Georgia: Next Step for Euro-Atlanticism?
By Alexandros Petersen
18 Feb 2008
In 2004, Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO, and in 2006, the two former Soviet-bloc countries joined the European Union as full-fledged members. Their inclusion into the Euro-Atlantic community raises the prospect of their fellow countries in the Black Sea region also orienting themselves towards the West. While Turkey has long been a NATO member and has trundled through the rigmarole of EU accession for almost as long, and Ukraine presents a unique geo-political, historical and demographic case in terms of Euro- Atlantic orientation, the South Caucasus country of Georgia offers an interesting test case about the limits of the spread of Euro-Atlanticism.
While Georgia’s prospects depend very much upon decisions taken in North American and European capitals, it is vital to examine policies and prospects in the aspirant country itself. The history of Euro-Atlantic expansion indicates three major stages in the integration process: a general Western-oriented foreign and security policy, NATO membership and EU membership. For Georgia, Westernorientation can be understood in terms of good governance, willingness to join Euro-Atlantic institutions and scepticism of Russian influence in the region.
After Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, US educated attorney-turned-president, Mikhail Saakashvili, began a concerted reform effort aimed at Euro-Atlantic integration. The overhaul of the old order saw radical changes inspired by grand plans and soaring rhetoric. In his inaugural speech Saakashvili proclaimed, ‘We will steer a steady course towards European integration… [the EU] flag is Georgia’s flag as well, as far as it embodies our civilization, our culture, the essence of our history and perspective, and our vision for the future of Georgia.’ Now, EU flags hang from every government building in Tbilisi, are painted on the grass in parks and always stand beside their Georgian counterparts at official functions. Abroad, Georgian officials, including Saakashvili when speaking at the Royal United Services Institute in 2007, never cease to emphasise that Euro-Atlantic integration is the nation’s ‘number one foreign policy priority’.
The pull of Euro-Atlanticism made Georgia the world’s fastest reforming country in 2006 according to the World Bank. Earlier, the international institution had recognised improved good governance indicators in the areas of political development and control of corruption. Saakashvili’s impatience for change generally matches the public’s frustration with the stasis of the 1990s, and due to his National Movement party’s strong parliamentary majority, it pervades almost all sectors of government. In early 2007, he sacked the country’s customs head and dissolved a transportation regulatory body that proved to be corrupt and inefficient.
However, this impatience has meant that significant portions of the population have been left behind. Georgia’s national police force, a notoriously corrupt pillar of patronage before the Rose Revolution, was all but disbanded by Saakashvili in favour of new personnel trained to Western standards. Beneficiaries of the pre-reform state apparatus and a growing sophisticated urban population discontented by Saakashvili’s absolutist approach took to the streets in November 2007, rallying around a beleaguered opposition in scenes that echoed the people power exercised in 2003. However, the protests were neither a new colour revolution (as the opposition would have the West think) nor a Moscoworchestrated counter-revolution that Saakashvili described.
The Government’s response was heavyhanded: dispersing the protestors with tear gas and shutting down an opposition television channel – owned by Badri Patarkatsishvili, whose recent death in Britain is currently under police investigation – and so disenchanting Georgia’s Western friends. However, the new life injected into Georgia’s public debate and the seeming development of genuine opposition politics is a long-term gain for the country. In a shrewd political move, Saakashvili acquiesced to opposition demands for early presidential elections, held on 5 January, and narrowly avoided a run-off by winning 52 per cent of the vote, largely due to support from rural areas.
Although irregularities were reported, Western and other outside observers considered the polls free and fair overall, despite opposition claims to the contrary. However, after renewed protests in Tbilisi, this time uninterrupted by police, Saakashvili inaugurated an inclusive cabinet, with opposition and administration beginning talks on political compromise. Georgia’s first major, united opposition movement, Georgia’s Way, led by Salome Zurabishvili, a former Tbilsi council member and a former French diplomat, emerged out of the presidential election process. It now looks to significantly erode, if not overturn, the National Movement’s majority in the parliamentary elections expected to take place in April – around the time of the next NATO summit in Bucharest.
Elements of Western Orientation
Georgia’s government and people can be characterised as the most sceptical of Russian influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2005, after a unanimous vote, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution which eventually led to the withdrawal of Russian military forces based in Georgia. Saakashvili has frequently challenged Russia’s role in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has called for Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones to be replaced by EU peacekeepers.
Thus, Georgia can be considered to have accomplished the first stage in the Euro- Atlantic integration process: the general orientation of the state’s policies, despite their absolutist character, point West. What of the prospects for NATO and EU membership though? Saakashvili’s government has consistently defined Euro-Atlantic integration in terms of joining both institutions. In September 2006, NATO offered Georgia ‘Intensified Dialogue’ status, as part of its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) towards eventually joining the alliance. Now, a trans-Atlantic debate has been brewing for months over whether to offer Georgia the next step: a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest summit.
Before the events of November, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said Georgia is ‘on track…has performed well and it is performing well’ in terms of moving towards membership, but his statements have since been more guarded. The US, with Senator Richard Lugar at the forefront, continues to push for the presentation of a MAP in April. Western European capitals, Paris in particular, are more sceptical, and have floated the idea of a compromise or Georgia Action Plan. Nevertheless, Tbilisi maintains that membership could be realised in 2009.
This is not because Georgians are not enthusiastic about joining the Alliance. In March 2007, Georgia’s parliament voted unanimously in favour of a declaration committing the country to further reforms aimed at NATO membership. Opinion polls consistently show 80 per cent of the population in favour of joining NATO, and a national referendum held in conjunction with January’s election produced a 77 per cent result in favour of membership.[1]
However, this is linked to perhaps the greatest obstacle to Georgia’s accession. Much of this enthusiasm stems from the belief in Georgia that NATO membership will protect them from Russian influence, but also may present a solution for Georgia’s breakaway frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, alliance expansion fatigue aside, Georgia would likely become a NATO member if reforms continued, were it not for its frozen conflicts. Russian sponsorship of the de facto independent statelets would bring two potential Article V issues into the alliance, where collective security might have to be exercised against Russian-backed or Russian armed forces. While both Scheffer and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier have said that the frozen conflicts should not hinder Georgia’s NATO aspirations, the hesitancy with which the Alliance has approached Georgia’s enthusiastic case can only be explained by their festering presence.
NATO membership is viewed by many as a stepping-stone to eventual EU membership. It has been demonstrated that this is the aim of Saakashvili’s government, but unlike a Georgia in NATO, a Georgia in the EU is on the short-term horizon. In 1996, Georgia and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which set up a number of consultative bodies that met on a regular basis. However, it was only in 2004 that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was extended to the South Caucasus, and an EU-Georgia Action Plan was only signed in November 2006. Intense work by Georgian officials produced a more comprehensive Action Plan than for Georgia’s South Caucasus neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with almost all of Tbilisi’s requested elements included. The EU’s new Black Sea Synergy and Central Asia policies have shed light on Georgia’s aspirations and concerns, and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana mentioned the possibility of EU peacekeepers for Georgia’s frozen conflicts.
Overall, relations between the EU and Georgia may be healthy, but this does not necessarily increase Georgia’s prospects for membership. In fact, the ENP was extended to the EU’s neighbours in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa in order to help foster a ‘ring of friends’ around the bloc. Since the striking down of the EU Constitution in 2005, expansion-sceptic EU member states have hinted at the ENP as drawing a line in the sand for EU boundaries. Again, this reality is largely due to internal EU factors, not Georgia’s inherent unsuitability or lack of potential. Therefore, Georgia’s prospects of joining NATO, while maybe not next year, are good in the medium term. In the long term, should the EU not entirely restrict further expansion, Georgia may well become a member of the European club.
Alexandros Petersen
Program Director, Caspian Europe Center, Brussels and Adjunct Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
NOTES
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, ‘Georgia doesn’t fit NATO bill – Russia’s NATO Ambassador’, 21 January, 2008-02-07 accessed on 07 February, 2008
18 Feb 2008
In 2004, Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO, and in 2006, the two former Soviet-bloc countries joined the European Union as full-fledged members. Their inclusion into the Euro-Atlantic community raises the prospect of their fellow countries in the Black Sea region also orienting themselves towards the West. While Turkey has long been a NATO member and has trundled through the rigmarole of EU accession for almost as long, and Ukraine presents a unique geo-political, historical and demographic case in terms of Euro- Atlantic orientation, the South Caucasus country of Georgia offers an interesting test case about the limits of the spread of Euro-Atlanticism.
While Georgia’s prospects depend very much upon decisions taken in North American and European capitals, it is vital to examine policies and prospects in the aspirant country itself. The history of Euro-Atlantic expansion indicates three major stages in the integration process: a general Western-oriented foreign and security policy, NATO membership and EU membership. For Georgia, Westernorientation can be understood in terms of good governance, willingness to join Euro-Atlantic institutions and scepticism of Russian influence in the region.
After Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, US educated attorney-turned-president, Mikhail Saakashvili, began a concerted reform effort aimed at Euro-Atlantic integration. The overhaul of the old order saw radical changes inspired by grand plans and soaring rhetoric. In his inaugural speech Saakashvili proclaimed, ‘We will steer a steady course towards European integration… [the EU] flag is Georgia’s flag as well, as far as it embodies our civilization, our culture, the essence of our history and perspective, and our vision for the future of Georgia.’ Now, EU flags hang from every government building in Tbilisi, are painted on the grass in parks and always stand beside their Georgian counterparts at official functions. Abroad, Georgian officials, including Saakashvili when speaking at the Royal United Services Institute in 2007, never cease to emphasise that Euro-Atlantic integration is the nation’s ‘number one foreign policy priority’.
The pull of Euro-Atlanticism made Georgia the world’s fastest reforming country in 2006 according to the World Bank. Earlier, the international institution had recognised improved good governance indicators in the areas of political development and control of corruption. Saakashvili’s impatience for change generally matches the public’s frustration with the stasis of the 1990s, and due to his National Movement party’s strong parliamentary majority, it pervades almost all sectors of government. In early 2007, he sacked the country’s customs head and dissolved a transportation regulatory body that proved to be corrupt and inefficient.
However, this impatience has meant that significant portions of the population have been left behind. Georgia’s national police force, a notoriously corrupt pillar of patronage before the Rose Revolution, was all but disbanded by Saakashvili in favour of new personnel trained to Western standards. Beneficiaries of the pre-reform state apparatus and a growing sophisticated urban population discontented by Saakashvili’s absolutist approach took to the streets in November 2007, rallying around a beleaguered opposition in scenes that echoed the people power exercised in 2003. However, the protests were neither a new colour revolution (as the opposition would have the West think) nor a Moscoworchestrated counter-revolution that Saakashvili described.
The Government’s response was heavyhanded: dispersing the protestors with tear gas and shutting down an opposition television channel – owned by Badri Patarkatsishvili, whose recent death in Britain is currently under police investigation – and so disenchanting Georgia’s Western friends. However, the new life injected into Georgia’s public debate and the seeming development of genuine opposition politics is a long-term gain for the country. In a shrewd political move, Saakashvili acquiesced to opposition demands for early presidential elections, held on 5 January, and narrowly avoided a run-off by winning 52 per cent of the vote, largely due to support from rural areas.
Although irregularities were reported, Western and other outside observers considered the polls free and fair overall, despite opposition claims to the contrary. However, after renewed protests in Tbilisi, this time uninterrupted by police, Saakashvili inaugurated an inclusive cabinet, with opposition and administration beginning talks on political compromise. Georgia’s first major, united opposition movement, Georgia’s Way, led by Salome Zurabishvili, a former Tbilsi council member and a former French diplomat, emerged out of the presidential election process. It now looks to significantly erode, if not overturn, the National Movement’s majority in the parliamentary elections expected to take place in April – around the time of the next NATO summit in Bucharest.
Elements of Western Orientation
Georgia’s government and people can be characterised as the most sceptical of Russian influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2005, after a unanimous vote, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution which eventually led to the withdrawal of Russian military forces based in Georgia. Saakashvili has frequently challenged Russia’s role in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has called for Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones to be replaced by EU peacekeepers.
Thus, Georgia can be considered to have accomplished the first stage in the Euro- Atlantic integration process: the general orientation of the state’s policies, despite their absolutist character, point West. What of the prospects for NATO and EU membership though? Saakashvili’s government has consistently defined Euro-Atlantic integration in terms of joining both institutions. In September 2006, NATO offered Georgia ‘Intensified Dialogue’ status, as part of its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) towards eventually joining the alliance. Now, a trans-Atlantic debate has been brewing for months over whether to offer Georgia the next step: a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest summit.
Before the events of November, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said Georgia is ‘on track…has performed well and it is performing well’ in terms of moving towards membership, but his statements have since been more guarded. The US, with Senator Richard Lugar at the forefront, continues to push for the presentation of a MAP in April. Western European capitals, Paris in particular, are more sceptical, and have floated the idea of a compromise or Georgia Action Plan. Nevertheless, Tbilisi maintains that membership could be realised in 2009.
This is not because Georgians are not enthusiastic about joining the Alliance. In March 2007, Georgia’s parliament voted unanimously in favour of a declaration committing the country to further reforms aimed at NATO membership. Opinion polls consistently show 80 per cent of the population in favour of joining NATO, and a national referendum held in conjunction with January’s election produced a 77 per cent result in favour of membership.[1]
However, this is linked to perhaps the greatest obstacle to Georgia’s accession. Much of this enthusiasm stems from the belief in Georgia that NATO membership will protect them from Russian influence, but also may present a solution for Georgia’s breakaway frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, alliance expansion fatigue aside, Georgia would likely become a NATO member if reforms continued, were it not for its frozen conflicts. Russian sponsorship of the de facto independent statelets would bring two potential Article V issues into the alliance, where collective security might have to be exercised against Russian-backed or Russian armed forces. While both Scheffer and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier have said that the frozen conflicts should not hinder Georgia’s NATO aspirations, the hesitancy with which the Alliance has approached Georgia’s enthusiastic case can only be explained by their festering presence.
NATO membership is viewed by many as a stepping-stone to eventual EU membership. It has been demonstrated that this is the aim of Saakashvili’s government, but unlike a Georgia in NATO, a Georgia in the EU is on the short-term horizon. In 1996, Georgia and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which set up a number of consultative bodies that met on a regular basis. However, it was only in 2004 that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was extended to the South Caucasus, and an EU-Georgia Action Plan was only signed in November 2006. Intense work by Georgian officials produced a more comprehensive Action Plan than for Georgia’s South Caucasus neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with almost all of Tbilisi’s requested elements included. The EU’s new Black Sea Synergy and Central Asia policies have shed light on Georgia’s aspirations and concerns, and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana mentioned the possibility of EU peacekeepers for Georgia’s frozen conflicts.
Overall, relations between the EU and Georgia may be healthy, but this does not necessarily increase Georgia’s prospects for membership. In fact, the ENP was extended to the EU’s neighbours in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa in order to help foster a ‘ring of friends’ around the bloc. Since the striking down of the EU Constitution in 2005, expansion-sceptic EU member states have hinted at the ENP as drawing a line in the sand for EU boundaries. Again, this reality is largely due to internal EU factors, not Georgia’s inherent unsuitability or lack of potential. Therefore, Georgia’s prospects of joining NATO, while maybe not next year, are good in the medium term. In the long term, should the EU not entirely restrict further expansion, Georgia may well become a member of the European club.
Alexandros Petersen
Program Director, Caspian Europe Center, Brussels and Adjunct Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
NOTES
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, ‘Georgia doesn’t fit NATO bill – Russia’s NATO Ambassador’, 21 January, 2008-02-07 accessed on 07 February, 2008
You need 4 credits to access this item
If you are a member or registered user, please login
Not already a member and have not yet registered?
Copyright © 2009 RUSI