Complex Weapons: Challenges for Industry

By Chris Conroy
27 Feb 2007

The United Kingdom’s (UK) missile industry (or ‘Complex Weapon’ (CW) industry when including torpedoes and energy weapons) was restructured during 2006 through the formation of Team CW. Announced by Lord Drayson at the Farnborough Airshow, Team CW represents a partnering arrangement of national ‘CW’ companies to be led by MBDA UK and including QinetiQ, Thales Air Defence, Thales Missile Electronics, Roxel and other suppliers. This is part of the policy of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) to move from procurement through open competition (where competition is not viable or cost effective) to the use of long-term partnering agreements. One reason for this shift is to help to preserve national ‘onshore’ industrial capability where it meets criteria for ‘appropriate sovereignty’ as defined in the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). It is relevant that CW procurement is likely to fall by as much as 50%1 over the next few years following the delivery into service of several new systems such as the Storm Shadow cruise missile and Brimstone anti-armour missile.

While the sector adapts to these changes, several new technologies are on the horizon with the potential to alleviate this business downturn through presenting access to new markets. However, they also threaten to cause further upheaval. This paper aims to highlight these ‘transformational technologies’ and suggest possible ways forward for companies operating within the CW sector.

The Impact of NEC

Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is the integration of sensors, weapon systems, communications, support capabilities and decision makers with the purpose of improving the effectiveness and interoperability of military forces. NEC acts as a force multiplier, allowing smaller forces to achieve the desired military effect, and is fundamental to the future evolution of the UK’s armed forces. Potential benefits of networking for CW systems include improvements in flexibility and agility and enhanced effectiveness and precision. Specific applications include;
• Mid-flight re-targeting.
• Tuneable warhead effects.
• On-board/off-board sensor trade-offs.
• Man-in-the-loop/autonomous trade-offs.
• Collaborative weapons operation.
• Battle Damage Assessment information reporting.

These concepts call for highly complex systems and will demand greater use of Open Architectures and System of Systems Engineering capability from industry. Additionally, companies will increasingly need to design systems with a ‘tri-service’ networked customer in mind.

Conversely, systems which become dependent on the use of NEC may face restricted export potential because they may be unsuitable for nations lacking advanced networking capability. Industry must therefore walk a technology tightrope in finding a balance between designing NEC-compliant systems capable of optimising networking capability and growing dependent upon such networks.

Most importantly, CW companies must make their voices heard during development of NEC, not only to ensure that the network provides the necessary data, bandwidth and security for operation with CW systems, but also to establish themselves as ‘NEC suppliers’ in their own right.

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs)

UCAVs are not a new concept; indeed they have existed in various forms since the Vietnam War. Over the past decade, however, progress in developing UCAVs has accelerated, for instance in high-profile projects such as the American J-UCAS. UK involvement in UCAVs had been relatively modest, although there has been the occasional release of details of secret BAE Systems projects2 and references to a MoD-sponsored ‘Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment)’ (SUAV(E)) programme3 to investigate the feasibility of unmanned deep-strike platforms.

That was until December 2006 when it was announced that a joint MoD–industry team, to be led by BAE Systems, would develop a UCAV technology demonstrator named Taranis. This project will involve many other UK companies, such as Rolls-Royce, QinetiQ and Smiths Aerospace, in line with the DIS. Taranis is intended to provide experience to pave the way for a service UCAV providing an element of the desired ‘force mix’ of manned and unmanned combat aircraft to replace the RAF’s Tornado GR4 bomber fleet late in the next decade.

But what implications will the introduction of UCAVs have on the CW industry? They possess very different characteristics to manned platforms – indeed the very justification for their development. The absence of a cockpit allows designers greater freedom to develop smaller platforms with improved stealth configurations. Stealthy platforms need stealthy weapons and the use of internal weapons carriage becomes highly desirable. Design and integration of weapons for internal aircraft carriage has become something of a lost art amongst UK industry, and current involvement in the JSF programme, with its internal weapon bays, could provide a vital ‘refresher course’. Internal carriage, especially aboard small UCAVs, may also demand the development of a new class of ‘micro-munitions’.

An exciting outcome of the introduction of UAVs and UCAVs is the business opportunity they present for companies not traditionally considered as air platform providers. As platforms become smaller and on-board systems become arguably more important than the airframes themselves, the door opens to new companies such as those within Team CW – the technology and skills utilised to produce cruise missiles and Loitering Munitions being turned to the development of unmanned aircraft.

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs)

DEWs are advanced weapons which impart damage through the application of directed energy rather than through the use of projectiles or explosives. Long restricted to the realm of science fiction, several technologies are now close to actual service use. One wonders how many times that has been promised in the past 50 years!

• High-Power Microwave (HPM) systems cause disruption to electrical systems through generation of a power surge, similar to the Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) of a nuclear weapon. An example is the Raytheon Vigilant Eagle system which is designed to scramble the on-board electronics of incoming enemy missiles (see Homeland Security below).

• High Energy Laser (HEL) systems fall into several categories. Chemical laser systems are at present more powerful (up to megawatt class) but require the use of large volumes of chemical fuels. For this reason Boeing’s Airborne Laser (ABL) is deployed aboard a modified 747 aircraft. ABL is designed to engage ballistic missiles at ranges of several hundred kilometres and the first missile intercept test is currently scheduled for 2008.

• Less-Lethal systems include a variety of DEW technologies such as dazzle lasers, which cause temporary blindness, sonic weapons (already in service) and heat rays. Raytheon’s Active Denial System (ADS) is one of these last, using millimetre wave energy to cause unbearable heating sensations on the skin. Several variants are in advanced stages of development for military and civilian applications, and are being marketed by Raytheon now.

• Rail-guns use electromagnetic accelerators to propel projectiles at hypersonic speed, many times faster than conventional chemically driven shells. Although not technically DEWs, these systems have many commonalities, such as high power demand and long range (possibly hundreds of kilometres when using guided shells). BAE Systems is developing a 64-megajoule system for the US Navy which is earmarked for use on the next generation destroyer, the first of which is due to be launched in 2012.

One of the problems preventing the fielding of these systems is their massive power requirement, but this should become less of an obstacle in view of the trend for ‘more electric’ ships and aircraft.4

All of these programmes have been US efforts; things have been comparatively quiet on this side of the Atlantic. As DEWs present very new and sensitive technologies, companies may be holding their cards close to their chests. The MoD has acknowledged DEWs as a potentially disruptive technology and is working towards increased understanding across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) with the aim of technology ‘pull-through’ to a higher Technological Readiness Level (TRL).

The UK does not currently possess a defined ‘DEW industry’ and, although MoD includes DEWs under the CW banner (rightly so as they are indeed Complex), these technologies are fundamentally different to those used in present missile-based solutions. The technology required to design and mass-produce aerodynamic tubes, fitted with seekers and filled with explosives and propellants, is not immediately applicable to the design of high-power electrical generators and powerful lenses. Team CW companies will need to restructure themselves to expand in this area, calling in expertise from other business divisions, shareholders or companies.

Homeland Security
Since 2001, nations worldwide have paid increased attention to Homeland Security (HS) to defeat acts of domestic and global terrorism – the US alone spending more than $40Bn.5 Some CW companies such as QinetiQ and Thales already possess HS interests, but these divisions can almost be regarded as separate companies. We need to consider potential CW-based applications exclusively.

Some of the DEW concepts mentioned earlier are well suited to security roles. Less-lethal ‘heat ray’ systems can be used for riot control, checkpoint security and border control. HPM ‘disruptor’ systems can be applied to cut out the engines of non-compliant vehicles at checkpoints, or to stop drug-carrying boats. These applications provide further justification for industry to invest in DEW technologies. However, the biggest opportunity in the security market for CW companies using existing technology is arguably in the defence of commercial aircraft, countering the threat posed by terrorists using Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) to destroy civil airliners. Because MANPADS have limited range, such an attack is anticipated to occur at an airport when airliners are also at their most vulnerable during take-off. A successful attack could result in tremendous loss of life and cause massive economic damage. Although such attacks have been rare to date, the threat is assessed as growing due to increasing technical proficiency of terrorist organisations and the proliferation of these small, shoulder-fired weapons.

Possible solutions to deal with this threat, applicable to the CW industry, include:
• Missile detection and warning devices, which warn of the launch or approach of a missile.
• Deployable countermeasures such as dispensed decoys (flares and chaff).
• Directional infrared countermeasure ‘jammers’ (DIRCM).
• Advanced anti-missile systems (possibly based on DEWs).

Deployable countermeasures and jammers have been in use on military aircraft for decades, and it may seem obvious to fit these systems to commercial aircraft. However, there are a number of reasons why this is not practical, primarily relating to reliability. Current military systems require frequent maintenance and this is very undesirable to airlines whose profitability is dependent upon minimising airframe down-time. Commercial systems would need to be much more ‘hassle free’. Additionally, military systems are prone to occasional false alarms which would cause chaos in commercial use. Consider the implications of a false alarm inducing a mass release of pyrotechnic flares over Junction 15 of the London M25 motorway during rush hour!

Several companies are working to overcome these problems and obtain a stake of this potentially multi-billion-dollar market. DIRCM systems are being developed by both BAE Systems North America (JETEYE) and Northrop Grumman (Guardian). Ground-based DEW solutions include Raytheon’s Vigilant Eagle HPM, which would scramble the hostile missiles’ circuitry, and Northrop Grumman’s SkyGuard chemical laser system, designed to destroy hostile missiles outright.

The European CW industry is in a good position to develop these systems, with access to both military countermeasures technology and a local civil aircraft manufacturing base (Airbus). Companies may also stand to benefit from offering CW consultancy and intelligent customer services to airlines and airport authorities.

Conclusion
Domestic CW activity is, at least in the short term, in decline. While business is quiet, industry could well benefit from finding adjacent markets. These emerging technologies may present just such opportunities to expand into the provision of military networks, unmanned air vehicles and energy weapons. Homeland Security may even allow companies access to the commercial world, although industry must face the non-trivial challenge of adapting from serving a military customer, with procurement timescales measured in years or decades, to serving a civilian customer demanding immediate solutions to security threats.

NOTES

1. Defence Industrial Strategy – Six Months On

2. Unmanned Vehicles – BAE Systems: Out of the Black, Into the Blue
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 July 2006

3. Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicles (Experiment) (SUAV(E)) – MoD Fact Sheet

4. MoD Defence Technology Strategy – Section B: Cross Cutting Technologies

5. US Department of Homeland Security: Budget in Brief – Fiscal Year 2007

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