Phoney war and Blitzkrieg: The territorial army in 1939-1940
Apr 1998, Vol. 143, No. 2
By Peter Caddick-Adams
At the outbreak of war in 1939 the Regular army was augmented by Territorials
and militia to make up the British Expeditionary Force. By May 1940, they had
suffered serious defeats which, given that the TerritoriaL.s had theoretically
been training for years, raised worrying questions. Here Peter Caddick-Adams
explores why the TA was in fact so unprepared for war; tracing back from its
initial deployment the roots the problems encountered in out of date equipment,
training. recruitment aril leadership, highlighting the dichotomy between
peacetime and wartime needs. These shortcomings were exacerbated by a lack of understanding of German strength and tactics which contributed to the defeats em encountered in Belgium. After considering the credible performance nce of the TA against the odds, Captain Caddick-Adams discusses the poor financing and lack of commitment on the part of the authorities during the 1930s. Despite these difficulties, TA units performed credibly, and with increasing importance and
ability throughout the war. While the TA may be much better integrated into
today's military capabilities, the author concludes that current feelings of
underfunding and undervalue still prev-ail and need to be countered if today s
TA is not to be taken for granted.
Add your comments
By Peter Caddick-Adams
At the outbreak of war in 1939 the Regular army was augmented by Territorials
and militia to make up the British Expeditionary Force. By May 1940, they had
suffered serious defeats which, given that the TerritoriaL.s had theoretically
been training for years, raised worrying questions. Here Peter Caddick-Adams
explores why the TA was in fact so unprepared for war; tracing back from its
initial deployment the roots the problems encountered in out of date equipment,
training. recruitment aril leadership, highlighting the dichotomy between
peacetime and wartime needs. These shortcomings were exacerbated by a lack of understanding of German strength and tactics which contributed to the defeats em encountered in Belgium. After considering the credible performance nce of the TA against the odds, Captain Caddick-Adams discusses the poor financing and lack of commitment on the part of the authorities during the 1930s. Despite these difficulties, TA units performed credibly, and with increasing importance and
ability throughout the war. While the TA may be much better integrated into
today's military capabilities, the author concludes that current feelings of
underfunding and undervalue still prev-ail and need to be countered if today s
TA is not to be taken for granted.
You need 4 credits to access this item
If you are a member or registered user, please login
Not already a member and have not yet registered?
Add your comments
Copyright © 2008 RUSI