Bordering on the Impossible: Securing Lebanon's Borders with Syria
Oct 2007, Vol. 152, No. 5
By Alistair Harris
On 11 August 2006 the United Nations adopted Resolution 1701, bringing to an end the hostilities between Lebanese Hizbullah and the Government of Israel. Paragraph 3 of that Resolution states unambiguously that within Lebanon there are to be ‘no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon.’3 The Resolution reiterates the provision of Resolutions 1559 and 1680 that require ‘the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that…there will be no authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State’. In addition, Resolution 1701 calls on the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms
or related materiel.
International actors have stated repeatedly that compliance with the provisions of these Resolutions will help avoid a further escalation in tensions in Lebanon and prevent a recurrence of hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel. This article will analyze the nature of Lebanese and international attempts to stem the flow of weapons into the country by increasing Lebanon’s capacity to manage its own borders. The central question to be addressed is whether the porosity of the Lebanese border reflects a lack of Lebanese capacity to interdict weapons shipments, or a lack of will to do so. The paper will conclude that Hizbullah’s political ascendancy and reemergence as the party of resistance will
ensure Hizbullah retains an armed resistance capacity for the foreseeable future. This, and reluctance on the part of the Lebanese government, regional governments and the UN to disarm the resistance will necessarily hamper efforts to increase Lebanon’s border monitoring capacity.
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By Alistair Harris
On 11 August 2006 the United Nations adopted Resolution 1701, bringing to an end the hostilities between Lebanese Hizbullah and the Government of Israel. Paragraph 3 of that Resolution states unambiguously that within Lebanon there are to be ‘no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon.’3 The Resolution reiterates the provision of Resolutions 1559 and 1680 that require ‘the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that…there will be no authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State’. In addition, Resolution 1701 calls on the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms
or related materiel.
International actors have stated repeatedly that compliance with the provisions of these Resolutions will help avoid a further escalation in tensions in Lebanon and prevent a recurrence of hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel. This article will analyze the nature of Lebanese and international attempts to stem the flow of weapons into the country by increasing Lebanon’s capacity to manage its own borders. The central question to be addressed is whether the porosity of the Lebanese border reflects a lack of Lebanese capacity to interdict weapons shipments, or a lack of will to do so. The paper will conclude that Hizbullah’s political ascendancy and reemergence as the party of resistance will
ensure Hizbullah retains an armed resistance capacity for the foreseeable future. This, and reluctance on the part of the Lebanese government, regional governments and the UN to disarm the resistance will necessarily hamper efforts to increase Lebanon’s border monitoring capacity.
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