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NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Future Relationships and Strategies

10:00, 5 Oct 1987
RUSI, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET
Link to map: multimap

About the event:

The main inaugural address given by the Right Honourable Lord Carrington, KG, CH, KCMG, MC, Secretary-General to NATO, at RUSI on 5th October, 1987

Lord CarringtonThe speech:

My first reaction, when asked to make an inaugural presentation for your study on ‘NATO and the Warsaw Pact: the next fifteen years’ was perhaps a predictable one. I spend a good deal of my time worrying about what just one of those organizations is going to be doing in the next fifteen weeks; and to cover even that from now into the next century in half an hour or so, seemed sufficiently difficult to justify a polite but firm ‘no thank you’.

But then I thought again. The Field Marshal, after all, has never been much of a one for shooting foxes. Nor, l suppose, are other members of the RUSI Council. So, having planned an impressive one year’s study programme for a large and no less impressive cast, why would they run the risk of inviting someone who might come up with the answers at the formal opening? If you look at it that way, the penny begins to drop—and the job to look less difficult. The essence of it must be to steer well clear of the fox and of the answers. Those familiar with the literature and with the lecture circuit will know the trick to be neither unprecedented nor impossible to repeat; and l shall do my best to justify the confidence placed in me as someone likely to prove safe in this respect.

Forecasting the future

But looking ahead fifteen years is a complicated business, even if you are expected to leave the real work to others; and some tactical way must be found to divide up the field. Perhaps as good a beginning as any is to recall what in simpler times used to be suggested as the basic rule of British weather forecasting: you could do as well as anybody, and better than most, by predicting that the weather tomorrow would be much the same as the weather today. That rule had one very important drawback. However often it came top of the class in predicting tomorrow’s weather, it proved perfectly useless at predicting change in the weather. And it is the ability to predict change—in the weather or in the political climate—that meteorologists and political scientists are most concerned to develop. And rightly so, because it is above all change that brings opportunities to be grasped and problems to be resolved. This truism is never more apt than at present, when the recent agreement in principle on INF has made even sober observers like myself talk in terms of changes in the landscape of European security, of unprecedented prospects for genuine reductions in nuclear arsenals, and of a climate in East—West relations that frankly would have been unthinkable when I took up office under three and a half years ago. I shall try in what follows to indicate some areas where change, preferably for the good, seems possible. But before doing so, let me underline, in the interests of proper perspective, that the safest prediction about NATO and the Warsaw Pact may still prove to be the one about the British weather.

Approaching the year 2000

It is not very exciting to suggest that we may find ourselves in fifteen years time much as we are now; and that is certainly not the stuff of which headlines and fashionable seminars and TV programmes are made. But it may nevertheless be true. The sky may not fall on our heads on 3l December 1999; Mr Gorbachev`s thinking may prove nearer realization at home than abroad; Eastern Europe may know better than to test the limits of Perestroika; and somebody may find himself here in fifteen years time, worrying about the Alliance relying too much on nuclear weapons and American help—essential though both will continue to be—and doing too little to provide a sufficient counterweight to Warsaw Pact conventional strength. As I say, not very exciting. But not entirely unrealistic either, despite—or should I say because of—the recurrent talk of ‘NATO in crisis’ and ‘NATO at the crossroads’, such headlines here become almost as much part of Alliance life as communiqués and special meetings of the Council.

But I undertook to concentrate on the possibilities of change. I shall do so, if you will allow me, very largely with NATO in mind, because it would be a subject for at least another lecture to do justice to all the things which could happen to the Warsaw Pact - but which I suspect will not.

Possibilities of change

I shall start with possibilities of change for the worse; but I do not propose to include among them the visions of nuclear holocaust that are most frequently used to fuel the fervour of the protest movements. They, for their part, may claim that such an omission is arbitrary, cowardly and dishonest; and perhaps even all three. And they may seek to argue their case by sketching out a specific scenario—let us say an accidental nuclear launch, leading to retaliation and subsequent escalation—and by asking what odds one would give against its happening. A million to one? Five hundred million to one? A billion? A trillion? And, once you`ve picked your number, the triumphant answer: aha, so you admit it could happen tomorrow!

It won’t happen tomorrow. And it won’t happen while we stick to the main lines of our present political and military approach. I can’t prove that, mathematically or otherwise. And I am certainly not saying that those who have accumulated this unprecedented destructive power do not have an awesome responsibility to ensure that the nightmare never happens. They do. And I am confident that they will. That is not to say that I can’t think of ways in which things could be improved, and I shall come back to that later. But it does mean that I disagree with those who claim that the present position is inherently and fundamentally unstable.

My own fear is rather that we could bring about a less stable situation by introducing—no doubt with the best of intentions—what turn out to be the wrong changes. And it seems to me the beginning of wisdom in this field is to accept that dangerously wrong changes could he made either in the way that we arm or the way that we disarm. Neither process can be declared a priori to be stabilising or destabilising; and it is prejudice rather than logic which accounts for the strongly—held views to the contrary at either end of the political spectrum.

Strategic defence

To take the armaments side first, I must confess I have always been rather suspicious of those who claim that the Soviet Union is on the point of producing a super-weapon that will leave the West at a hopeless disadvantage unless we very quickly spend a lot of money on X or Y. And I am equally suspicious of those who see a technological fix just around the corner for our own problems. But, despite the tendency to science-fiction hype, the only safe assertion to make about emerging technology is that it will continue to emerge; that it will continue to have an important influence on actual and perceived military strength; and that we cannot afford to lose our competitive edge.

Attempts to stop the tide by unreliable bans on particular kinds of research are bound to fail, and to bring arms control into disrepute in the process. And self-denying ordinances by one side may have the counter-productive effort of encouraging the other to exploit a monopoly. For both these reasons, I believe that the Americans have been right to pursue their research into strategic defence. I also believe that they have been right to question the assumption that the best way to adhere to a global ban on chemical weapons is to leave the Soviet Union with a de facto monopoly.

In other words, I see in both these areas a good prudential case for not sitting on our hands. But it will mean action carefully judged to achieve what is strategically and politically sensible and not merely what is technically feasible; because stability in a dynamic world will be affected at least as much by reaction as by the original action, and Soviet reactions are something that we can hope to influence but not to control.

Incautious disarmament

For all the concern about a technologically driven and potentially destabilising arms race—by no means all of which is exaggerated and misplaced—the greater danger for NATO seems to me not the Scylla of incautious armament, but the Charybdis of incautious disarmament. By which I mean not only, active disarmament, which is a matter of conscious decision, whether taken unilaterally or as a result of negotiation; but also what might be called passive disarmament, which is what Defence Ministers are finding increasingly difficult to avoid, under pressure on the one hand from Finance Ministers and Cabinet colleagues and Star Chambers and on the other, from a seemingly inexorable rise in the real costs of defence equipment.

I hope that your study will find time to look in some detail at the question of passive disarmament, because it is a problem which should be of growing concern to the West in general and to Western Europe in particular. An INF agreement will inevitably highlight the conventional element in deterrence and the imbalance which currently exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this area. There is not the slightest doubt that Western Europe could afford to contribute more to its defence, and a failure to do so—and, still more, a failure to maintain current levels of effort—will be to convey two potentially very dangerous signals. One, to those in the United States in any case inclined to question the scale if not the principle of the American commitment to the defence of Europe. And the other, to those in Moscow who argue that there is no reason to negotiate seriously about a conventional balance which, given time, will inevitably tilt further in the Soviet direction.

Defence expenditure

The problem cannot simply be pushed aside on the grounds that we`ve heard it all before, because the crucial point is that the signals are now being read by new political generations who will reach conclusions based on the evidence as they see it. The problem is to convince them; and to do that we shall have to look hard at attitudes which are well established, but which we cannot now afford. We all want hospitals and schools; most of us also want lower taxes; and some of us attach great importance to targets for the public sector. But it cannot make sense to determine defence spending by seeing what is left after all those complicated sums have been done; rather than by tackling directly the admittedly difficult task of identifying the job that needs to be done, and the tools that are needed to do it. Given wise leadership, there should be no need for highly-coloured analysis of threat—and still less for actual crisis—to remind us that defence is the first responsibility of government, and the most basic of the services it is there to provide. But political attitudes grown out of decades of peace have tended to leave, all over Europe and in NATO, Defence Ministers rather isolated in Cabinet; in most cases quite simply not getting enough.

That is not to say that the problem is entirely one of input; there are attitudes to be changed on the military and on the defence contractors’ side too. It is easy to understand why new systems need to perform better than those they are designed to replace; but I find it much less easy to understand why sophisticated electronics seem to get progressively cheaper on the High Street and more expensive when you put them into uniform. Some will tell you that, if there were a simple answer, it would have been found long ago. I used to be told that at great lengths. But the answer is simple, and it is not the finding that is difficult. No-one would deny as an abstract proposition that such ingredients as cost-plus contracting, state-of-the-art-plus specifications (often ratcheted up a further demanding notch or two in mid-stream) and protectionist—not to say chauvinistic—purchasing policies are potentially explosive as far as prices are concerned. If we insist on combining spark and tinderbox, it's easy enough to predict the result; but not nearly so easy to mobilise and to sustain the political impetus to do something effective about it.

European collaboration

Having said that, I must in fairness recognise and commend the efforts that are being made, both in national administrations and internationally, in the IEPG and in NATO. There are certainly encouraging steps to which we can point, and I do not doubt that they can be incrementally built upon. But I shall not believe that we are locked into a virtuous circle until all the Heads of Government of the NATO countries get whole-heartedly into the act, and commit governments as a whole to the necessary long-term effort.

If a dramatic move is needed to start things off, let me suggest the next generation of the main battle tank. There are those who perhaps even remember in l970 that I tried just to do that. Assuming that we shall need one, why could not governments decide now that one country or one consortium will build it for use by NATO as a whole? All kinds of arrangements could be envisaged to provide compensating balance where it may be needed; and I would in particular envisage a special degree of involvement in the design effort and in contracted-out production on the part of the existing tank-producing nations. But let us have the courage to say with de Gaulle "L'intendance suivra". If we insist always on putting the compensatory details first, I am afraid that it may turn out that le tank ne suivru pas. Major breakthroughs may not be round the corner, but over the long term I suspect that the Alliance will have to consider some real changes in the way it organises and operates the conventional defence effort if current pressures are to be relieved and a better return on investment is to be achieved.

Active disarmament

Turning now from passive to active disarmament, I ought, of course, to be able to dismiss the dangers of unilateral disarmament as no longer of major concern. The INF story has, after all, provided us with an excellent lesson; and, assuming that the agreement in principle is brought to fruition on the lines now envisaged, the conclusions should be indisputable. The unilateralists contributed to the debate many reasons for not deploying Western systems, but not a single idea likely to get rid of or lessen the menace of the SS-20s. They remind me of Dean Inge’s remark: "It is useless for the sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism when the wolf remains of a different opinion". Western governments took their decision, stuck to it, and there is now every reason to expect that we shall end where we said we were ready to go in 1979: to a position without Cruise and Pershing II, and without any of the relevant Soviet systems.

That, surely, as far as the unilateralists are concerned, should be game, set and match. Not for West against East, because disarmament negotiations need to strike a balance of advantage if they are to succeed, and this one is no exception. But for Western governments against their anti-nuclear critics. I would feel more confident that the lesson had been learnt if some of the more prominent of those critics were at least prepared to say: ‘Well, it was a difficult one to call, but I have to admit that on this occasion you were right’. Perhaps they have, and I missed it.

However that may be, we face the future with the middle ground of Western public opinion still uneasy about the nuclear element in NATO strategy, and ready to lend at least half an ear to whatever is presented as a radical alternative: ranging from the unilateral adoption of what is rather optimistically called a policy of ‘defensive defence’; through what is surely in the foreseeable future a quite unrealistic objective of total worldwide nuclear disarmament; to the erection of perfect defences. I can understand the temptation; but the real challenge of our time is surely how to live with—and to live safely with—nuclear weapons that will remain potentially devastating. Here again, there is a need for wise leadership; and wise leadership that extends across party lines.

The dangers of negotiated disarmament

Perhaps—and I hope it will, Field Marshal—part of your study will look at why it is that bipartisan consensus on crucial aspects of defence policy has seemed to break down in quite a large number of allied countries; at whether it is in the process of re-establishing itself; and at what might be done to help. There is a clear responsibility here for parties in government, as well as for parties in opposition; and this really is a case where things could turn very badly for the worse if we do not come up with the right answers.

I am not, of course, alone in seeing dangers in unilateral disarmament; but there are some at present who seem more concerned to spell out the dangers of negotiated disarmament—or, at least of specific negotiations. I would not deny for a moment that you can come away from a negotiating table with a thoroughly bad deal; and, if the only deal on offer is a bad one, we must have the courage to reject it—or, better still, the foresight not to head down that road in the first place. But I do not believe that the INF agreement which has been reached in principle is a bad one. Having worked hard and consistently to that end since 1979 and 1981 and finally brought the Soviet side round, we should take yes for an answer—and also take credit for the major achievement that is in sight.

The Alliance is now in a good position to do some constructive thinking on future disarmament negotiations, and your study could not be better timed. An INF agreement is, I hope, well on the way; 50 per cent reductions in US and Soviet strategic arms should be the next step in the nuclear field; and we are also committed to work for an effective global ban on chemical warfare, and for a stable East-West balance in conventional weapons at lower levels. None of this need—or should—be put into question. But we do need from now on to have a better overall picture of the route we want to take, and of the influence which progress—or the lack of it—in one field, whether nuclear or conventional, should have on what we do in another.

That in very general terms is what I think foreign ministers at Reykjavik decided needed to be done;

That’s what the Council in Permanent Session is beginning to do. It is not a one-off job; and it ought to become more a way of life, if that phrase has not acquired a meaning rather less productive than what I have in mind. The point is that we have much to gain from a sensible and indeed energetic pursuit of disarmament agreements of the right kind; that it requires military as well as political judgment to decide what is the right kind; and what mistakes can be costly—and a failure to go for the right agreement may prove just as costly as settling for the wrong one. The planning, and the politico—military balancing and steering process implied by all this, are vital tasks for the Alliance, and ones that need to occupy the Council more fully and more systematically than has been the case in the past.

I said that I would start with possibilities of change for the worse. You will nevertheless have noticed, sometimes between the lines and sometimes more directly, some fairly broad hints about the possibilities of change for the better; and I hope that I shall not be branded a pessimist if I refrain from spelling them all out again. But I should like to add a word or two more on the optimistic side of the balance before concluding.

Continuity vs change

Turning just to the United States, the main policy ingredient I would hope for is continuity rather than change. Not because I think that everything Washington does is right; but because, standing back and trying to look at the forest as a whole, I would judge that United States` foreign and defence policy in the post-war period has done us all proud. American budget experts will be able to demonstrate that this has been done at a considerable cost. What is much harder to demonstrate—and another thing I can’t prove—is what I suspect would have been the much greater cost, for the United States as well as for Western Europe, of doing anything very different. I believe that that will continue to hold broadly true over the period of your study.

And so will the very special responsibility of both the United States and the Soviet Union for managing the nuclear factor in the strategic equation. I mentioned earlier that this was an area in which improvements might be envisaged; and here too I would put the emphasis on the need for continuity in American policy. Continuity that is, in what has become an established tradition of American leadership in this field, beginning with the ABM Treaty and SALT I, and now moving well beyond the territory of SALT II to the radical reductions for which successive US administrations have called. Life, of course, has not been quite that simple and what I have called the established tradition has come under rigorous attack from those who question whether we can safely do business with the Soviet Union in this field. My own inclination has always been to ask whether we can afford not to do business, if by that you mean trying not only to negotiate formal agreements but also to develop through dialogue greater predictability and confidence in the management of the strategic balance.

And the fact is that business is being done, on an agenda much more radical than anything that has gone before. The next major task will be to remove the obstacles to 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive weapons; and the present and future picture on the defensive side of the coin will undoubtedly be relevant. But to recognise a logical inter—relationship between offensive and defensive does not make it

any easier to predict how it will work in ten years time; and my guess is that what may now seem major problems will be easier for the United States and the Soviet Union to tackle once the 50 per cent reductions in strategic arms have actually been achieved, and there has been more time—and more experience—to put into joint study of the way ahead.

Improved East-West relations

There are other ways too in which Mr Gorbachev could help. Not by taking risks with the security of the Soviet Union, which no-one in the West is expecting or asking; but by concentrating on what really would be new in Soviet thinking on foreign policy. By which I mean not the warming over and spicing up of the self-serving initiatives of yesterday; but a determined and sustained effort to do with the Western governments of the day the business that is there to be done.

The evidence on the nuclear side is still mixed. On the conventional side, some new things are being said while some old things are being done—or, in the case of MBFR, not done. A fully satisfactory solution in this field would require some radical re-thinking in Moscow of what is needed not only to face the West but also to maintain Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. But we must not close our minds to the possibility that the Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in a better relationship with the West, albeit for reasons of making their own system work better rather than some democratic evolution.

The future of NATO

And then there is Western Europe, whose post-war achievement in reducing old enmities has been immense and will, I am confident, prove lasting. But to say that the laurels will not fade, is not to condone their being sat upon. It will, I think, become increasingly clear over the period of your study that Western Europe needs to contribute more to its security, both in the East-West and the global context. The potential is there politically, economically and militarily; but it will be a formidable task, not least for institutional reasons, to mobilise it effectively. Similarly there are creative developments, whether they be in fora such as the IEPG, WEU or, indeed, through increased Franco/German cooperation which can be forces for the good, provided they are seen, both by the Europeans themselves and from across the Atlantic, as contributing to the vigour of the Alliance as a whole rather than weakening its integrity and cohesion.

If the job is done successfully—and there is an element of challenge there to the United States as well as the more direct one to Western Europe—it will do much to determine the answer to what NATO and the Warsaw Pact will look like fifteen years hence. You will perhaps, Field Marshal, have noticed that I have seen through a glass darkly; my crystal ball is a bit clouded. There may be some who follow you who have a much clearer and more certain idea of what is to come. Well, they may be right or they may not. All I hope is that like you and I they will be cautious and prudent where our independence and our security lies.

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