Feb 2006, Vol. 151, No. 1By Lawrence FreedmanThe Falklands conflict was a watershed as Britain overcame its Suez syndrome: fearful of US attitudes to its own foreign policy posture. Since then, Britain has deployed military force and diplomatic muscle with increasing confidence, but with the proviso that it must enlist US commitment. The point here is that the contemporary caricature of Blair as Bush’s poodle in agreeing to go to war against Iraq in 2003 does not work. He was already an established activist and, in his lights, a successful one. In his first term he had seen British forces get Kosovar Albanians back to their homes, rescue Sierra Leone from complete collapse and, under Australian leadership, help pacify East Timor. In Afghanistan, British special forces were active, if unreported, and the Government rushed to get stuck in to nation-building – far more so than the Americans, who took a long time to realize that they could not duck this task. As far as Saddam Hussein was concerned, Blair had no compunction in joining in air strikes against Iraq in December 1998, and if Clinton had been willing, Blair would probably have supported ground action.
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