America and the World in the Age of Terror
Aug 2005, Vol. 150, No. 4
By Daniel Benjamin (Editor)
One of the main accusations leveled against President George Bush during his re-election campaign last November was that, because of his obsession with overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, he squandered the huge amount of goodwill which the US enjoyed in the world immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The argument appears superficially persuasive: the day after those attacks, Le Monde, France’s leading daily newspaper, headlined its reporting with the remarkable phrase ‘We are all Americans now’. Yet barely a year later, the entire fabric of transatlantic relations seemed to be torn apart as Bush, together with a few European allies led by Britain, prepared to wage war in Iraq. The unity of purpose which existed at that time in the ‘war against terrorism’ was quickly shattered, never to return. A monumental mistake, argued Bush’s critics, especially in the Democratic camp in Washington. A missed historic opportunity, suggested Europe’s intellectuals, particularly those in France or Germany, who probably never believed in a close relationship with the US anyway.
The truth remains that the unity of purpose which existed in September 2001 was in any case just transitory, more of a knee-jerk reaction to a catastrophic event rather than a realignment of world politics. It is usually forgotten that in Europe, terrorism is seen as an internal danger – perpetrated by Basques, Irish or extremist Muslim elements who are nevertheless local citizens. But in the US terrorists are overwhelmingly portrayed as an external threat, people who should be destroyed. So, when President Bush told a sympathetic audience at the FBI Academy recently that ‘America must fight the enemy abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home’, he earned loud applause. But it is a speech which neither Prime Minister Blair of Britain nor any other European leader can possibly contemplate. In short, despite the warm noises of support, the Europeans and the Americans never shared the same perspective on the threat of terrorism and therefore never had an agreement about the way in which it should be tackled. As a consequence, even if Bush was true to his word and forged a global alliance to fight the menace of terrorism and even if the question of Iraq had never existed, differences between the US and other countries would have arisen pretty quickly after the events of 9/11.
And then there is the question of the other major powers around the world, for whom the issue of terrorism was merely one facet of much wider problems. America’s status as the world’s last remaining superpower, coupled with the growing technological edge of the US and Washington’s continued massive investment in its military was always bound to feature much higher in the minds of Russian or Chinese military planners than the hunt for Bin Laden and his acolytes. To suggest that, provided Bush acted ‘moderately’, the whole world would have remained friendly to the US is to ignore this huge array of global strategic considerations.
Daniel Benjamin, a senior fellow on the CSIS’ International Security Program, has assembled for this volume a group of excellent experts on China, Georgia, Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Each one of them was asked to look at the interaction between two inherently contradictory tendencies: the urge to support the US in its war against terrorism, coupled with the longer-term desire to curb American power and influence. The choice of countries is judicious: a mixture of the great and the small, the Muslim and non-Muslim, the emerging power and the declining one, as well as the strategically important. The result is a fascinating study in the conduct of international relations since 2001 and of the limitations – as well as opportunities, missed or otherwise – in the conduct of US foreign policy.
Add your comments
By Daniel Benjamin (Editor)
One of the main accusations leveled against President George Bush during his re-election campaign last November was that, because of his obsession with overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, he squandered the huge amount of goodwill which the US enjoyed in the world immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The argument appears superficially persuasive: the day after those attacks, Le Monde, France’s leading daily newspaper, headlined its reporting with the remarkable phrase ‘We are all Americans now’. Yet barely a year later, the entire fabric of transatlantic relations seemed to be torn apart as Bush, together with a few European allies led by Britain, prepared to wage war in Iraq. The unity of purpose which existed at that time in the ‘war against terrorism’ was quickly shattered, never to return. A monumental mistake, argued Bush’s critics, especially in the Democratic camp in Washington. A missed historic opportunity, suggested Europe’s intellectuals, particularly those in France or Germany, who probably never believed in a close relationship with the US anyway.
The truth remains that the unity of purpose which existed in September 2001 was in any case just transitory, more of a knee-jerk reaction to a catastrophic event rather than a realignment of world politics. It is usually forgotten that in Europe, terrorism is seen as an internal danger – perpetrated by Basques, Irish or extremist Muslim elements who are nevertheless local citizens. But in the US terrorists are overwhelmingly portrayed as an external threat, people who should be destroyed. So, when President Bush told a sympathetic audience at the FBI Academy recently that ‘America must fight the enemy abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home’, he earned loud applause. But it is a speech which neither Prime Minister Blair of Britain nor any other European leader can possibly contemplate. In short, despite the warm noises of support, the Europeans and the Americans never shared the same perspective on the threat of terrorism and therefore never had an agreement about the way in which it should be tackled. As a consequence, even if Bush was true to his word and forged a global alliance to fight the menace of terrorism and even if the question of Iraq had never existed, differences between the US and other countries would have arisen pretty quickly after the events of 9/11.
And then there is the question of the other major powers around the world, for whom the issue of terrorism was merely one facet of much wider problems. America’s status as the world’s last remaining superpower, coupled with the growing technological edge of the US and Washington’s continued massive investment in its military was always bound to feature much higher in the minds of Russian or Chinese military planners than the hunt for Bin Laden and his acolytes. To suggest that, provided Bush acted ‘moderately’, the whole world would have remained friendly to the US is to ignore this huge array of global strategic considerations.
Daniel Benjamin, a senior fellow on the CSIS’ International Security Program, has assembled for this volume a group of excellent experts on China, Georgia, Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Each one of them was asked to look at the interaction between two inherently contradictory tendencies: the urge to support the US in its war against terrorism, coupled with the longer-term desire to curb American power and influence. The choice of countries is judicious: a mixture of the great and the small, the Muslim and non-Muslim, the emerging power and the declining one, as well as the strategically important. The result is a fascinating study in the conduct of international relations since 2001 and of the limitations – as well as opportunities, missed or otherwise – in the conduct of US foreign policy.
You need 4 credits to access this item
If you are a member or registered user, please login
Not already a member and have not yet registered?
Add your comments
Copyright © 2009 RUSI