Aug 2007, Vol. 152, No. 4By Alexander AldersonThe Army’s counter-insurgency doctrine is published in Part Ten of its Field Manual. It was last updated fully in July 2001. The pamphlet is the latest in a line of Army publications that have wrestled with the challenges of applying military force to meet the threat of revolutionary war and insurgency thrown up by the Cold War, the withdrawal from empire and, latterly, Northern Ireland. The field manual lays out very clearly the British Army’s approach to counter-insurgency; one that emphasizes minimum force, the rule of law, the importance of intelligence-led operations, civil-military co-operation and tactical adaptability and agility. British doctrine recognizes that countering insurgency is not simply the application of one military force against another. This is because in counter-insurgency, as General Sir Frank Kitson made clear, there is ‘no such thing as [a] purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.’
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