Eighteenth-Century European Warfare
Oct 2005, Vol. 150, No. 5
By Jeremy Black
Any historiographical article is an exercise in choice, but the process of choices is usually far from explicit. Furthermore, the choices that are made are commonly constrained by the tyranny of the familiar. In other words, the issues are usually which books to consider or in what order, but there is scant departure from an established course of topics. In the case of eighteenth-century European warfare, this course is presided over by the figure of Frederick the Great of Prussia (r. 1740- 1786) and moves him from the wars of Louis XIV of France (r. 1643-1715) and then leaps on to consider the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802). As with most conventional approaches, this is not without foundation, but again, as with most such approaches, the failure to engage with methodological issues when choosing what to cover, or indeed to engage with the issue openly, creates and reflects problems. In the case of eighteenth-century military history, there is also a powerful subtext to the accustomed coverage. As with a familiar ‘soap opera’, the established cast is assumed to be the most important, and the process of military development is supposedly shown by the transfer from one to another. In so far as this is justified by a theoretical perspective, it is that of ‘baton-transfer’ between paradigm powers, those that supposedly defined best practice. This definition, it is assumed, led to a process of emulation and a practice of diffusion, thus ensuring that you can have, for example, the Age of Frederick the Great, and so on. These are not the suppositions that underlay what follows. Instead, a different set of suppositions play key roles. First, in place of a single paradigm, it is argued that best practice varied in response to different goals that themselves arose from contrasting military environments and strategic cultures. Secondly, it is suggested that it is necessary to scrutinize the standard list of topics with considerable care. This is appropriate in order to focus more attention on conflicts that have received insufficient attention or that do not play a sufficiently large role in the central narrative of the period.
Add your comments
By Jeremy Black
Any historiographical article is an exercise in choice, but the process of choices is usually far from explicit. Furthermore, the choices that are made are commonly constrained by the tyranny of the familiar. In other words, the issues are usually which books to consider or in what order, but there is scant departure from an established course of topics. In the case of eighteenth-century European warfare, this course is presided over by the figure of Frederick the Great of Prussia (r. 1740- 1786) and moves him from the wars of Louis XIV of France (r. 1643-1715) and then leaps on to consider the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802). As with most conventional approaches, this is not without foundation, but again, as with most such approaches, the failure to engage with methodological issues when choosing what to cover, or indeed to engage with the issue openly, creates and reflects problems. In the case of eighteenth-century military history, there is also a powerful subtext to the accustomed coverage. As with a familiar ‘soap opera’, the established cast is assumed to be the most important, and the process of military development is supposedly shown by the transfer from one to another. In so far as this is justified by a theoretical perspective, it is that of ‘baton-transfer’ between paradigm powers, those that supposedly defined best practice. This definition, it is assumed, led to a process of emulation and a practice of diffusion, thus ensuring that you can have, for example, the Age of Frederick the Great, and so on. These are not the suppositions that underlay what follows. Instead, a different set of suppositions play key roles. First, in place of a single paradigm, it is argued that best practice varied in response to different goals that themselves arose from contrasting military environments and strategic cultures. Secondly, it is suggested that it is necessary to scrutinize the standard list of topics with considerable care. This is appropriate in order to focus more attention on conflicts that have received insufficient attention or that do not play a sufficiently large role in the central narrative of the period.
You need 4 credits to access this item
If you are a member or registered user, please login
Not already a member and have not yet registered?
Add your comments
Copyright © 2009 RUSI