

## The RUSI Project on Civil-Military Relations

### Workshop II: Coordinating Multiple Actors to Achieve Maximum Effect in NATO SSRT Operations

#### Summary and Main Points of Interest

##### **Defining Priorities by Dissecting the Present: Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan**

###### *Problems:*

- False expectations
- No clarity of mission
- Multi-mandate aspect is making operations difficult for many actors
- PRT model is different in every country
- Each HQ brings a different legacy, and every theatre is different
- Development cannot be caused by NGOs, must come from within
- Key problem is enabling local structures; limit to Afghans' own capacity

###### *Suggestions for Improvement:*

- Note the difference between discussions on organisations versus discussions on functions
- Need common objectives agreed upon
- We must remember to consider what the insurgency is offering that we are not
- Misunderstanding that development takes place all the time in zones of conflict; it does not
- Far too little information-gathering and conflict analysis—work on this before a conflict too

##### **Improving Inter-Governmental Coordination**

###### *Problems:*

- Coordination is not enough, must have integration as well
- Difficulties with funding cycles as well, for example many development actors fund on three-year, not year on year cycle like most Governments
- NATO feels let down by lack of civilian engagements and therefore developed parallel structures to compensate
- Iraq business is engaged but not very enabled
- Issue of cost effectiveness: NATO, EU, UN all composed of the same Member States

###### *Suggestions for Improvement:*

- OECD guidelines on fragile states is a useful guide
- Strategy should not be entirely aspirational. Set targets that are actually achievable
- Understand differences in basic vocabulary: also called 'harmonisation and alignment', or 'coherence'
- Find ways to fill the constant gap in the provision of policing
- Need to incentivize cooperation rather than encourage competition
- Need higher-level military representatives to meet with NGOs

##### **Is NATO fit for Purpose?**

###### *Problems:*

- Today ISAF has much larger footprint than when it entered in OEF
- NATO does not want to have sole leadership of the comprehensive approach

- High demand for training and not enough resources to meet the need
- Limited resources—need sufficient military capacity for future comprehensive plan
- Different ROE & Chains of Command; internal tensions between MS

*Suggestions for Improvement:*

- Must develop a culture of strategic consultation and situational awareness
- Need to calibrate military engagement in full knowledge of other components
- Could use the comprehensive approach as a bridge for dialogue between HQ, National Governments, theatre level ops

**National Red Lines and Capabilities within the NATO Context**

*Problems:*

- Need the sharing of risks, rules and responsibilities
- Need more commonality

*Suggestions for Improvement:*

- Ultimately NATO MS are the ones in control, all sovereign states
- NATO needs to figure out its own identity
- Possibility of Civilian National Guard?
- The majority of people in Afghanistan already are private consultants; people are willing to go we just need to set it up properly with pay, insurance, time off work etc
- Understanding duty of care

**NATO's Role in Peace-Building and the PRT**

*Problems:*

- Basra: a litany of chaos
- Knowledge is temporary and timelines are odious
- Assassinations have hugely detrimental effect on recruiting local volunteers
- Need a review of PRTs due to the very unclear guidelines
- Want to avoid a situation where every PRT develops its own guidelines
- Very little training; few occasions where locals are involved

*Suggestions for Improvement:*

- Need a proper engagement matrix
- Goal of the PRT: to transition power out to the local population as quickly as possible
- Perfect PRT is civilian-led with embedded military/security advisers; should the name be called 'Provincial Stabilisation Team' instead?
- Need to re-evaluate the assumptions for PRTs:
  - R & D leads to consenting hearts and minds
  - good for morale of soldiers
  - development leads to security
  - troops have capabilities to offer R & D services
- PRTs should have a flexible concept that is adaptable

**Involving the Wider International Community**

*Problems:*

- difficulties in involving wider national community because of different jurisdictions, ie. NATO cannot confirm support officially for the ESDP Police Mission because one NATO member (Turkey) has blocked all support for EU, and need unanimity
- there are too many actors already in Afghanistan; also many bilateral commitments in addition to commitments through NATO or EU, ie UK counter-narcotics operations

- need to boost capacity to 1200 to 1600 (minimum) police officers
- need more built-in infrastructure to take over when ISAF and National forces leave so Afghans can take care of second-tier threats on their own
- need a better strategic framework
- problems of coordination are at the macro level, not theatre level
- fundamental difference between perceptions of different IOs, ie UN vs NATO 'you do war and we do peace and never the twain shall meet'

*Suggestions for Improvement:*

- ESDP Police Mission in Afghanistan-goal of 200 police officers to be stationed there, with the aim of building a professional, trusted and efficient police force
- Goals of ESDP Police Mission:
  - increased interaction between police and wider criminal justice systems work w/Min of Justice
  - coordinate and support the Joint Strategy
  - increased Afghan ownership of the police reform process
  - training, mentoring, monitoring, advising (non-executive)
  - putting the Afghan police in the driving seat
- Coordinate the economic and judicial structure to prevent newly trained ANP leaving to PSCs or becoming corrupted by bribes—use non-material incentives or increase pay
  - police force is not very useful without an accompanying judicial system and jails
- Better self-regulation in international community to ensure states meet their commitments
- Build internal capacity and resist private sector offers

**Strategic Communication and the Comprehensive Approach**

*Problems:*

- NGOs reluctant to associate themselves with NATO
- Need to enlarge the NC3-National Coordination Communication Centre
- How has Al Qaeda out-communicated the world's leading communicator?
  - Al Qaeda, Taliban have no accountability—they tell lies because there is nobody to stop them from telling lies. Western societies have to be accountable
  - Taliban say primary objective is to undermine support back in the UK for the mission; killing NATO soldiers is secondary goal
- The media has its own agenda; the UK media is doing the Taliban's job for them!
- We are guilty of treating stories in a disproportionate fashion by giving them way too much importance

*Suggestions for Improvement:*

- Three main groups to communicate to/ with: Afghanistan, UK and Third Countries
- Need to encourage support for the Afghan government
- Outreach activities such as photographic or other exhibitions, roundtables, workshops help keep everyone up to speed
- Lines to Take: are difficult to get in time, but they are useful to ensure consistency
- Journalists have potentially a very important role to play in communicating the comprehensive approach, but we need to work with them and they need to work with us if that is to happen.