



Africa Programme

Zimbabwe: Crisis, Reconstruction and Security*

RUSI Conference 7 February 2008

On 7 February 2008, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) hosted a conference on Zimbabwe. This conference, which attracted a full house, discussed the current crisis with a particular focus on the March 2008 elections and the prospects for reconstruction and improved security in its aftermath. International and regional experts from academe, NGOs, the media, political and security fields were joined by a number of speakers and participants from Zimbabwe, representing both opposition parties and the government.

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Summary

Presentations and discussion spanned security, politics and economics. After the keynote speakers, the second session covered the Zimbabwean security sector.

- Police and military in Zimbabwe are politicised and are sources of insecurity
- The police are a tool of autocracy politically dominated by the ruling party
- The military are part of the governing fabric of the state
- Both are critical to understanding the Zimbabwean political landscape, particularly when considering post-crisis reconstruction

The session on the post-2000 crisis and future scenarios involved heated discussion and a wide variety of views on the panel and in the discussion.

- Politics has been characterised by intolerance and disunity.
- Foreign media coverage obscures the real MDC/ZANU-PF divisions by framing the issue in terms of white farmers and land reform
- MDC representatives compared the coming election to the 1980 election; then, the incumbent regime controlled the media and security forces, but still lost
- The opposition has an 'extraordinary penchant for scoring own goals'
- Ethnic or sectarian conflict is unlikely but voters are increasingly disillusioned with the ruling and opposition parties

There has been little comprehensive work concerning 'post-Mugabe Zimbabwe', and the next session elaborated on the economics of reconstruction and the media.

- Reconstruction needs bilateral donors alongside multilateral mechanisms.
- The international consensus on economic renewal and development is congruent with the aims of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
- Agriculture should form the initial dynamo of Zimbabwe's economic recovery
- China's influence in Africa will alter the character of Western assistance
- The diaspora will play a key economic role, whether they return or not
- The Media has polarised Zimbabwean society, and the roots of the problems may be in the foundations of the state itself

Rising to the next level of analysis, the final session discussed the global and regional context of the crisis and reconstruction, including the role of the diaspora.

- Despite political mistrust, regional integration spurred by non-state actors is now a reality
- In the SADC, Zimbabwe finds few friends at the policy level, even if there is no public censure
- The diaspora has emerged from the economic and political excesses of the regime, and exile has been involuntary and voluntary

- Critical perspectives on the country's economic collapse exist: the country only became a 'failed state' after land reform was highlighted in the foreign media
- The role of the diaspora is not straightforward, but ultimately return will only happen if there is an inclusive democratic system; capacity remains a challenge

Opening Remarks

Lord Peter Blaker

The Hon Lord Peter Blaker presented the keynote address. He charted the historical relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe. In his presentation, he pointed out that during the UDI period, from 1965-1980, Britain imposed punitive sanctions on the Rhodesia Front government led by Ian Smith. He added that Britain's interest in post-independence Zimbabwe has never been one of encouraging regime change. Rather, Britain has consistently promoted development and good governance in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere.

Lord Blaker also stated that the post-2000 sanctions imposed by Britain were not economic sanctions against the Zimbabwean people. Rather, they were targeted sanctions against the 130 key members of the ZANU-PF elite. He said that Zimbabwe's problem was not one of a bilateral dispute between Britain and Zimbabwe; it was due to a failure of governance by the Mugabe regime, which was at war with its own citizens. He stated that the March elections offered the people of Zimbabwe a chance to elect their leaders, and that it was his hope that the post-election period would see a genuine resolution of the crisis.

Dr Agostinho Zacarias

Dr Zacarias (United Nations Development Programme, Harare) spoke about the UNDP's role in Zimbabwe. He pointed out that the UNDP has had to weather criticism from all sides about its role in Zimbabwe. Some critics have attacked the UNDP for remaining in Zimbabwe, while others have criticised the organisation for not becoming more involved in helping to resolve the crisis. Dr Zacarias noted that the UNDP in Zimbabwe has to walk a tightrope because it must maintain impartiality and promote development in the country.

Session Two: the Security Sector

This session examined the current architecture of both the police and the military in Zimbabwe in terms of their institutional make up and their impact on the political environment and human security.

Security sector reform and national reconstruction

Dr Martin Rupiya (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria) was the first presenter. He focused on the politicisation of the Zimbabwean military and the militarisation of the nation. For the ruling party, the military are an alternative to the mass support that sustained them until 2000. The imperfect execution of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and security sector reform (SSR) in the post-majority rule era has resulted in an officer corps that is very close to, and aligned with, the ruling party. Furthermore, in public utilities, the insertion of military personnel has formed a stop-gap administrative measure in response to the mass exodus of skilled employees and professionals. There are around 40,000 soldiers in the military.

Dr Rupiya pointed out that the military is not, however, a monolithic entity. Few military personnel are directly involved in politics (around 1,000): there are two distinct parts to the military. The larger part is beginning to suffer from the wider economic decline, whereas the smaller part is entwined in the political establishment. The degradation of the military because of military activity will be a key concern in post-crisis Zimbabwe.

Nevertheless, the military are to be found in many political and geographical spheres of the nation. Most importantly, they are an integral part of the political centre that releases election results. This subversion of the ideal divide between the body politic and the military is worrying, but it is not new. In 2000, the military declared that it was non-partisan. However, this was the last apolitical statement that they have made; since then, the military has moved towards becoming part of the governing fabric of the state.

The March election is not simply about changing the ruling party, but about reworking wider governance arrangements. Understanding the nature and the role of the military in Zimbabwean politics is essential when considering post-election outcomes. Should Mugabe be returned by the result, then there will be an effort to reverse the severe economic distress before his public support collapses completely, and the military will be at the centre of this effort. If Makoni were to win, then he may be challenged by funded war veterans and unable to extend his rule into the countryside. Even with a Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) victory, the military are likely to play a key role in political affairs. Thus, a key question in any post-election outcome is: how can we achieve reconciliation between the military and society?

The role of the police in Zimbabwe

Dr Charles Goredema argued that the Zimbabwe Republic Police exercises powers inherited from the British South Africa Police, which was the tool of a minority-rule state. The transformation of the police was essentially in name only, and it retained its authoritarian streak. Despite the declaration of populist principles since 1980 – claiming to be ‘for the law, for the people and for the country’ – it has remained a tool of post-colonial autocracy. The police are a highly militarised institution, and politically dominated by the ruling party through extensive systems of patronage, particularly at senior levels of command.

Dr Goredema argued that there is a crisis in law enforcement. The strong umbilical bond with government has undermined the ability of the police to provide basic security. It cannot deal with organised crime and the explosion in the illicit provision of goods and services. It is also unable to deal with internal corruption within the force. Far from an ideal-type institution upholding the law without fear or favour, the predatory police force commits human rights violations and holds the law and judiciary in contempt. He asserted that it is the police themselves suppressing the rule of law, and fostering the environment of lawlessness.

The result is that the police themselves are a threat to human security. A predatory police cannot be expected to give protection from crime. Instead, they block access to justice and further the persistently negative international perceptions of Zimbabwe.

When considering the reform of the police in a post-crisis environment, there appear to be three underlying assumptions: first, there must be fundamental constitutional change; second, there must be sufficient funding for the transformation of the police; third, there must be structures in place to prevent a new government from exploiting the transition for its own benefit. Whatever the outcome of the elections, a multi-pronged strategy will be required. He argued that the strategy must comprise a comprehensive examination of the scale and nature of police misconduct since 1980; the senior levels of command must be replaced, and there must be an appropriate dispensation of justice and the appointment of civilian personnel to key strategic posts; the police must also be re-branded; and training must be revised. The UN and Interpol should be able to provide technical assistance in this regard.

He concluded by saying that police reform will be protracted and the meeting of public expectations is not guaranteed. However, for there to be a chance of success, both time and funds are needed.

Discussion

Participants queried the need for, and implementation of, comprehensive SSR. To what extent is the problem due to simply ill-suited appointments in the upper echelons of the military? How would a reform package deal with regime members in the police?

It was observed that the Zimbabwean context is complicated. Military officers sit not only in the central committee, but also in other party structures. One reason for this has been the loss of skilled civilian staff to emigration. The result, however, is that the military is diverted from its proper role of defending against national threats from abroad. In dealing with the top brass, of twenty to twenty-five officers, much will depend on the process of examination of responsibility for crimes and abuses. This will also guide action towards middle ranks. A truth and reconciliation commission will likely be a minimum requirement.

One final suggestion aired was that due to the 'creeping coup' in the country, hopes for a military 'liberation' of the country are unfounded.

Session Three: Post-2000 Crisis and Future Scenarios

The third session examined the history of the opposition in Zimbabwean politics before moving on to a wider examination of Zimbabwe's political future, including the candidacy of Simba Makoni.

The opposition in Zimbabwe 1980-2008

Mr Wilf Mbanga (Editor, *The Zimbabwean*) provided a historical overview of Zimbabwean state vs opposition politics, which he described as being characterised by intolerance. Before majority-rule, nationalist leaders were suspicious of each other and disunited. The language used today shows the continuation of this legacy; opponents are described as 'sell outs'. Former Rhodesian leader Ian Smith accused all nationalists of being communists; blacks were supposed to be content in the Rhodesian state. Today, this rhetoric is mirrored: opponents of the Mugabe regime are not autonomous; rather, they are guided by external forces seeking to undermine the state. This has been the case since before majority rule. The political opposition to the regime has been systematically denounced and quashed after 1980.

The destruction of the alternative nationalist party, ZAPU, meant there was no opposition to the ZANU-PF regime for a number of years. The first test of ZANU-PF's

primacy was ZUM, and there was a violent backlash against the new opposition. The emergence of the MDC in 1999 posed the first challenge in twenty years.

Predictions that Mugabe would lose the 2000 elections caused a panic; while the murder of white farmers grabbed international headlines, this disguised the real line of division; all those killed (including 200 black farmers) were in fact MDC supporters. International scrutiny did cause the regime to tone down its tactics away from killing to beatings and intimidation. But the message was clear: opposition to Mugabe would elicit a heavy toll, and violence against electoral opposition was acceptable.

The security sector has been complicit in this. Mbanga noted that police do not arrest ruling party members no matter how violent the crime. Often, the security services are directly involved in committing the crime. Regime tactics include patronage to regime supporters, violence against opposition supporters, infiltration of the opposition (for example, by agents provocateur) and control of the security apparatus and the media.

There are two main strands of opposition to the Mugabe regime in the coming election: the external challenger of the MDC, and the recently declared internal challenge from within ZANU-PF of Simba Makoni.

'The politics of change': the Makoni candidacy

Mutumwa Mawere (Chairman, Africa Resources) examined Makoni's opposition to the Mugabe regime. It is clear that there is a problem in Zimbabwe, but it is less obvious whose responsibility it is to fix it. It is beyond doubt, however, that the majority of Zimbabweans believe change is necessary. Very few people actually participate in politics in the current environment, leading to a situation whereby those excluded from the ZANU-PF government are 'less Zimbabwean'.

The candidacy of Makoni, while not likely to draw the support of all opposition elements, offers a new face for change. But a change of regime in Zimbabwe will not happen, Mawere suggested, without input - there must be some form of investment in the process from non-governmental actors, such as the diaspora.

Zimbabwe 2008: what next?

Abraham Mdlongwa (Chairman, MDC UK, Mutambara) and **Richard Ndlovu** (MDC UK, Mutambara) outlined the MDC's perspective on the crisis. The opposition in Zimbabwe has historically made mistakes and not turned problems into opportunities. Indeed, in

the past they have displayed an 'extraordinary penchant' for scoring own-goals and as a result have both failed in the task itself and in learning the lessons of failure. The MDC now recognises this: in 2008, an MDC leader apologised to the Zimbabwean people for the collapse of a coalition, while also trying to reach an accommodation with rival factions.

The opposition face many barriers, and finding a winning strategy is very difficult. It is therefore not surprising, they observed, that many lose faith in the process. But they maintained that under no circumstances should opposition votes against ZANU-PF be split.

The elections in 2008 provide a turning point in Zimbabwean politics comparable to 1980, according to Mdlongwa and Ndlovu. Similarly to 1980, the incumbent regime enjoys a number of advantages; challengers have limited access to the media and violence and intimidation are deployed against the opposition as they were under minority rule. Nevertheless, 1980 resulted in a victory for the nationalist parties opposed to the ruling government. However, transposing this outcome to the present will require massive voter turnout to outpace the government's ability to rig elections.

Finally, one intriguing scenario was posed. If Mugabe wins the presidential elections but does not secure a parliamentary victory, the ruling party factions may try to form a coalition with opposition parties to form a national unity bloc.

The 2008 elections, the internal negotiations and Zimbabwe's future

The presentation by **Martin Makururu** (Zimbabwe High Commission, London) outlined the government's perspective on the coming elections. The 2008 elections will be held under new dispensation. Although it takes place under the constitution agreed at the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations, it is nevertheless amended by constitutional amendment 18,[†] agreed to in the Zimbabwean parliament.

Originally, 8 February 2008 was the final date for nominations, but this had been extended by one week. (At the time of the conference, it was not possible to confirm who, exactly, would be contesting the election, as many parties emerged at election time).

[†] The amendment provides for a shortened presidential term, an increased number of parliamentary seats in both the House of Assembly and the Senate, gives power to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to delimit parliamentary and local constituencies and places the parliament as an electoral college should the office of president become vacant.

Within Zimbabwe, there are negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDC, facilitated by the South African Development Community (SADC). This dialogue has resulted in the constitutional amendment under which these elections are taking place.

Makururu highlighted the divisive nature of the land reform issue, which lies at the core of Zimbabwe's problems. The way forward, he said, is to discuss and resolve the land ownership issue.

Discussion

This session was heated as participants challenged the speakers on a variety of issues. Some major strands of discussion emerged: what would elections achieve? More specifically, what is it that each of the parties offer the individual voter? And were there fears about a repeat of post-election ethnic violence seen in Kenya?

The likelihood of ethnic or sectarian violence was said to be low; conflict would occur for other reasons and along other lines. Another panellist argued that Zimbabwe is beyond Shona/Matabele issues: the parlous state of the economy is the dominant concern.

Regarding the platforms of the various parties, Mr Makururu declined to comment on behalf of the government. The MDC panellists listed a system of free and fair political participation, equal access to resources regardless of ethnicity, privatisation of politicised nationalised organisations, anti-corruption measures and security of land-tenure as opposition plans.

Points were also raised concerning the political parties and the constitution. Some argued that there is a fundamental disconnect between the people and the parties - for example, the negotiations under SADC auspices were between self-interested political parties, and parties cannot be separated from government. A lack of principles, one participant argued, was prevalent across the political spectrum, and Zimbabwe therefore had little hope of real change. Others made the point that the land reform issue is a dead-end, and that a change of power could be a healing factor in Zimbabwe's politics.

Session Four: Reconstruction

This session analysed the economics and the media of crisis and post-crisis Zimbabwe.

Post-crisis reconstruction

William Morrison (Adam Smith International) spoke about Zimbabwe's reconstruction.

He pointed out that there has been little comprehensive work regarding 'post-Mugabe Zimbabwe'. There were typically two responses: from government, that they recognised the need for planning; and from stakeholders, that crisis was not imminent. There is a concern over the lack of strategic planning for major international support for post-economic collapse. Lessons from other international economic interventions show that co-ordination is essential for an effective effort. Speed, in particular, is invaluable. Support should not simply be left to multi-donor mechanisms or the World Bank.

In his address, Morrison pointed out that assistance must be provided by bilateral donors such as the Department for International Development (DfID). A post-crisis government should also capitalise on the goodwill and intentions of the international community. A new government, however, must be careful to manage the expectations of its own population whilst also competing effectively for volume and quality of international assistance.

A reform agenda proposed by Adam Smith International suggests a '100 day agenda' of practical actions for donors and governments in the post-Mugabe era. Amongst these are the restoration of fiscal responsibility; removing the causes of conflict and implementing DDR; ensuring government capacity to deliver in the short term; and encouraging the return of skilled émigrés.

Morrison concluded by saying that international actors need to do more planning than they have done to date. The government of Zimbabwe, on the other hand, must get control of donors, and exert – and be seen to be exerting – this control.

The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe

Dr Beacon Mbiba (Oxford) followed with a presentation on a specific sector, agriculture, and its possible contribution to reviving Zimbabwe's economy. The World Bank's perspective is that there is a global environment conducive to Zimbabwe's revival and development. Agriculture can be the dynamo of this revival. At least in nominal terms, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) holds aims that are substantively congruent with this global consensus. The differences, however, may lie in implementation.

Briefly stated, the World Bank argues that agriculture contributes to growth and poverty alleviation, particularly in very underdeveloped economies where investment in the agricultural sector yields more GDP growth than investment in other sectors. It also provides backward and forward linkages, spurring growth in other sectors. But to achieve such results with small-holder agriculture, security of tenure (property rights) is vital. Zimbabwe has in recent years regressed from a transition economy (where agriculture contributes less) to one where it has more impact.

There are challenges in such a programme, according to Mbiba. Zimbabwe exhibits diversity in geography, infrastructure, ecology and markets. Both local and regional markets must be considered in any development package, as well as the diversity of actors in the system. Labour supply at the individual farm level may also prove a challenge, especially because of AIDS/HIV and migration.

Realising these challenges, reconstruction must balance long-term alignments (such as meeting EU standards) with short-term impact on local and regional economies. For each challenge, there is an opportunity. Labour shortages, for example, invite capital-intensive approaches to farming. With an economic consensus between Zimbabwe and global partners, small holders are the key to the revitalisation of the economy. Ultimately, they must become less dependent on the state.

The media and Zimbabwe

Mr Brilliant Mhlanga advanced a controversial thesis: that the media in Zimbabwe were 'guilty as charged' of creating polarisation within the country. He based his argument on a political economy approach to the media; whose interests are behind it?

The media's role in society is to give society a view of itself. Mhlanga insisted that institutionalised editorial policies in the Zimbabwean press, however, have served to distort this function and create a divided society. The media has framed issues and created angles that leave the consumers - the public - opinionated and polarised.

Mhlanga observed that this was evident in the characterisation of the crisis: Mugabe as a 'mad old man', geo-politically intransigent and misconstrued depictions of Zimbabweans. Other myths the media has created include the idea that Mugabe was a 'great leader' until 1998, and that his misdeeds can be dated from 2000.

Instead, argued Mhlanga, the real genesis of today's problems was in the creation of the post-colonial state. The pre-majority rule assumption that a peaceful and united Zimbabwe was possible was deeply flawed: the nation is based on a falsehood.

Furthermore, there is much hype in the media depictions of Makoni and Tsvangirai. But there is little information in who Makoni actually is; instead, he is depicted as a potential 'messiah'. Opposition leaders have been canonised by the media, even though they themselves have not stepped aside as leaders despite years at the helm.

Discussion

The first major question raised by participants concerned the role of China in post-crisis Zimbabwe. Given the emergence of China as a major economic investor on the continent and the adoption of 'look east' policies of development, what role could China play?

The case of Liberia was briefly examined. There, the effect of Chinese investment was readily apparent in major infrastructural and public service projects. This may effect a change in Western development thinking, which has shied away from such projects since an ideological shift in the 1980s. Western donors may once again start putting money into long-term projects and reform. Finally, there was also a need to restart Zimbabwe's indigenous intellectual capacity through funding of schools and higher education.

A renewed discussion of media culture followed: was the glorification of political opponents more to do with Zimbabwean political culture?

Some argued that the public nature of the environment in which the media operates has an effect, creating disagreement. Also, the media may be guilty on focusing on issues that are not conducive to conflict resolution, such as debating the causes of the conflict but not potential solutions.

Attention then turned to the role of the Zimbabwean diaspora. How would they be attracted home? The white farming community played a significant role in Zimbabwe's economy: how would they be attracted back? Furthermore, not all of Zimbabwe's 4 million diaspora are politically motivated; many have moved south for economic reasons. How might they be enticed back?

Predictably, the issue was complicated. The government would have to offer amnesties for those who had fled because of repressive legislation, and guarantee other rights such as citizenship and voting. This issue is a long-running one, dating from before 2000. But not all émigrés could be expected to return immediately, even if the government offered meaningful political guarantees. But this might offer an opportunity: entrepreneurs within the diaspora offer the possibility of international

economic linkages with Zimbabwean markets, boosting the chances for successful small-holder agricultural revival.

With regard to the white farming community specifically, the examples of the Mozambican and Zambian experiences were considered. There, without title to land (instead, there were ninety-nine year leases), production increased markedly. Infrastructure was developed with international donor support on land without title. Some participants argued, however, that the liberation struggle was essentially about land, but that politics over the issue should not be construed as zero-sum. Nevertheless, many expressed doubts over whether a return of departed white farmers was likely.

Questions were raised as to the specifics of the World Bank report on agricultural regeneration, in particular regarding how the interests of small holders would be defended in a globalised marketplace.

Agricultural reform would be a challenge. It was emphatically stressed that this would not just be the creation of 'peasant' subsistence farming. Linkages to other activities would sustain local economies. But distribution of good land would have to be considered, due to the great diversity of access to good land and skills. The under-utilisation of land must be rectified, and a tax system introduced to encourage its appropriate usage. Hope can be found in a core of agricultural production that can feed the nation and produce surplus for international markets.

Session Five: Zimbabwe and the International Community

The final session placed Zimbabwe and its crisis in global and regional context, including an examination of the Zimbabwean diaspora and its role in crisis and revitalisation.

South Africa, SADC and Zimbabwe

Mark Ashurst (Africa Research Institute) said that the Zimbabwean and regional narrative script suffers from a lack of 'imagination'. The relationship in the region and internationally has concerned befriending 'my enemy's enemy'. It is very difficult, when taking the 'long view', to analyse the alliances and alignments in the region. There is a legacy of mistrust in southern Africa.

Nevertheless, regional integration is, in fact, a reality in the region. It is driven by non-state actors, rather than political activism and governmental activity. In the SADC, we see a regional free trade area of 326 million people, and the political de-linking of issues. Within this region, Zimbabwe finds itself greatly out of step: it has become a liability in the wider project.

During the South Africa apartheid regime, Zimbabwe flourished. It was a key player in the regional trading bloc while South Africa was a pariah state. The decline of Zimbabwe is correlated with the revival of South Africa and an agenda of economic liberalisation in the region. But South Africa remains engaged with Zimbabwe because it has the second largest industrial infrastructure in the region; cutting Zimbabwe off like South Africa was during the apartheid era is not a realistic option.

So far, this agenda has failed to induce reform. Yet, Zimbabwe now finds few friends at the policy level in the SADC, though there is no desire to publicly ostracise Mugabe. Angola, flush with cash because of oil, supports the Mugabe regime because of a good personal relationship. A regional approach to modifying Zimbabwe's behaviour must do so in a way that Angola cannot undo.

My generation: the viewpoint of a Zimbabwean in the diaspora

Tendai Marima (Goldsmith, London) presented a 'real life' assessment of life Zimbabwe based on what she had seen during her most recent visit, in January 2008. Although currently working in the UK, Ms Marima was at pains to stress that she does not see herself as an alienated member of the diaspora, but rather as a Zimbabwean who is still very much in touch with the situation at home. From an academic perspective, Marima observed that the diaspora has emerged from the political and economic excesses of the regime; there is both voluntary and involuntary exile.

The negative impact on price controls on the private sector is clear. Consumers took advantage and began to hoard goods. The economy is reeling from this: shops are lined with 'rows and rows of bare shelves'. The black market is thriving, accounting for most economic activity. The banking sector is also beleaguered. Of the RBZ's reserves, 97 per cent have gone missing, and people have queued hours for paltry sums of their own money to be released to them. Hyperinflation has gripped the nation as banking confidence has collapsed.

It is not surprising, she argued, that an illicit cash economy has emerged through loopholes in business law. Although these are being closed, the underground currency markets are still thriving.

Zimbabwean Economic Collapse

Alfred Mutasa (independent political analyst) provided a critical perspective on the Zimbabwean economic collapse. He argued that in order to understand this crisis, global dimensions must be considered. Neo-liberal economics had a role to play, and the way in which they had been spread by globalisation.

The situation, Mutasa said, would not be resolved with the removal of Mugabe. The issue at stake is the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. Globalisation, through the global community, has cast blame on Zimbabwe for its ills, and ignored the impact of aid sanctions. These sanctions contribute to the suffering in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it was only after land reform that Zimbabwe was categorised as a 'failed state'. Zimbabwe, he said, is a victim of 'economic warfare' and the regime is only taking measures to protect its basic interests.

Addressing earlier points of the disunity of nationalist movement leaderships in pre-majority rule Rhodesia, he argued that on the ground such movements were more co-operative than their respective leaderships were.

He concluded by stressing that Zimbabwe is not a problem in the region. Far from being isolated, Zimbabwe is an active participant in the community of southern African nations.

Mr Phillip Chikwiramakomo (We Zimbabwe Trust) spoke about the diaspora. He challenged many of the assertions made about the diaspora, arguing that it is such a huge body that it cannot be expected to play *the* vital role in re-habilitating post-crisis Zimbabwe. There are economic issues, as well as political, at play.

Fundamentally, there must be a democratic system where people can contribute economically without fear or assistance. Change must be sustainable, and the youth are instrumental in this: there must be education to build a solid foundation for the future.

The main challenge is capacity: there is much talk, but few are actually willing to reengage, he claimed. The diaspora is important to the redevelopment of Zimbabwe, but immigration and asylum issues as discussed in the UK are harmful to this body of émigrés.

Discussion

Two main strands of debate emerged in the discussion, one concerning relations with South Africa, the other returning to the diaspora issue. How would Jacob Zuma as head of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa alter dynamics between the two states?

Panellists warned that we must not assume that Zuma will become president. The real architects of his victory have been the trade unions, and they are strongly aligned with those in Zimbabwe, and will not be in favour of a 'neo-liberal' strategy in the region. This is not a great result for Zimbabwe.

There are conflict dynamics within the ANC between the unions and other organs of the party: at the government level, the ANC has particular constraints. This will not see them attack Zimbabwe on idealistic positions, or advocate regime change. They are very aware of the limitations of the advocacy coming from certain groups in civil society, and the racial dimensions of an openly critical position.

One suggestion was raised as to how members of the diaspora, particularly skilled members, might be tempted back to Zimbabwe with higher wage packages. This idea was rejected. Pay must be meritocratic and based on skills. Manufactured incentives for return will not work: there is an increasing outflow of professionals elsewhere in Africa despite similar schemes. Globalisation itself, and the opportunities it provides, is one reason for this flow. Lastly, there was doubt over the ability of returning diaspora to seamlessly integrate into a changed society. There are likely to be tensions between returnees and those who stayed.