I started by saying that on 7 July the British people stood as one. The victims of that day will never be forgotten. Accordingly the Treasury stands ready to play a part in funding a memorial that victims families may consider fitting.
The global terrorist threat is such that we cannot afford not to be vigilant at all times.
I have suggested how this global terrorist problem must be fought globally - with all the means at our disposal: military, security, intelligence, economic and culture.
We will not yield, relax, rest, become complacent or lower our guard but will use every means, every necessary resource - all methods of diplomacy, all means of intelligence, all tools of law, policing and our security and military forces.
At no point should any serious decision-maker be soft or posture on security matters and refuse to acknowledge the new world we are in. Instead we must be tough-minded, long-termist and solid in our resolution. We should remember 7 July and 21 July, 11 September, the Bali bombings, the Spanish atrocities and terrorist acts killing innocent people across every continent.
Because 7 July reminded us that we must find strength not just in shared vigilance, but in the strength of an indomitable common purpose, it is right to re-emphasise and strengthen the responsibilities each and all of us owe our country as British citizens. By being tough on security, with strengthened resources and powers, and tough on accountability, with safeguards for individuals and oversight through Parliament, we can make Britain safer and more secure while affirming our very British commitment to the liberties of the individual and showing we will never sacrifice the very values terrorism wishes to destroy.
And around this I believe it is our responsibility to build a strong unified national consensus which reflects a modern patriotic purpose that - every day and without fail, we will do what is right to protect the security and liberties of our citizens and country, and in the face of global terrorism we will prevail.