Air Power: Survivability of the Offensive Force

By Air Power Group, Royal Aeronautical Society
15 Nov 2004

A Royal Aeronautical Society specialist paper The Survivability of the Offensive Force was published in May 2004. Prepared by Air Vice Marshal John Browne, Squadron Leader Tim Gosling, Group Captain Hoppy Granville-White and Group Captain Robin Springett, the paper was reviewed by the Committee of the RAeS Air Power Group, consisting of Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, Rear Admiral Terry Loughran, Brigadier Colin Sibun, Dr Christina Goulter, Mr Russell Thersby, Wing Commander Mike Bratby and Air Marshal Sir Roger Austin.

The Royal Aeronautical Society Air Power Group was established in 2000. It arose from the wish of the then President of the Society to promote interest in the study of air power and to enable the Society to offer views on air power topics. It is composed of serving and retired members from all the Armed Services, from academia and from industry. It has no allegiance other than to the Society.

Since its formation, the Group has run a number of seminars on topics of current air power interest and it produced a foundation paper, Air Power in the New Strategic Environment. This paper now draws on the first and deals with a specific aspect of air power, the ability of the offensive force to survive in the hostile environment of likely future conflicts.

The paper begins with an examination of the likely rules of engagement in future conflicts and an assessment of the threat to the offensive force from the air and from the ground. It then discusses the way in which technological developments and tactics may help to counter that threat and the vital contribution of support, particularly in deployed operations, before analysing the relative strengths and weaknesses of Blue and Red Forces. It then offers some conclusions about National and Coalition operations.

The paper consists of the following sections and sub-sections:

The Threat to the Offensive Force

Asymmetric Rules of Engagement
The Threat in the Air
Surface-to-Air Missiles
Directed Energy Weapons
Air Defence Fighters and their Systems
Other Red Airborne Military Assets
Ground and Airborne EW Systems

The Threat on the Surface

The Threat on Land
The Threat at Sea

The Technological Response

Manned and Unmanned Aircraft
Reductions in Radar Cross-Section and Infra-Red and Ultra-Violet Signatures
Reductions in Electromagnetic Emissions
Automatic Integrated Passive and Active EW Systems

Weapon Systems

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Systems
Carrier Groups

The Tactical Response

Weather
Targeting
Weapons
Battle Damage Assessment
Radar SAMs
Attack Packages

The Contribution of Support

People
Intelligence
Logistics
Ground Defence
Training Ranges

Analysis of Blue Force and Red Force Strengths and Weaknesses

Public Opinion and ROE
Air Defences
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
Intelligence
Air-to-Air Refuelling and Transport
Airborne Early Warning
Logistics
Red Forces

Conclusions

The Royal Aeronautical Society has kindly agreed that RUSI Defence Systems may publish the conclusions to the paper.

CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more complicated strategic environment has demanded a rethink of doctrine and force structure, particularly within NATO, and most Western nations have found that the comparative advantage they once possessed over ‘countries of concern‘ and ‘rogue states‘ is narrowing. This is certainly true of ground-based air defences. Of particular concern is the continued enhancement of SAM systems and the associated radars, many of them Soviet systems, and the way in which the capabilities of the older systems have been significantly improved using relatively cheap technology. Therefore, countries lacking credible air forces, and even sub-state groups, are now able to challenge the air superiority of Western nations. In expeditionary warfare, where forward basing may be hastily improvised, the threat of man-portable systems is serious.

The threat posed by such systems has been exacerbated by the constraints imposed by very restrictive allied rules of engagement and other political considerations, all of which are magnified by the media. We are currently facing a tension between the need for precise targeting to achieve economy of effort and avoid collateral damage, and force protection issues which point us and our allies (especially the US) increasingly towards the use of stand-off weapons and UCAVs in medium and high threat areas. The political sensitivities, however, put a high premium on visual identification or other verification of targets to avoid collateral damage and risks to friendly forces. Ironically, as the enemy is most unlikely to be constrained by such considerations, this understandable desire can increase the risk to the offensive force. Similarly, the resulting asymmetry of ROE which require on the one hand that the allies identify airborne as well as ground targets visually before attacking them while on the other allowing enemy AD aircraft to launch increasingly available long-range, BVRAAMs at them from a safe distance represent another serious threat to the allied offensive force. This further reinforces the importance of network centric operations which offer, as a minimum, a partial solution to the problem.

One counter to improving enemy ground-based and airborne air defence systems is aircraft with low

radar signatures which, given a knowledge of enemy ground radar dispositions plus the correct tactics, can penetrate with relative impunity. Their immunity may reduce when VHF and HF ground radars are more widely deployed, and the current generations of low observable aircraft are costly to produce and maintain but the UK armed forces look forward to the next generation JSF, their first aircraft with a seriously reduced signature. UAVs have also attracted interest in recent years and they do have much to offer in the reconnaissance role, both tactical and strategic. They may also prove to be acceptable attack vehicles given sufficiently robust data links and control, target-identification and weapon-aiming systems to satisfy the strict allied ROE.

Whatever the roles of the allied air vehicles, they all need an effective EW defensive aids system and this requirement extends to transport aircraft and helicopters. Many current platforms have an EW system which was tailored to Cold War threats and low level operations. It will be some time before all the offensive assets have a fully integrated, automatic system providing the complete cover around the aircraft required by medium level operations and capable of addressing the full current range of threats. Even the most modern systems require regular updates to keep them abreast of developments in the threat.

SEAD is always vital to the survivability of an attacking force, particularly when operating at medium level. Its importance increases even more if positive target identification is called for. The UK has only a limited SEAD capability and the rest of Europe has little more. Add to this Europe‘s weakness in stand-off jamming and Intelligence, Surveillance and Tactical Air Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and the conclusion must be that, without US support, intensive operations at medium level cannot be conducted by EU nations on their own without considerable risk of combat losses. In this situation, low level operations may be the optimum solution.

When considering the survivability of an attacking forces it is natural to concentrate on platforms and systems but the support infrastructure can be a profitable target and an attractive one, particularly for a terrorist foe. We are increasingly engaged on expeditionary warfare at long range so the air and sea lines of communication are critical. The latter emphasises the continued need for Blue Water dominance which we have taken for granted for so long but now run some risk of neglecting. Forward airfields, particularly in expeditionary warfare where basing may be hastily improvised, are vulnerable to attack by TBMs, aircraft and regular or irregular ground forces, with MANPADS posing a potentially serious threat to aircraft on the approach or after take-off. While aircraft carriers can be positioned beyond the range of enemy aircraft, fast attack boats and suicide squads, this may necessitate integral AAR assets to give their attack aircraft sufficient range which points toward vessels larger than those currently in service.

The logistic support, on which the effectiveness of any fighting force depends, must be tailored for

expeditionary warfare. Much has already been achieved in this area but, while specialist units can be formed and people can be trained reasonable quickly, it takes longer to ensure that all equipment is designed and produced with deployed operations in mind.

An efficient intelligence organisation is crucial to the offensive force‘s effectiveness and survival. It should be able to provide a detailed picture of the enemy‘s strength, disposition and likely intentions. A number of instances of incorrect targeting, aircraft losses and unnecessary second attacks have resulted from intelligence, including BDA, which was less than perfect. An assessment of the extent and the accuracy of the intelligence currently available is impossible for those outside the MoD. What can be assessed, however, is the adequacy of resources for gathering tactical intelligence. The UK has a small but effective ELINT capability and ASTOR will soon add a stand-off radar to the ORBAT but the rest of Europe is less well equipped. Without a major contribution from the US, Europe‘s ability to provide an adequate intelligence picture is patchy.

In summary, therefore, the survivability of the offensive force today depends on a wide variety of factors and it is dangerous and misleading to view the issue purely from the perspective of the front line operators and their equipment. Like air power itself, the survivability of an offensive force rests on a pyramid comprising everything from intelligence, INFOSEC, Survive to Operate (STO) procedures in theatre and logistics to political input. For a purely national operation, that nation must have a realistic capability in all areas of the pyramid. It is always tempting to offer a less than helpful, over-long shopping list of essential improvements, however, the priorities clearly outlined in this paper are: people (in adequate numbers, fully trained and practised), a step change in reducing friendly fire incidents, defensive EW systems which cope with the current threat, an improved SEAD capability, and equipment designed and produced for deployed operations. Resources are of course limited and we should therefore strive to retain a balance of force capabilities, if only to maintain a vestigial ability to act independently where the national interest demands. Years of NATO force goals have failed to produce the required improvement in the capability of many of our allies. It needs to be recognised now, however, that given the additional demands arising from network enabling capabilities, many nations face the prospect of becoming liabilities in the battle-space and thereby ruling themselves out of a coalition of the willing. A successful offensive air campaign of the sort the nation has come to expect is hard to envisage without a US presence.

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