The GCC's anti-revolutionary expansion
RUSI Analysis, 19 May 2011
By David Roberts, Research Fellow / Director, RUSI Qatar
With its thirtieth anniversary in May, the Gulf Co-operation Council is proposing to expand by incorporating Morocco and Jordan. The unlikely inclusion is more a response and a challenge to the revolutionary impulses of the Arab Spring than it is towards regional coherence.
By David Roberts, Deputy Director, RUSI Qatar
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) celebrates its thirtieth anniversary in May and by way of celebration it is mooting the inclusion of two other countries. Yemen is not being considered for membership, even though it long wanted to join, is situated within the eponymous Gulf, borders two current members, shares tranches of historical memory as well as cultural similarities and is in profoundly desperate need of regional political and economic support. Iraq, a Gulf state bordering two current GCC members, sharing a similarly extensive historical record with its neighbouring states and plainly in need of the economic assistance that GCC membership could offer, is also not being considered
Instead, Jordan and Morocco are the countries in question. Though Jordan is not a Gulf country, it is contiguous to Saudi Arabia whereas Morocco's capital - Rabat - is separated by at least six countries, the Red Sea and nearly six and a half thousand kilometres from Muscat, Oman's capital: even Shanghai is closer. Given these geographical anomalies, what sort of union could seriously be made between this group of countries?
The GCC was founded in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent alteration of the regional order caused by the offensive role played by Iran in the Gulf, which led to the Iran-Iraq war. In search of common support, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Oman joined together. Initially hopes were high that this union would herald the beginning of greater economic, political and cultural unity among members. Three decades on, and aside from a few relatively minor accomplishments, the GCC has been remarkably unproductive.
Its lack of tangible end product is surprising. The group of states involved possess a common language, religion, geography, history, culture, economic make-up and many face similar problems; to name but one, all of them fear Iran to a greater or lesser degree. Yet even under these circumstances and with an archetypal example of a common 'enemy' which - as Rene Girard described - would often bind countries together, the GCC are a remarkably argumentative bunch.
The economic union and single GCC currency, for example, is a long running saga. Initially proposed in 2000 and scheduled to come into force in 2010, the latest estimates now point to somewhere around 2013. In the mean time, the UAE pulled out of the currency, seemingly not able to withstand the notion of the GCC Central Bank being based in Riyadh and not Abu Dhabi.
In military matters, the Peninsula Shield force too, comprising elements of all the GCC countries, is a shell of a fighting force. A study conducted in 2000 by a Lieutenant Commander at the US Naval War College is scathing of the Peninsula Shield as a whole.  Not only was there a 'nearly complete lack of interoperability' among the various units but the training was comically bad, so much so that 'success' on a gunnery exercise was judged on whether you could 'get the ammunition out of the muzzle. The number of hits is ignored.' Since 2000 things did not improve much given that the Peninsula Shield force was all but abandoned as the 2000s wore on. In 2008 it was resurrected under the mandate of a 'Rapid Reaction Force' but little was heard of it until its surprising intervention in Bahrain in February.
This is not the first time that other countries have been invited to join the GCC. In 1991 after, just after a crisis - Iraq's invasion of Kuwait - the GCC sought to station Syrian and Egyptian troops in the GCC under the auspices of the 'Damascus Declaration'. This idea soon fizzled out.
After another crisis - this time not the invasion of a member but an arguably bigger threat to all; the Arab Spring - again the GCC is moved to action. Yet the invitation of Jordan and Morocco appears to be a curious move.
The initial assumption is that the GCC are just expanding their club of Sunni Kings (with Oman being an exception; they are mostly Ibadi). Were Morocco and Jordan to join then all monarchies in the Arab world would be tied into the GCC. Obviously, the GCC with their significant wealth would then be able to support their fellow Kings to a greater degree: after all, no one in the GCC wants to set the precedent of one of their brethren falling from power to a republic or even set a tone of greater constitutionality.
Following on from the Damascus Declaration precedent, the GCC could be motivated by the notion of facilitating an official path for the stationing of Jordanian troops in the Gulf. Not only are the Jordanian armed forces the most professional Arab force, but the Gulf Kingdoms clearly do not trust their own forces. Historically, many rested on foreign guarantees of power from the Ottomans then the British then the Americans on whom many rely to this day. Moreover, the recent example of the UAE's development of a mercenary army is a devastating indictment on the lack of confidence that they have in their own armed forces.
The idea that these states would join together to augment their collective strength is also - at least in theory - persuasive. Indeed, there are two possible blocs for the GCC to unite against. First, there is the sectarian divide which has come to the fore in recent months, whereby the GCC could band together their political and military capabilities versus Iran. After all, it was Jordan's King Abdullah who coined the phrase 'the Shia Crescent' in 2004. Second, this new configuration of states could come together as a bulwark against the two potentially resurgent Arab states that traditionally sought to dominate the region: Egypt and Iraq.
Yet arguably the most persuasive driver of this unusual policy stems from the fact that the GCC states want to draw a line in the sand: no more revolutions. This initiative is heavily led by Saudi Arabia with the UAE following closely behind. The revolutions have profoundly perturbed the powers that be in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Seeing Tunisia's regime fall was interesting if slightly perturbing; seeing Egypt's regime fall was earth-shakingly concerning: if Mubarak with his three decade-long vice-like grip on power in a country that experienced 5 per cent growth per year that was staunchly supported by America can be evicted, anyone can. After Mubarak, Syria and Libya began to wobble alarmingly and any such concerns in Bahrain were viciously halted with Saudi Arabia's help and mandate.
The notion of Jordan and Morocco joining the GCC is, therefore, arguably first and foremost a way of stopping the roll of the revolutions; halting its momentum. Any recent progression in Morocco and Jordan towards a more representative, constitutional monarchy would in all likelihood be halted as an intrinsic part of the GCC deal.
Will it come to pass?
The GCC is replete with half-baked and unrealised initiatives. Such a profound change would surely take this organisation, which typically operates at a glacial pace, many years to arrange, during which time the idea will most likely be quietly shelved. Indeed, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait appear to be far more reticent about the expansion.
Qatar and Kuwait in particular are secure in their own borders have very little to fear from the Spring Revolutions. Oman meanwhile probably does not want to see an extra two hungry mouths to feed, fearing that while they would never be left to starve and fend for themselves, they would most likely ipso facto get more support if Jordan and Morocco are not included.
The only caveat to this is that Saudi Arabia is profoundly concerned by recent events as indicated by the unprecedented intervention in the Bahrain troubles. Under these circumstances, and given how much politics across the Gulf is dominated by personalities, they could potentially strong-arm this move through the GCC: after all, unusual times call for unusual measures.
It is also worth noting that this move is not necessarily supported in Jordan and Morocco. Certainly, many may be pleased at such a union given the potential economic benefits that might transpire. However, not only would the trickle-down of any GCC cash take some time, but many realise perfectly well that joining the GCC would, as mentioned earlier, in all likelihood shelve any movement towards a more democratic system.
It may be a good thing for the GCC were this union not to come to pass. Already and despite the aforementioned similarities, there is an intrinsic disunity within the GCC and a bizarre lack of identity; of clarity of mission. The inclusion of the other states would make deciding what the GCC is actually there to do yet more of a challenge. Thus perhaps the GCC's lack of an ability to make a decision will, for once, be its saving grace.
 The Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsula Shield Force' Glenn Kuffel, Naval War College (7 February 2000)
Further Analysis: The Gulf Region, Middle East and North Africa