By Thomas J.Welch5 Aug 2005
During the 1980s and 1990s, American and Chinese authors pointed to a new revolution in military affairs. The authors agreed that the information revolution and long-range precision-guided weapons would be central to the transformation’s materiel dimension. There was also general agreement that this materiel would be available to many militaries and that the real competition would depend on doing well with organizational and doctrinal change. Since then, US and China transformation decisions and programmes have been driven in large part by how each saw its top strategic challenges. Further, while US transformation management focuses on near-term needs as defined by the ‘joint warrior’ in the field and fleet, Chinese authors stress transformation urgency: meeting top-down, long-term goals set forth by Chinese transformation management. A major premise for US planning and programming seems to be that the US has an unassailable advantage in military capability. But China’s transformation effort and the asymmetries challenging the U.S. suggest this may not be the case for long, and the real issue is how well the US might do in confronting the military capabilities coming out of Chinese transformation.
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