Letters
Dec 2006, Vol. 151, No. 6
SIR, Despite your two excellent articles, 'Pardons for All' and 'The Life and Death of Private Harry Farr' (RUSI Journal, October 2006), there are some points on the Farr case that I think merit further comment. Farr's trial was well-summarized in Corns and Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone (pp. 202-5 in the soft back edition), but the full record has been in print since 1993. It was transcribed from PRO.WO.71/509 by Dr A J Peacock JP in his magazine, Gun Fire, No 27 (with additional notes by J Putkowski). The London Library certainly holds a copy of the magazine. It is too easy to forget that it was by Act of Parliament that discipline was regulated in British armies, and that in war Parliament judged that death could be an appropriate penalty for cowardice.
The Army did not invent this penalty. And the nation through Parliament recognized – however reluctantly – that in war, the greater good (the cohesion of the fighting forces) had to outweigh individual factors. The principle was expressed
most bleakly by the proletarian Trotsky (see The Times, 26 August 2006, p.22) who wrote:
Masses of men cannot be led todeath unless the army command has the death penalty in its arsenal ...the command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear.
No 8871 Private Harry Farr was a pre-war Regular. Born in December 1890, he enlisted in the West Yorkshire Regiment in May 1908, and by 1914 had passed onto the Regular Reserve. He and his fellows would have expected to be judged by Regular standards of discipline and behaviour, and at his court martial he almost certainly was so judged.
Farr was in France with the 2nd Battalion from November 1914 until the opening of Aubers Ridge, 9 May 1915 (three soldiers of the Battalion were killed that day), when he was sent back with shell shock. After five months, in October 1915, the medical authorities considered him fit for front line duty and he was sent to his regiment's 1st Battalion. There he remained until arrested on 18 September 1916, prior to court martial for cowardice.
We know from the solitary defence witness, Sergeant Andrews, that during his time with 1st Battalion, Farr went sick with 'nerves' about April 1916 and was kept at the dressing station for a fortnight; and that he again reported sick on 22 July but was returned to duty the following day. He was not sent back to hospital. Three questions not asked at the trial were:Why did the medical authorities consider Farr fit for battle in October 1915? Why did the Battalion Medical Officer (MO), Captain Chiles-Evans RAMC, not deem him completely unfit for front line duty in the course of 1916? Why did the Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant-Colonel Lang (who commanded the Battalion from August 1914 until 18 September 1916 and must have known Farr's medical and other records), not send Farr back to depot as useless and unfit for duty?
As Farr never raised these points in his defence and had no 'Soldier's friend' to do so, the questions must remain open. Professor Wessely's account of Farr's court martial is so clear that I shall not repeat it all here. In terms of events on the day of the final Farr incident, 17 September 1916, the court heard or read overwhelming evidence, and Farr's own testimony generally corroborated the
prosecution case. 'Guilty as charged' was almost an inevitable verdict.
RSM Laking sought to jolt a frightened and disobedient Farr into risking the wrath of the guns in preference to the furious anger of his RSM (that, in part, is what RSMs are for). Although Professor Wessely does not mention this, when Farr still refused to go up with the rations, the RSM said that he intended marching him forward up the trench to be seen by the MO. That was probably the only way of resolving the issue on the spot without charging Farr. Had he gone to the medical post, it might just possibly have made a difference to his fate. But against that Chiles-Evans had not hospitalized him on previous occasions – and in fact was not available, falling wounded on the 17th. In the event, Farr struggled, ran away, and was charged with cowardice the next morning.
At the trial, the prosecution kept strictly to the facts concerning events on the one day, 17 September, and Farr's statement that Lance-Corporal Form referred to his
running away on the 17th as 'same as he did last night' must have made a bad impression. Farr himself made no reference to anything in his past or his hospitalization, and under questioning made the fatal admission, noted by Professor Wessely, of not seeking medical advice after his arrest because he now felt better again.
Apart from Sergeant Andrews, not one man came forward to speak in Farr's favour, though some had known him from pre-war days and others during the eleven months since he had joined this Battalion. One gets the impression that although nobody sought his death by a firing squad, they had seen enough to want him out of the Battalion – to be rid of him.
Chiles-Evans's replacement, Captain Williams RAMC, spent his first days with the Battalion treating dozens of wounded and dying, and his brief reports on Farr said merely that he was physically and mentally fit to stand trial. Even those who did
mention Farr's 'shell shock' or similar symptoms gave fairly unhelpful testimony. 'A' Coy commander, Captain Wilson, is quoted by Professor Wessely, and his description of Farr as a man whose behaviour was liable 'on many occasions' to 'cause a panic' is so telling that the earlier inaction of the MO and the Colonel seems incomprehensible. But it must have hardened opinion against Farr.
The Adjutant, Lieutenant Paul, have the court Farr's official service record and refrained from any comment. Paul had served twenty years with the Battalion, rising to RSM before receiving his commission: he must have known Farr very well. The other character witness, Second Lieutenant Marshall, stated that he had known Farr for six weeks during which he had three times asked to leave working parties as he could not stand the noise of artillery, and was trembling and not properly in control of himself.
Thus, I believe that the evidence (and silence) at Battalion level and the importance of protecting the greater good (in essence, Trotsky's tenet) led the court to withhold any recommendation to mercy. Furthermore, there had been the recent fighting.
For all the survivors remembered the cost of that attack. On 15 September, 6th Division received orders for the entire 18 Brigade (in which 1/West Yorks served) to attack the Quadrilateral strongpoint at 0550 hrs on 18 September. Troops moved into position on the evening of the 17th, the evening of the Farr incident. The attack succeeded but the Battalion lost forty-two killed, and about three times as many wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Lang.
At each review level, the same thoughts must have applied: 18 Brigade had lost 1,228 men in the battle, 6th Division 5,000. Each commander in turn recommended Farr's execution, through Corps (Cavan), through Army (Rawlinson) to the Judge Advocate General and then to the Commander-in-Chief. One might say that in such circumstances not to confirm the sentence would have been letting down those who stuck it out, and died.
Farr's was a hard case and I think of it with unease. But it does not necessarily affect the other seventeen executions for cowardice in 1914-18. And if we are to
remember Harry Farr, we should also remember those almost-forgotten forty-two young men of 1/West Yorks killed doing their duty on 18 September 1916: the two Captains, the Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant, the four Sergeants, two Corporals, five Lance-Corporals and twenty-seven Privates, whose names can – and should – be read on the regimental Roll of Honour.
John Hussey
RUSI Member
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SIR, Despite your two excellent articles, 'Pardons for All' and 'The Life and Death of Private Harry Farr' (RUSI Journal, October 2006), there are some points on the Farr case that I think merit further comment. Farr's trial was well-summarized in Corns and Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone (pp. 202-5 in the soft back edition), but the full record has been in print since 1993. It was transcribed from PRO.WO.71/509 by Dr A J Peacock JP in his magazine, Gun Fire, No 27 (with additional notes by J Putkowski). The London Library certainly holds a copy of the magazine. It is too easy to forget that it was by Act of Parliament that discipline was regulated in British armies, and that in war Parliament judged that death could be an appropriate penalty for cowardice.
The Army did not invent this penalty. And the nation through Parliament recognized – however reluctantly – that in war, the greater good (the cohesion of the fighting forces) had to outweigh individual factors. The principle was expressed
most bleakly by the proletarian Trotsky (see The Times, 26 August 2006, p.22) who wrote:
Masses of men cannot be led todeath unless the army command has the death penalty in its arsenal ...the command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear.
No 8871 Private Harry Farr was a pre-war Regular. Born in December 1890, he enlisted in the West Yorkshire Regiment in May 1908, and by 1914 had passed onto the Regular Reserve. He and his fellows would have expected to be judged by Regular standards of discipline and behaviour, and at his court martial he almost certainly was so judged.
Farr was in France with the 2nd Battalion from November 1914 until the opening of Aubers Ridge, 9 May 1915 (three soldiers of the Battalion were killed that day), when he was sent back with shell shock. After five months, in October 1915, the medical authorities considered him fit for front line duty and he was sent to his regiment's 1st Battalion. There he remained until arrested on 18 September 1916, prior to court martial for cowardice.
We know from the solitary defence witness, Sergeant Andrews, that during his time with 1st Battalion, Farr went sick with 'nerves' about April 1916 and was kept at the dressing station for a fortnight; and that he again reported sick on 22 July but was returned to duty the following day. He was not sent back to hospital. Three questions not asked at the trial were:Why did the medical authorities consider Farr fit for battle in October 1915? Why did the Battalion Medical Officer (MO), Captain Chiles-Evans RAMC, not deem him completely unfit for front line duty in the course of 1916? Why did the Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant-Colonel Lang (who commanded the Battalion from August 1914 until 18 September 1916 and must have known Farr's medical and other records), not send Farr back to depot as useless and unfit for duty?
As Farr never raised these points in his defence and had no 'Soldier's friend' to do so, the questions must remain open. Professor Wessely's account of Farr's court martial is so clear that I shall not repeat it all here. In terms of events on the day of the final Farr incident, 17 September 1916, the court heard or read overwhelming evidence, and Farr's own testimony generally corroborated the
prosecution case. 'Guilty as charged' was almost an inevitable verdict.
RSM Laking sought to jolt a frightened and disobedient Farr into risking the wrath of the guns in preference to the furious anger of his RSM (that, in part, is what RSMs are for). Although Professor Wessely does not mention this, when Farr still refused to go up with the rations, the RSM said that he intended marching him forward up the trench to be seen by the MO. That was probably the only way of resolving the issue on the spot without charging Farr. Had he gone to the medical post, it might just possibly have made a difference to his fate. But against that Chiles-Evans had not hospitalized him on previous occasions – and in fact was not available, falling wounded on the 17th. In the event, Farr struggled, ran away, and was charged with cowardice the next morning.
At the trial, the prosecution kept strictly to the facts concerning events on the one day, 17 September, and Farr's statement that Lance-Corporal Form referred to his
running away on the 17th as 'same as he did last night' must have made a bad impression. Farr himself made no reference to anything in his past or his hospitalization, and under questioning made the fatal admission, noted by Professor Wessely, of not seeking medical advice after his arrest because he now felt better again.
Apart from Sergeant Andrews, not one man came forward to speak in Farr's favour, though some had known him from pre-war days and others during the eleven months since he had joined this Battalion. One gets the impression that although nobody sought his death by a firing squad, they had seen enough to want him out of the Battalion – to be rid of him.
Chiles-Evans's replacement, Captain Williams RAMC, spent his first days with the Battalion treating dozens of wounded and dying, and his brief reports on Farr said merely that he was physically and mentally fit to stand trial. Even those who did
mention Farr's 'shell shock' or similar symptoms gave fairly unhelpful testimony. 'A' Coy commander, Captain Wilson, is quoted by Professor Wessely, and his description of Farr as a man whose behaviour was liable 'on many occasions' to 'cause a panic' is so telling that the earlier inaction of the MO and the Colonel seems incomprehensible. But it must have hardened opinion against Farr.
The Adjutant, Lieutenant Paul, have the court Farr's official service record and refrained from any comment. Paul had served twenty years with the Battalion, rising to RSM before receiving his commission: he must have known Farr very well. The other character witness, Second Lieutenant Marshall, stated that he had known Farr for six weeks during which he had three times asked to leave working parties as he could not stand the noise of artillery, and was trembling and not properly in control of himself.
Thus, I believe that the evidence (and silence) at Battalion level and the importance of protecting the greater good (in essence, Trotsky's tenet) led the court to withhold any recommendation to mercy. Furthermore, there had been the recent fighting.
For all the survivors remembered the cost of that attack. On 15 September, 6th Division received orders for the entire 18 Brigade (in which 1/West Yorks served) to attack the Quadrilateral strongpoint at 0550 hrs on 18 September. Troops moved into position on the evening of the 17th, the evening of the Farr incident. The attack succeeded but the Battalion lost forty-two killed, and about three times as many wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Lang.
At each review level, the same thoughts must have applied: 18 Brigade had lost 1,228 men in the battle, 6th Division 5,000. Each commander in turn recommended Farr's execution, through Corps (Cavan), through Army (Rawlinson) to the Judge Advocate General and then to the Commander-in-Chief. One might say that in such circumstances not to confirm the sentence would have been letting down those who stuck it out, and died.
Farr's was a hard case and I think of it with unease. But it does not necessarily affect the other seventeen executions for cowardice in 1914-18. And if we are to
remember Harry Farr, we should also remember those almost-forgotten forty-two young men of 1/West Yorks killed doing their duty on 18 September 1916: the two Captains, the Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant, the four Sergeants, two Corporals, five Lance-Corporals and twenty-seven Privates, whose names can – and should – be read on the regimental Roll of Honour.
John Hussey
RUSI Member
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