

Emergency Response and Civil Defence

11 December 2007

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Emergency Response and Civil Defence

Report of the workshop held at the Royal United Services Institute on 11 December 2007

Editor: Jennifer Cole

Workshop sponsored by



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Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop

ACRONYMNS AND ABBREVIATIONS

C1	Category 1 Responder (as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004)
C2	Category 2 Responder (as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004)
CBO	Citizen Based Organisation
CRB	Criminal Records Bureau
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CERT	Community Emergency Response Teams (USA)
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
COMAH	Control of Major Hazards Regulation 1999
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (USA)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA)
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
HSRD	RUSI Homeland Security and Resilience Department
LRF	London Resilience Forum
LRT	London Resilience Team
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RAF	Royal Air Force
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SIA	Security Industry Association
SCC	Strategic Co-ordination Centre (Gold Command)
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
TA	Territorial Army
WHO	World Health Organisation
WRVS	Women's Royal Voluntary Service

INTRODUCTION

Emergency Response and Civil Defence Workshop 11 December 2007

**Jennifer Cole, Homeland Security and Resilience Department
Royal United Institute for Defence and Security Studies**

The Emergency Response and Civil Defence Workshop held at the Royal United Services Institute on 11 December 2007 followed a year of research into emergency response models in the UK and overseas, looking at modern approaches and the historical perspective; the different kinds of agencies that respond to emergencies, including blue light, military, volunteer and community groups; and the experience of the communities that have been affected by emergencies in the past.

The genesis of the idea to run a RUSI workshop on emergency response and civil defence began in March 2007, after RUSI representatives attended an external event on community reassurance. The day made a strong impression. On the positive side, it was clear that there was huge enthusiasm and willingness on the part of individuals and community groups to offer their time and skills in the event of an emergency and to engage in whatever preparedness activities they could in advance. The delegates, and the groups they represented, very much wanted to be part of the solution even if they had been caught up in the problem.

Less positively, however, there was a surprising and disappointing lack of awareness of how emergency response in the UK is managed and co-ordinated. Many of the delegates were unaware of the mechanisms through which they might offer their help, such as by contacting their Local Resilience Forum or the Emergency Planning Officer in their local Borough Council to make their skills and availability known. There was a similar lack of awareness of what plans are already in place and of the way emergency response is managed at local, regional and national level. There was little familiarity with existing resilience initiatives such as Local Resilience Forums, Community Risk Registers, London Prepared (www.londonprepared.gov.uk) or the website of UK Resilience (www.ukresilience.info), let alone of the actual processes and systems that come into play during an emergency, such as Gold, Silver and Bronze commands.

This lack of understanding of the processes often resulted in the volunteer groups wrongly perceiving a lack of provisions and/or gaps in emergency planning that simply did not exist. In some cases, this resulted in community groups seeking to offer services and skills that duplicate those already available. An example of this would be the willingness of community groups to provide translators for non-English speakers in the event of an emergency, unaware that such skills will be sourced through existing lists of police and crown prosecution service translators, or through the Language Link service used widely by Government and the public sector¹.

A second problem was a resistance to what could, in some cases, be seen as unnecessarily bureaucratic and/or establishment systems. An example of this would be the unwillingness of some groups to submit their members to Criminal Bureau Records (CBR) checks that were not required for their usual activities². Such resistance could be overcome in most cases by explaining

¹ See <<http://www.languageinkuk.com>>

² CRB checks are mandatory for volunteers working in rest centres or other situations in which they may come into contact with children or vulnerable members of the general public and if the volunteers have not been checked, there is little point in them offering their help.

clearly to the group that CRB-checks are essential for all volunteers working with vulnerable people affected by an emergency situation and, more importantly, by offering administrative and financial support in getting the volunteers checked so that the burden does not fall on the volunteer group itself.

These examples and others suggested that the underlying problem is one of communication. In many cases, the volunteer agencies' concerns that the needs of the group they represent are not being met are unfounded: the agency is simply unaware of what plans have been made. This lack of awareness also prevents them from being able to offer skills they possess that may in fact be useful. On the part of the Category 1 and 2 responders, there seemed to be a similar problem in communicating to the volunteer groups (and by extension, to the general public) what plans were already in place, how volunteers feed in to these plans and that the volunteers may not be needed because the situation is already well covered.

What the day did make clear was that the role of volunteers and volunteer agencies in emergency response – both in terms of enabling a successful response and easing the experience for the affected community – was clearly a highly complex issue that warranted further examination.

Moving forward

Over the following months, a number of articles³ were commissioned for, and published in, the RUSI *Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor* on the role of volunteers in emergency response. This soon expanded to, as it was intrinsically linked with, both the community response (the response at the individual and household level, by members of the affected community in the short time before professional responders arrive) and the 'surge' response – the additional manpower, material, systems and resources that come into play when a larger than average response is needed, or when resources are needed that are neither in place nor on standby permanently because for the vast majority of the time, they do not need to be. In this context, 'surge' capacity includes volunteer aid to Category 1 and Category 2 responders, such as the additional capacity St John Ambulance can offer to ambulance services, and also the additional resources or capacity offered by organisations operating outside their usual duties, such as the help provided by the army during the 2007 Gloucestershire floods, when soldiers and army trucks were used to deliver drinking water to affected households. It also includes the movement of resources across administrative borders to provide mutual and horizontal aid – an example of which would be a Fire Service lending personnel and equipment to a neighbouring service whose own resources have been overwhelmed by the scale of the response needed.

One of the first articles to be published looked at Citizen Corps⁴ in the United States. A voluntary national service programme under the jurisdiction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), itself part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Citizen Corps has more than 2,300 county, local and tribal councils operating in 55 states and territories. It serves more than 223 million US citizens – 78 per cent of the US population and is, in effect, an umbrella

³ *Road to Safety: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina*, Jennifer Cole, *Monitor* Vol 6, No.2, March 2007; *Testing the UK's response to a global flu outbreak*, Ben Sheppard, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 3, April 2007; *Citizen Corps: preparing for emergencies in the US*, Lana MacGill, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 4, May 2007; *Home Bodies*, Brent Bankus, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 7, September 2007; *Turning the Tide*, Janey Comber, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 8, October 2007; *Hugh Fogarty, RNLII* interview, *Monitor* Vol 7, No 3, April 2008

⁴ *Citizen Corps: preparing for emergencies in the US*, Lana MacGill, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 4, May 2007 and <<http://www.citizencorps.gov>>

organisation bringing together five separate volunteer agencies⁵. If a single, nationally administered emergency response organisation was to be suggested as a way forward for the UK, Citizen Corps is a good model for consideration.

Community responses

Another perspective emerged from a visit to Boscastle, a village severely affected by the north Cornwall floods of 2004, to look at a series of long-term flood defences that were being developed. The reconstruction work, and its effects on the community, highlighted another important aspect of emergency response: the recovery phase is often long, painful and as important as the rescue efforts that take place in the immediate aftermath.

The Boscastle visit also brought a new issue to light. In London, there are so many volunteers offering their help and support that the biggest issue is how to administer them; how to decide, from the plethora of volunteer help on offer, which organisations are needed and which can, on the day, be politely turned away by blue light and other Category 1 responders who have the situation under control. In Boscastle, the problem was the polar opposite: the village has no in-situ fire service, no ambulance station or paramedics, no hospital and no police station. Take one step back and neither does it have a St John Ambulance group, Red Cross, Salvation Army or the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) ... and so the list continues. Boscastle's entire emergency response capability consists of two Auxiliary Coastguards who live in the village and who were in fact the first to alert the emergency services to the situation in 2004, by radio. Of course, Boscastle's residents have access to the blue light services on a day-to-day basis under normal conditions, but when the only road into the village was flooded in 2004, they were cut off from outside help. The village was, for a short time, literally on its own.

In cases such as Boscastle's, the issue is not so much the administration of the organisation(s) offering emergency response, but the resources available to those directly affected by the event. The location of easily accessible sandbags is more important than which agency or organisation might fill them. This emphasises how different some areas and communities of the UK are from others and, therefore, the importance of a response framework that can be adapted locally to meet the needs of each community it serves. An inner-city housing estate and a remote rural village each have their own very different problems to overcome and a single model may not suit both. Such differences reinforce the importance of the flexible approach set out in the Civil Contingencies Act⁶ – an approach that can adapt not only to all hazards, but to all the communities affected by those myriad hazards.

International perspectives

Further meetings and events continued to inform the research. Discussions with New Zealand's Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management highlighted the need to co-ordinate and manage donations of aid so that the receiving community is not overwhelmed by more donations than it needs or by donations of things it does not need. A meeting with representatives of the Civil Defence offices of Beijing, China emphasised how a community that is well-educated, trained and exercised in providing a response to a regular, recurring threat – in the case of China, the need to react quickly and efficiently to earthquakes – can, once in place, be adapted to cope with most other threats. This is borne out by several other examples: in April

⁵ Fire Corps; Neighborhood Watch; Volunteers in Police Service; Medical Reserve Corps and Community Emergency Response Teams. Figures correct as of February 29, 2008

⁶ Civil Contingencies Act 2004, ISBN 0 10 543604 6

2007, the US state of California was able to react quickly and efficiently to an oil tanker crash that destroyed a major transport interchange thanks to plans in place, and previously used, for recovering from earthquakes⁷. These examples, and there are many others like them, show that the threat of regular natural disasters that strike indiscriminately but regularly, anywhere and at any time can be a greater driver to public engagement in emergency response than the threat of terrorism. The latter, while more dramatic for the media, is generally considered by the public to be the Government's responsibility.

The floods that affected large areas of the UK throughout the summer of 2007 brought these issues into sharp focus once again and provided excellent case studies. Community resilience came into play through the distribution of water in areas where mains supplies were cut off or compromised. Temporary facilities such as reception centres, staffed predominantly by volunteers, were widely utilised. The use of organisations in activities outside the remit of their core business, such as the Fire and Rescue Service and the Royal National Lifeboat Institute (RNLI) for inland flood rescue all provided examples of activities only undertaken in times of emergency for which capacity does not exist permanently and probably does not need to but which is absolutely vital in some circumstances.

This last point is perhaps the most important one to consider in all these discussions. It is unreasonable and unrealistic to expect UK taxpayers to support a dedicated emergency response organisation on permanent standby to deal only with large-scale emergency situations, as a majority of their time would be redundant awaiting a disaster. The response to wide-impact, large-scale emergencies comes by necessity from organisations that already exist to deal with smaller, day-to-day emergencies, backed up by additional capacity from part-time support, volunteers, the community and, indeed, anyone else who is willing and able to help when and if they are needed. Since the turn of the twenty-first century alone, the civil contingencies that have required such a response have included the foot and mouth crisis of 2001, severe flooding in north Cornwall in 2004, the London bombings on July 7 2005 and the extensive flooding events seen over the summer of 2007. Where the next disaster will come from, what it will be and what will cause it is unknown; therefore, emergency planners prepare for myriad eventualities as best they can.

The more deeply the subject is examined and the more closely different national models are compared, the clearer it becomes that the flexible, all-hazards approach of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) is the best one for the UK. Through Regional Resilience Teams, Regional Resilience Forums and Emergency Planning Offices within local authorities the CCA provides mechanisms to plan resilience in advance of an emergency, to practice the response and to put these plans into action on the day. The system of Gold, Silver and Bronze commands allows for the command and control of the incident to be managed as effectively as possible on the day, while the work currently being undertaken by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat into the role and facilitation of long-term response will ease recovery for those communities affected. The system's most vocal critics are usually those who understand least well how the existing model actually works.

Improving understanding

There are however two main areas in which lessons need to be learned. The first is in awareness and transparency: far too few people outside of those working for the responder agencies named in the CCA understand the UK's emergency response plans or make use of the publicly available

⁷ See *Rebuilding the MacArthur Maze: repair and recovery*, Lana MacGill, *Monitor* Vol 6, No 6, July 2007

information provided by UK Resilience or local government websites, such as the advice given by UK Resilience on dealing with severe weather⁸. The public and local businesses could gain assurance that the authorities have plans well in hand by reading the Community Risk Registers available on the websites of most local, borough and county councils – but few do. Lack of awareness of this information often leads to criticisms of the Government and of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat that is wholly unjustified. How to make the public and the private sector more aware of the existence of this information should be a major consideration for the future. The second point to consider is the need for some kind of national co-ordination network through which ideas, lessons learned, past experience and awareness of the available mutual and horizontal aid can be shared. This should not eradicate other initiatives and organisations already in place, and may need to be an online resource only. Such a resource could be used to help smooth the flow of information between departments and agencies involved in emergency response prior to, during and after an event.

The Fire and Rescue Service has responded to this need by the creation of the National Flood Co-ordination Centre, a one-stop-shop to provide flood response advice and co-ordination to the UK's sixty-one fire brigades. The National Flood Forum⁹, a charity set up in 2002 by people who, as stated on the homepage of its website, have 'been through the experience of flooding and suffered the distress, losses and frustration that follow', has provided a forum for sharing information. It also campaigns actively for greater co-ordination within Government, a large part of which the organisation sees as being an awareness campaign highlighting the danger of flooding to those at risk. The recent review of humanitarian assistance in the UK¹⁰ commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, recommends that the Government should 'support and facilitate more opportunities for information sharing with particular reference to learning from experiences of humanitarian aid provision in incident response'. It recommends achieving this through an annual conference or national workshop.

The role the Royal United Services Institute can play in this picture is two-fold. Firstly, by continuing to explore the UK's planned and actual emergency response, we can highlight important and emerging issues and conduct research, offer analysis and provide comment on these as we find them. Secondly, we can provide a forum in which the private sector, volunteer organisations and the public sector can come together and discuss their experiences so that they better understand one another: in particular, so that the private sector and volunteer agencies understand the plans that local, regional and national government has in place. They may still feel a need to criticise but it is important that they first have as great an understanding as possible of what the plans are. This will make it easier for volunteers and surge capacity agencies to offer their help and for Category 1 and 2 responders to accept it if and when additional manpower and resources are needed.

The Emergency Response and Civil Defence Workshop held on 11 December 2007, supported by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, provided such a forum. The twelve speakers and four chairs of the morning presentations and afternoon discussion forums represented between them national and local government, the private sector, the volunteer sector, the military and the faith community. They spoke on emergency response models from across the world, spanning more than 100 years. The eighty delegates were drawn from all three major UK political parties; local, regional and national government; Category 1 and 2 responders; academia; national, international and community-based volunteer organisations; the British Army (regular and

⁸ See <<http://www.ukresilience.info/emergencies/weatherandflooding.asp>>

⁹ See <<http://www.floodforum.org.uk>>

¹⁰ See <http://www.ukresilience.info/upload/assets/www.ukresilience.info/ha_capability0710.pdf>

reserves); the private sector; foreign military and foreign embassy staff; faith groups; and, last but not least, the general public. The vast majority have taken, and continue to take, an active part in emergency response as well as in formulating the plans and policy. They had personal experiences to share, personal lessons learned to pass on and a wealth of ideas to discuss with their peers.

We are extremely grateful to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, and to Bruce Mann in particular, for supporting the workshop itself and the production of this report; to Group 4 Securicor for their generous sponsorship, which meant that there was no charge to attend the workshop and gave access to volunteer agencies who may not otherwise have been able to take part; and to Simulstrat for their supporting sponsorship and the valued input of Dr Sara Ulrich.

Thanks to their help, the event was such a success that we now intend to make it an annual fixture on the Homeland Security and Resilience Department calendar.

PART I

UK Perspectives on Emergency Response

UK Perspectives on Emergency Response

Civil defence in historical perspective

Dr Robin Woolven FICDDS

The UK has a long history of active volunteer involvement in civil defence, much of which has relevance to current emergency response. Dr Robin Woolven examines the history of the Civil Defence organisation in the UK and examines the lessons from it that can be applied to the modern situation.

Dr Robin Woolven spent twenty-three years in the RAF as a specialist navigator, with tours in Vulcan, Canberra, Shackleton and Nimrod aircraft. This was followed by seventeen years in the Security Service before he retired in 1997 to research *UK civil defence policy 1935-1945*, the subject of his 2001 PhD thesis in the War Studies Department at King's College, London.

In 2002, he was a Research Consultant to the *Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks in the UK* project at the Centre for Defence Studies, International Policy Institute, King's College, London before he joined the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at Southampton University as a Visiting Fellow researching civil protection aspects of the *UK Nuclear History 1953-1974* project.

A Fellow of the Institute of Civil Defence and Disaster Studies, he has been a member of that Institute's General Council since 1999 and has written extensively on civil defence and security.

The Institute of Civil Defence and Disaster Studies (ICDDS) will celebrate its seventieth anniversary in 2008. Founded in October 1938, the Institute began in a month in which the UK faced the new, imminent and severe threat of aerial bombardment, against which the Government needed tens of thousands of civilian volunteers to man the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Services.

Discussions of modern emergency response models can benefit from the historical perspective of UK civilian defence over the last seventy years. Two points are particularly relevant: firstly, that civil defence is an enormous subject covering a vast range of activities. The ICCDS was founded as the Air Raid Protection Institute but, once the number of activities covered expanded to include rest centres, gas identification, decontamination, welfare, fire fighting and fire watching, and a range of other matters, the wider term Civil Defence (CD) was adopted nationally. Later, Home Defence was used to reflect the wider policy context.

Secondly, the scale of volunteering is relevant. Some 84 per cent of wartime civil defenders (and 94 per cent of the ARP Services) were true part-time volunteers, their numbers peaking in March 1944 at more than 1.5 million unpaid men and women who served part-time (in addition to their day jobs) alongside 400,000 paid full-time civil defenders, police and firemen. As manpower shortages increased and conscription and war work predominated, the civil defence volunteers were 'frozen' i.e. unable to resign without the permission of their local authority or, ultimately, their Regional Commissioner, and some conscription was used. Furthermore, these 1.5 million volunteers did not include the 5 million plus citizens who were legally required to serve for forty-eight hours a month as Fire Guards.

After a generally very successful performance in wartime – recorded in the Official Histories¹¹ – and greatly aided by extensive inter-authority and inter-regional mutual support, Civil Defence was disbanded before the end of the Second World War. Local authorities had performed well, in spite of the *Daily Herald's* influential critic Ritchie Calder writing in 1940 that, 'Giving the task of ARP to local authorities was like giving to the Mayor of Dunkirk the task of evacuating the British Expeditionary Force'.¹²

The Civil Defence Act 1948

In the face of new post-war threats, the 1948 Civil Defence Act set up a new organisation whose policies were heavily influenced by the then-recent wartime precedents and the many practical lessons learned under fire. Volunteers were again raised for a nationally organised, but locally-run, Civil Defence Corps with HQ, Rescue, Wardens, Welfare, Ambulance and First Aid Sections. A new element was established, the volunteer Scientific Intelligence Officers, to advise controllers on such matters as post-attack radiation levels and likely air contamination and to give advice on the water and food supplies. A new Auxiliary Fire Service (AFS) was established, together with a National Health Service Reserve to support fire and hospital services. A few officials staffed the Home Office Department, Staff Colleges and Training Establishments, but the services again relied on recruiting large numbers of locally based part-time volunteers – trained and equipped to protect the civil population against the current threat: first of the atomic bomb then, from 1955, of the hydrogen bomb.

Organising a civil volunteer force has always been a politically sensitive matter and has invariably met opposition. Prior to the Second World War, some 'hard-left' local authorities strongly objected to what they saw as the thin edge of conscription, while the activities of the post-war anti-nuclear movement complicated CD preparations and produced major local authority revolts in Coventry in 1954 and St Pancras in 1957-58. An example where these sensitivities have led to the disbanding of an organisation is the Women's Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) 'One in Five' scheme, which provided short talks to women on the hazards of nuclear war. The talks, which aimed to reach one in five women in the UK (a total of nearly three million), provided information on how to protect family and home, how to be independent and how to care for the sick in the home (without any obligation for the women to enrol directly in the Civil Defence Corps) but eventually had to be wound down following denunciation by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament¹³.

Finance and motivation

Two essential ingredients for a volunteer organisation are finance and the motivation of volunteers. Some finance is, of course, always necessary in order to get any such organisation off the ground. Following the end of the Second World War, the post-war central Government funded approved expenditure on the new CD Corps and the AFS as part of the Home Office budget. Annual expenditure reached £25 million, seen by all parties as a necessary part of Home Defence. It is important to remember that UK defence policy at the time was one of nuclear deterrence and, as pressures on defence spending increased, some felt that the money would be

¹¹ HMSO, *Civil Defence, Official History of the War*, Terence H O'Brien, Civil Series, 1955 and HMSO, *Problems of Social Policy, Official History of the War*, R M Titmuss, 1950

¹² Ritchie Calder, *The Lesson of London*, Seeker & Warburg, 1941, p. 37

¹³ Eric Alley, *A Brief History of Civil Defence* (Ed. T Essex-Lopresti), Civil Defence Association (2005), p.40

better spent on the integrity of the deterrent. Home Defence was seen as insurance lest the deterrent fail¹⁴.

Another issue is motivation. In 1938, the threat of the German bombers was real but in 1949 the public perception of the Russian threat was less obvious and, consequently, the CD Corps suffered from a lack of volunteers. In February 1952, the new Conservative Government used its first Defence White Paper to appeal for more, reminding the country that, 'the main objects of a civil defence organisation are to reduce casualties, to respond to the needs of those who are injured or have lost their homes, to maintain order and to fight fires, to keep essential services going and to sustain morale.'¹⁵ The mention of public morale is particularly important as it was a constant concern of Government and the stated reason for pre-war ARP measures.

As the 1950s progressed, civil defence planning exposed a number of gaps which threatened its credibility. For example, nuclear shelters were too expensive to be provided for the entire civilian population. The problems and implications of evacuation planning in the thermonuclear age were never properly addressed.

There is little doubt, however, that the best use was made of scarce resources. The CD Corps always turned out at civil disasters during this period, including major train crashes at Lewisham, Harrow and Wealdstone and at Sutton Coldfield. They were present at the 1966 Aberfan mudslide and at the disastrous floods at Linton and Lynmouth in 1952 and along the East Coast in 1953, when the Lord Mayor of London reported, 'The emergency proved the value of having thousands of trained workers. Britain never lacked volunteers but organisation and training more than doubled their effectiveness'.

Government accepted that it was politically impossible to abandon civil defence but the lack of sufficient civilian volunteers to make the organisation viable was met by using the armed forces to man two Experimental Mobile Columns, Fire Columns and even a specially raised, but short-lived, army Mobile Defence Force.¹⁶ But the end of National Service in 1960 meant that the troops were no longer available – although a military Home Defence Force to support the police in the maintenance of law and order was being established in 1966. Nevertheless, the CD Corps eventually had 360,000 members (of which 53,000 were in the WVS Welfare Section) while another 200,000 volunteers served in the Industrial CD organisation covering 50 per cent of British industry. These figures show that despite some problems, the extent of public participation in peacetime was significant.

Post-National Service

A 1962 reorganisation brought higher standards of Corps efficiency (and a £10 annual prize for the most highly qualified members of the Corps), however, the incoming 1964 Labour Government's intention to spend more on social initiatives meant a further reduction in personnel. By 1966, the CD Corps was down to 122,000 members with plans to continue the reduction to 75,000.¹⁷ The final blow was the major public spending cuts of December 1967 following the devaluation of sterling. On 1 April 1968, the CD Corps and the AFS were put on a

¹⁴ 1960 Home Defence Review Committee, 1960 Home Defence Review (H.D.R. (60) 51), December 1960, National Archives file CAB134/2041

¹⁵ Cmd 8475 Statement on Defence 1952 VII – Civil Defence

¹⁶ Specific decisions announced in the 1955 Defence White Paper included the establishment of the 48 Battalion Mobile Defence Corps, specially trained and equipped for rescue and fire-fighting and the announcement that 10,000 RAF Reservists a year would be trained in fire-fighting so as to serve with the national fire service in war.

¹⁷ CAB 134/2893 *Home Defence Review Committee – Presentation of Government Policy*, 14 Dec. 1966

care and maintenance basis, retaining small planning and training staffs with the intention of expanding if a war approached. The new policy proved to be not much care and too little maintenance.

A year later, Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend warned Prime Minister Harold Wilson of, 'serious deficiencies in our present arrangements for home defence...[where] arrangements have been planned but not implemented...there could now be no question of reactivating arrangements placed in suspended animation, since there is very little to reactivate... [Ministers and officials wonder] whether it would be possible to spend a little more on making them minimally effective'.¹⁸

Such extra home defence expenditure was refused and total annual expenditure reduced to £10 million, with expectations that it would fall to £7 million in subsequent years.¹⁹ This produced very little local activity other than planning, as only four local authorities were allowed to retain their full-time Civil Defence Officers – and that officer's position in Birmingham was only viable once his duties were extended to include road safety. The 1969 Defence White Paper stated, "... the Statement of the Defence Estimates 1968 stated that the Government has decided that civil defence should be put on a care and maintenance basis. This has now been done. Training and planning will continue at the minimum level that will permit more active preparations to be resumed if this should prove necessary..."

The home defence shortcomings were reconsidered a year later by the incoming 1970 Conservative Government. However, times were changing and Edward Heath's main concern was the States of Emergency proclaimed during the 1972, 1973 and 1974 coal strikes, dock strikes and electricity strike that coincided with the Middle East oil crisis. Significant extra funding was again rejected as the two major threats to Home Defence were now considered to be industrial unrest and internal (i.e., Irish) terrorism. As a sign of the changing times, in 1972 a Government 'Home Defence' paper recommended establishing local Emergency Planning Teams. As the threat of the Cold war receded, civil defence was considered less important as new threats such as industrial unrest and internal terrorism came to the fore. New policies provided the capability to reactivate civil defenders in the event of war becoming likely but little effective protection was provided locally. The Regional Seats of Government and their communications were maintained, as were the planning staff and Civil Defence College at Easingwold but in all other regards the Civil Defence movement was essentially wound down.

The current climate

Over the last three decades, the emergence of international terrorism and need for keeping the country functioning through crises ranging from floods and fuel strikes to foot and mouth disease has continued to suggest a need for a civil defence capability. But the CD Corps was disbanded nearly forty years ago and the threats have changed. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 gave a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom, and Emergency Planning has become engrained in local government, but there is a sense that the public is seen by Government as part of the problem rather than a useful component part of the solution. In this respect, it is encouraging to hear Bruce Mann suggest²⁰ that the role of communities will be reconsidered, as communities and the people that comprise them need to be re-engaged.

¹⁸ T227/3212 Treasury copy of Cabinet Secretary's Minute to the Prime Minister, 9 July 1969

¹⁹ Cmnd 3927 *Statement on Defence Estimates 1969* Home Defence

²⁰ Earlier that morning, at the RUSI Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop

There is no easy or cheap answer to adequate civil protection. Scarce resources have to be effectively deployed and exercised under realistic conditions. There certainly once was, and surely still is, some role for volunteers beyond the specialist organisations. There is no shortage of volunteers for the Neighbourhood Watch system across the UK and no lack of willing communal co-operation in the July 2007 floods. Those capable and well-motivated individuals relied largely on common sense and utilised household equipment – but how many of them remembered where they put their *Preparing for Emergencies* booklet?

Of course, proper volunteers need equipment, funding, organisation and leadership from the centre and at local level. The public, the real first responders in a crisis, will not volunteer unless they perceive the threat as warranting their participation. People need to be reminded of the threats and how best they can contribute, but without frightening them. An uninformed public may go their own way, which could be counter-productive.

Sir John Hodsoll was involved with civil defence at the Committee of Imperial Defence from 1929 and headed the Home Office ARP Department in 1935. He was the wartime Inspector General of CD and once recalled:

*The English local government system was a most unsuitable machine to meet the needs of an all-out war against the civilian population yet preserving the democratic system we were fighting for, but, thanks to the British genius for innovation and improvisation, the arrangements worked.... The whole organisation succeeded because there was a very large body of citizens who were full of enthusiasm and who found a tangible and convenient way of serving their country.*²¹

Hodsoll's comments were made sixty years ago and we now have a very different society facing new threats. Whatever method is devised to guard against them, it will not be easy – and it will probably have been tried in this country several times before.

²¹ Hodsoll Papers, Churchill Archives, Cambridge. File 6/2 p 121

UK Perspectives on Emergency Response

Encouraging and enabling community resilience

Bruce Mann, Director of Civil Contingencies at the Cabinet Office

In his keynote address at the Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop, Bruce Mann spoke about taking forward work on the concept of 'community resilience' as one of the next steps in building the UK's resilience to major emergencies.

Bruce Mann has been the Head of the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat since September 2004. His previous appointments in the Ministry of Defence have included the Falklands and Gulf conflicts and secondment to NATO headquarters for the Kosovo crisis. He has served as the MoD's Director of Defence Policy and Director of Defence Resources and Plans. In his most recent MoD appointment as Director General Financial Management, he led a study after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US into the armed forces' future role in homeland defence. He was also Secretary to the Butler Committee. Bruce took up his current post on 1 September 2004.

When considering community resilience, I am not fixated on what precise language should be used. The term 'community resilience' has already been used in different contexts, including the ability of communities psychologically to withstand major shocks. It is now being used by at least one organisation as its business title. In this area, as in so many others, 'resilience' means different things to different people.

Nor is community resilience a particularly new or radical idea. It is a statement of the obvious to say that the response to a major emergency would be stronger if the four sectors – public, private, voluntary and community – worked together. Put the other way round, the first response to any emergency comes not from the 'blue light'²² services but from the public. In some parts of the country, people and communities might have to manage the immediate response themselves for the first vital few minutes and often, they are also best placed to know the location of important infrastructure or assets – and of the vulnerable members of their community. To use defence language, the engagement of people and communities has all the potential to be an important 'force multiplier' in the effectiveness of the emergency response.

This point is well recognised in other European countries, especially those with devolved governance structures coupled with relatively higher degrees of citizen participation. In France, they talk of civil protection being *l'affaire du tous* – 'everyone's business'. In the UK, what we should now see, as Dr Iain Anderson's first Lessons to be Learned Inquiry²³ on the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic noted, is that, 'whatever central Government does and however well, it cannot defeat a major outbreak of animal disease on its own. It needs to co-ordinate the support and services of many others, including those most directly affected. ... Wholehearted support for a common purpose depends on mutual trust and confidence. ... [these] cannot be built by the independent actions of one side alone'.

Despite that, as Sir David Omand noted in the *RUSI Journal* in 2004²⁴, the need to 'harness a genuinely national effort' has historically been less well recognised in the UK. After five years of

²² In this context, the 'blue light services' relates to Police, Ambulance Service and Fire & Rescue Service.

²³ See < <http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/fmd/2001/inquiry/lessons.htm> >

²⁴ See *RUSI Journal Vol 149. No. 4*, August 2004 < <http://www.rusi.org/publication/journal/ref:P4129D33BC0C8F/> >

concentrating on public sector capabilities, the time has come to reach outwards, to build that wider shared endeavour.

Will it fly?

There is plenty of evidence of people being willing to help in the immediate aftermath of a major emergency. However, the key to the concept must be that communities be asked to undertake preparatory activity before an incident occurs. And that raises the obvious question of whether people, in their busy lives, are willing to do that?

On the basis of preliminary discussions held with local responders around the UK, I am comfortable that they are. Community resilience under a variety of different names is already starting to happen; what we have to do is encourage and nurture it.

It is starting to happen particularly in those communities that have already experienced major emergencies and in rural communities who know that it may be some time before the blue light services reach them, so that self-help is vital. There are plenty of other good examples of citizen engagement in other public policy fields, including neighbourhood policing. That is not to say that it will happen everywhere; but there is sufficient promise for the concept to be fully developed.

What could it cover?

A key part of this concept will be working out the scope of any such arrangements. Discussions with local bodies show that people see some risks as being clearly within the scope of any new community preparedness arrangements, and some as being outside. Terrorism, for example, is regarded as wholly the responsibility of the Government, the Security Services and the police, and not something that the public can reasonably be expected to counter. The public is, however, somewhat more willing to accept some responsibility for providing protection from severe weather events and their consequences (such as the loss of electricity), flooding and accidents.

How would it work?

The clear lesson to be taken away from areas where community preparedness work is already under way is that it works best when kept to a focused local level – the village; the town ward; the housing estate. In part, it is down to people knowing who, and what, is where. It is also down to keeping the job within what can be managed by people in their spare time.

Preparedness work has been very practically focused. For example, communities have sought to understand the risks that they face, especially from flooding, drawing in part on the Community Risk Registers published under the requirement of the Civil Contingencies Act. They have thought through the management of the practical consequences – temporary shelter and feeding; emergency sources of power; 4 x 4s; and chainsaws. And there has been an obvious and welcome focus on looking after the vulnerable.

Leadership is an obvious issue that needs to be explored further. In some areas, people look to formal leaders, such as Ward Members, to have a role. In other areas, leadership is provided by more informal networks, such as existing community groups, especially in rural areas. What has become clear is that communities already engaged in such work look for relatively little from

their local authorities and, especially, central Government, beyond information and a little money to pay for administrative costs – and running their part of the response effectively.

One point reinforced to me by local police forces and local authorities in, for example, the north-west, Yorkshire and West Country, is that local authorities and police forces already have a range of community engagement programmes under way. Their clear message is that the last thing they need is another random Whitehall initiative which is not connected to those community programmes and risks cutting across them.

Where next?

There are obviously many more practical issues to be worked through. So how is the Civil Contingencies Secretariat going to do this?

The ‘development review’ of the mechanics of the Civil Contingencies Act, launched early in 2008, is intended to check whether the Act and its associated guidance is working as intended by Parliament. It will look at any areas where the original purpose of the Act has not been delivered, and what can be done to address them. It will also look at those areas ‘where we can build on the foundations put in place in the last three years and go further, especially drawing on the lessons of major emergencies since the Act came into effect’. Community resilience is one of those areas.

UK Perspectives on Emergency Response

Augmenting resilience and response: in partnership with the private sector

Ian Horseman Sewell, Director, G4S

As earthquakes join floods, pandemics and terrorism on the list of recent threats to the UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI), Ian Horseman Sewell, G4S UK's Director with special responsibility for protection of the CNI, examines the opportunities for more effective public-private partnership.

After graduating with first class honours in Geography from Cambridge University, **Ian Horseman Sewell** spent his early career in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, focusing in particular on the Middle East and Counter-Terrorism policy.

Since leaving the FCO, Ian has spent 15 years in the private sector specialising in the development of international outsourcing partnerships in sectors such as business continuity management, telecommunications, information technology and security services. Since 2007, he has assumed responsibility at G4S Security Services (UK) for the development of bespoke services for the protection of Critical National Infrastructure.

When we see natural disasters reported in the media, we are often horrified by the scale of damage and human suffering. Unless we were directly involved, however, we just as soon forget and we rarely take notice of the detail. The fact the agency X was found to have Y per cent fewer resources than the disaster situation demanded, for example. During last summer's floods, Humberside's successful pumping efforts, which avoided a second inundation of the city, did not qualify for funding from the UK Government's Bellwin²⁵ contingency funding scheme due to the very fact that they were successful. Failure (or lack of action) is more likely to be reimbursed than efforts which successfully prevent further damage from occurring. Behind the scenes, however, public and private sector risk and disaster management specialists know that today's operating and financial environment is more challenging than ever.

Flooding – a powerful example of renewed threats

Of all natural threats to our safety, widespread flooding is currently causing emergency planners particular concern. Their findings are posing an important question: should private industry be asked to play a more active role when large areas of a country or region are disrupted? As NATO Advisor, Admiral Sir Ian Forbes has put it, 'the private sector should be seen as an integral part of any security strategy' but, in the UK at least, the partnerships required to realise such integration 'have yet to be coherently established'²⁶.

The scale of the challenge can be immense. For flooding alone, reports suggest that even prior to recent increases in frequency, more than two million square kilometres of Europe were flooded in the five year period to 2003 – an area greater than France, Germany, Spain and the UK put together. In the UK, flooding now ranks with terrorism and an influenza pandemic as a serious threat to our Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and to the nation as a whole, a fact that is recognised as such in the newly published National Security Strategy²⁷.

²⁵ Local Government Finance – Bellwin Scheme. See <<http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/bellwin.htm>>

²⁶ Admiral Sir Ian Forbes, in *The National Security Debate: Developments and Opportunities – An Insight*, Booz Allen Hamilton, February 2008

²⁷ The Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, March 2008

This assessment is not the view of an ill-informed alarmist, but the considered opinion of Sir Michael Pitt, following his appointment by the UK Government to head an independent review of the flooding that devastated much of the country in June and July 2007. In his interim report, published in December 2007²⁸, Sir Michael makes eighty-seven recommendations and fifteen urgent proposals to help the UK cope with future flooding which, he says, is inevitable. He argues that the 2007 floods were a ‘wake-up call’ and that ‘flood risk management should be right up there’ with the fight against terrorism or preventative measures against a pandemic. ‘The changing natures of floods means we need to improve our flood warnings’, he adds, ‘flood risk and events of this sort are here to stay’.

Calls for improved preparation and response

Sir Michael’s is not a lone voice. A report produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2007²⁹ warned that billions of people face shortages of food and water and increased risk of flooding. Patrick McCully, executive director of the International Rivers Network and author of *Before the Deluge: Coping with Floods in a Changing Climate*, says that floods are the most destructive, frequent and costly natural disasters – and they are getting worse. In 2007, he pointed out that fourteen African countries experienced their worst floods in decades. McCully advises that we must learn to live with the increased frequency of such events and manage them as best we can.

In the UK, the Audit Commission report on the 2007 floods³⁰ found that, whilst the Government quickly made additional resources available, on the whole assistance was poorly targeted and unlikely to provide value for money. It concluded that the Government needed to provide more certainty about funding for future emergencies, which are inevitable nationally but impossible to predict geographically. In December 2007³¹, UK Government security adviser Patrick Mercer MP publicly warned politicians and professionals to ‘get real over dealing with disaster’.

An international private sector perspective

At G4S, we have the perspective of being a very significant employer of specialist security, contingency and risk management staff (with more than 500,000 worldwide) and also of being one of a significant group of companies who, in the UK in particular, are entrusted with building, owning and operating key elements of CNI.

Given this perspective, we have been seeking to lead a vibrant debate about increasing the role of the private security industry in planning for and responding to natural and man-made emergencies in the UK: what the Government’s National Security Strategy describes as ‘working in partnership with all who have a role to play’.³² Playing such a role – which most recently has ranged from emergency evacuations from the Lebanon to recovery support following Hurricane Katrina – is something which, looking beyond the UK, the private sector is regularly asked to do in many other parts of the world.

²⁸ Sir Michael Pitt *The Pitt Review, Learning lessons from the 2007 floods*, The Cabinet Office, 2007

²⁹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

³⁰ Audit Commission, *Staying Afloat: Financing Emergencies*, December 2007

³¹ At the Civil Protection 2007 conference in London

³² The Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, March 2008, Para 4.52

Augmentation not substitution

Since Sir Michael Pitt's interim report on the UK floods, the private sector has been holding active discussions with key government figures to discuss appropriate roles for them in building UK resilience. In so doing, we do not suggest that today's emergency services, with their immense specialisms, should in any way be replaced. Instead, we propose a mixed model of emergency response in which private sector resources complement those state agencies upon which we have traditionally relied for the restoration of normal conditions after flooding and other large-scale events that impact on CNI.

Most importantly, we see that complementary work by private sector organisations can free up specialists in the emergency services to do what they are highly trained to do. Specialist armed police officers, for example, should not have ended up directing hire car returns the day after a foiled suicide bomb at Glasgow Airport. Specialist fire crews should not be waylaid dealing with basic floodwater pumping duties when their advanced rescue skills are needed elsewhere.

We also recognise that the need for this augmentation of the UK's resilience resources and preparations is generated by national circumstances which have changed dramatically. Major military commitments overseas, new pressures on the emergency services caused by terrorism and counter-terrorism activities, combined with today's climate change trends, mean that the UK emergency response community faces an entirely new set of operational and financial challenges. Collaboration with the private sector will enable the UK to meet these challenges.

Private sector capabilities in resilience

Private sector involvement in the Government's service delivery to citizens has grown out of all recognition during the last thirty years. The fact that so much CNI in the UK is owned and operated by the private sector is perhaps reason enough to involve relevant businesses in planning for and responding to emergencies.

The private sector has specific 'resilience-building' and 'response' capabilities to offer. Private sector organisations have for years played a key role on both an official and, very often, on an unofficial or philanthropic basis, helping communities to recover following natural and man-made disasters. International companies bring with them very current emergency response experience gained in many varied environments around the world. In addition, in the event of a disaster, private sector organisations may be the first available qualified responders in a disaster zone.

Rapid response and international reach represent key strengths available to the emergency response community. This is the simple and compelling reason why, for instance, governments as powerful as those in China and the USA have recently turned to the private sector to extricate their citizens from emergency situations overseas.

Private sector motivations

It is important to stress that the motivation for private security providers to plan for and handle disasters is not purely profit. Instead, as the debate with Government develops, officials are beginning to understand the obligations on business leaders to protect shareholders' and employees' interests, and the implications this has for emergency response.

CNI delivers to our citizens the assets, services and systems they need to survive. It also provides the platform upon which corporations rely in order to do business and make money. Contributing to CNI protection and resilience therefore makes all-round business sense irrespective of whether doing so generates short-term profit margins. Indeed, for exactly this reason, every year G4S provides *ad hoc* emergency support to governments around the world without charge. There is a growing understanding in boardrooms that CNI protection is in large part a matter of sound business practice and corporate social responsibility.

Making the desirable affordable

A key element in the argument for increased private sector involvement is the perpetual need for emergency responders to do more with less. Budgets are tightening just as responsibilities of responders are expanding. Against this fiscal backdrop, the prospects for funding enhanced resilience and response staffing and resources become increasingly bleak – particularly where day-to-day costs of ownership (as opposed to invocation or deployment costs) do not qualify for Bellwin-type central government funding increases. One such example is that of Humberside, mentioned earlier in this paper. Another is Ulley Reservoir in South Yorkshire, where a combination of public and private sector pumping teams prevented a major reservoir failure in the summer of 2007. Again, the costs incurred were not covered by Bellwin funding. Furthermore, the Bellwin scheme also has structural weaknesses – principally delays in determining eventual outcomes, meaning that authorities may have to wait months before finding out whether costs will be reimbursed. Claim excesses mean that for some authorities, the first £1 million or more will not be reimbursed.

The private sector has a role to play in this regard. There is a growing debate with Government about how such a contribution can be realised. The market for resilience and recovery-related services internationally, combined with the domestic security services industry, gives private companies immense scope to create emergency response capabilities for which peacetime costs of ownership to public sector clients are modest, with certain costs defrayed by revenue generation through deployment of the same resources in other roles during non-emergency situations.

As the private sector develops these new ways to engage with public bodies charged with protecting CNI, surge capacities have already been developed in a number of key areas, including the emergency services and the military. Private companies now provide, inter alia, large numbers of highly-skilled former British Army Gurkhas to provide wide-ranging surge capacity and support to the British Army as and when needed. Virtually every Police Service in the UK now employs specialist contractors – many of whom are former police officers themselves – to augment their resources at times of severe over-stretch, freeing up full-time police officers for front-line policing.

Time to act

A highly active public-private partnership, with private sector resources properly under the leadership and co-ordination of the emergency services and other first responders, is long overdue. Citizens will quickly understand that rather than undermining the role of the emergency services, which will clearly remain paramount, greater private sector involvement is delivering a much higher level of resilience and a much greater comfort factor.

At a time when the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, has spoken unambiguously about his concerns that commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have left too few

soldiers to cope with unexpected events at home, delivering a new resilience partnership must be a top priority for government and it is hoped that the new National Security Strategy will be the impetus for this. The private sector can and will deliver material results for UK Resilience but we need to be invited to do so – soon.

UK Perspectives on Emergency Response

Civil protection and the community response

Baroness Neville-Jones, Shadow Security Minister, Conservative Party

Baroness Neville-Jones highlights the importance of acting on lessons learned from past emergencies, and of the vital role forward-planning plays in not only the prevention and mitigation of damage but also in the facilitation of long-term recovery.

After thirty years as a career diplomat, **Pauline Neville-Jones** was seconded to the European Commission where she worked as Deputy and then Chef de Cabinet to the Budget and Financial Institutions Commissioner, Christopher Tugendhat.

From 1991 to 1994, she was Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. Between 1993 and 1994 she was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and then, from 1994 until her retirement, she was Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which capacity she led the British delegation to the Dayton negotiations on the Bosnia peace settlement. On 2 July 2007, she was appointed Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to the Leader of the Opposition.

Before touching on how private sector and voluntary organisations could participate alongside governmental agencies in responding to emergencies it is important to set the context. We need to reflect on where we now stand in the development of an economy and society that is capable of showing the necessary levels of resilience during and after emergencies. My title of Shadow Security Minister may suggest to some that I am concerned mainly with terrorism but the Conservative party, like the Government, will adopt an ‘all hazards approach’ to resilience. It is clear that much of the organisation needed in an emergency is common to natural hazards such as flooding as well as man-made emergencies – be these terrorist attacks or crippling strikes.

A model for the UK condition

The decentralised UK model suits UK conditions. We have made considerable progress in identifying the major issues that emergencies produce but significantly less progress in acting upon the lessons learned from experience, especially when it comes to conclusions which relate to recovery. We are developing sensible procedures for response but we are a long way behind on what needs to be done to ensure swift recovery at minimal overall cost. Both are equally as important.

There are many reasons for this shortcoming. Our national character seems to play a part. We have a strong tendency, often exhibited in our history, to make false economies – to save now and pay later. In the various investigative reports written after recent disasters such as the Buncefield oil storage depot explosion and fire³³ and the severe, widespread floods of summer 2007³⁴, a frequent complaint is that recommendations which have already been made are not being acted upon.

The courage, dedication, skill and initiative of the emergency responders has never been in question in investigative reports. They are rightly much praised. The British are good in an emergency and we pride ourselves on our capacity to show the ‘Blitz Spirit’. There is however

³³ See < <http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/final.htm>>

³⁴ See < <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview.aspx>>

much entirely legitimate criticism of our failure to engage ahead of time in prevention and mitigation, to reduce the impact of potential catastrophes so that recovery from them comes faster, with less hardship and cost. There remains much to be done.

Much effort has been focused on the response to emergencies, but in future we need to apply ourselves much more to the even harder and more complex task of facilitating recovery. Failure to recover fast can be fatal for a community: the slow pace at which New Orleans has begun to recover from Hurricane Katrina has been much more damaging to the future of that community than the initial devastation.

Assessing vulnerabilities

The UK needs also to be aware of its vulnerability: not necessarily a fault but certainly a fact. Our living space is crowded, our economy is closely interlocked and, for a variety of reasons, we have little built-in spare capacity: businesses have spent the last twenty years or so stripping it out in the name of cost reduction. The well-founded British state of the nineteenth century was grossly underinvested in the twentieth century. Therefore, we have endured a lot of 'make do' and 'workaround' amendments to our infrastructure rather than the wholesale change and reinvestment required. All this makes for breakdown in conditions of stress. We must accept that part of the task we face is to bring sectors of our infrastructure up to acceptable basic modern standards.

At the heart of the British approach to emergency management lies the Civil Contingencies Act. The present Government was right to have updated the civil emergency legislation which goes back to the 1920s and to adapt it to modern circumstances. The Act is at the centre of the 'protect' and 'prepare' elements of the CONTEST³⁵ strategy. It places central responsibility on local authorities and local police forces and has been the framework within which the Gold, Silver and Bronze emergency command structure has been developed. Though more multi-agency exercising is needed, this system has bedded down and is reasonably robust. A strength of the Act is its cascading of responsibility to the local level. Local people know most and care most about local conditions and it is sensible to build on this. However, there are some shortcomings with this Act.

One does wonder about the validity of the distinction between Category 1 and Category 2³⁶ responders. Are the blue light services and the hospitals intrinsically more vital to response than the utility companies if neither can function without telecoms, water and power? And are not the second tier responders also absolutely vital to the ordinary public? There were some very narrow escapes this summer over the resilience of vital power and water pumping stations, most notably Wadham power station and the Ulley Dam.

This two-tier distinction between responders may be false since it suggests that the greatest importance needs to be attached to the short-term management of the emergency itself. While competent response is vital, it is the capacity to recover which, in the end, determines the seriousness of the incident. Here we continue to miss a vital trick. Efficient recovery requires advance planning within a national framework, involving nationally agreed standards. That in turn demands a long-term integrated approach.

³⁵ See, <<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/>>

³⁶ A full explanation of Category 1 and Category 2 responders can be found in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, or online at <<http://www.ukresilience.info/preparedness/ccact.aspx>>

Business continuity is a well understood concept in the private sector. It is a top priority for companies and the best among them understand that to be effective, it has to be planned for in all parts of the business chain, from suppliers through to customers. At the level of UK Plc we need to follow the same approach. Business continuity based on thorough risk assessment is the name of the game in national resilience. In this regard we are not fully functioning yet.

The need for forward planning

A theme common to all the reports written after emergencies is the need for more planning and standard setting in daily life than exists at present. This should be accompanied by clear lines of authority to enforce agreed norms. Following this summer's floods, the Environment Agency repeated that there continued to be uncertainty about the allocation of responsibilities for certain functions, for instance over surface water, drainage and sewers. Since surface water and lack of run off was one of the biggest causes of flooding, this confusion is serious, leading to slower responses and much slower, more expensive, recovery. It in turn is a symptom of something else: longstanding unwillingness to decide that some authority or body has to be undisputedly in charge.

The Environment Agency commented in its report³⁷ that local authorities had given the green light to no less than thirteen major developments in the previous twelve months in direct defiance of the Agency's advice. Seven of these were in areas defined as at highest flood risk. However, no special conditions had been agreed or imposed, thus clearly storing up considerable trouble for the future.

We may require increased availability of housing in the UK but this lack of foresight is unforgivable. If the Government does not want to accede to the Environment Agency's recommendation that it be given the statutory authority to set and enforce standards which will reduce flood risk – which involves it having the strategic lead on such things as risk assessment, mapping, modelling, data analysis, planning and flood warning, as well as having the power to stop local authorities giving high risk planning permissions – then it must locate the responsibility elsewhere e.g. in Defra³⁸ or the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).

This is only one example. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has joined the debate in a report on last summer's floods that came out in 2007³⁹. They say in effect that the Government needs to get behind its Environment Agency and they argue that in future, resilience needs to feature alongside energy and water efficiency in planning decisions and building standards. In an era where the frequency of extreme weather is increasing, even on our island, and sea levels are rising, this sounds like a sensible approach. The situation is dynamic and we must in future take a more systematic and rigorous approach to risk assessment. It may be argued that such an approach will increase costs but while this may displace funds from the emergency to the planning process, it may save much expenditure, including public expenditure overall.

The ABI report is significant in another respect. The ABI points out that the insurance industry's ability to offer flood insurance, not available in many countries, rests on the willingness of the Government to continue to invest in the reduction of flood risk. The budget is indeed going up, though it looks as if three-quarters of the extra £200 million will be eaten up by the backlog of

³⁷ See, <<http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/1867303/>>

³⁸ Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

³⁹ Association of British Insurers, *Summer Floods 2007: Learning the Lessons*, November 2007

needed flood defences. Public/private partnership is little short of vital to our success in building a more resilient economy and society. Quite apart from the ownership of much of our critical infrastructure being in private sector hands, much of the expertise to bring to solutions to problems also lies there. We need a willing, long-term partnership and agreed patterns of cost and responsibility burden sharing. Such a partnership needs to cover the standard resilience requirements for future new build (public and private sector owned) and a formula for sharing the cost of protecting and strengthening existing essential infrastructures that goes beyond what is necessary for business continuity in normal circumstances. Various ways of doing this are possible and may require legislation, so that the damage likely to be caused to them in the event of emergencies is reduced and the burden on first and second responders accordingly alleviated. The stronger the infrastructure in the first place, the less the burden there will be on the emergency services. We are doing far too little upstream.

Our need to knit recovery more clearly to initial emergency response is an important precondition of how best to bring the human resources of the whole community into the management of emergencies and their aftermath. It is a precondition because volunteers and other non-governmental organisations are a valuable resource and need to feel that their efforts are being neither exploited nor squandered. We need to develop resilience sufficiently that only the rarest events require significant numbers of volunteers to enable the emergency response. We cannot be calling every few weeks on unpaid organisations to turn out to help in situations where better planning would have prevented the incident in the first place.

Strengthening resilience

The vital private sector role in emergencies lies in strengthening resilience to emergencies. This will certainly involve the planning stage, it may also involve the operational stage. An obvious analogy is the way in which these days, defence suppliers go to the front line to service the equipment they supply – and in some cases operate it. After combat, private sector specialists such as the security companies move in to execute many functions that are dual military/civilian in nature. One can easily see that there is considerable scope for transferring this principle to response and recovery.

On the subject of ‘active citizenship’ versus a volunteer force, we need a well-organised responder organisation operating to broadly national standards (perhaps with adaptation to local conditions). Without this mutual assistance between regions, which can be nothing short of vital, has no chance of operating successfully.

This in no way reduces either the need for or the desirability of volunteer activity – whether locally or nationally organised. Even in the volunteer sector, however, certain basic methods and standards of operation are needed. There is little room for experimentation in emergency situations. Organisations like the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) and the Salvation Army do invaluable welfare work in emergencies. There is no reason to not invent them with a new remit. Their expertise needs integrating into overall planning and exercising. In London the Red Cross, for example, now have a great deal of well-exercised experience of providing emergency assistance which could be rolled out across the country. If in addition, we need a volunteer force, we need to consider carefully how it might be composed and with what functions in mind.

We need also to consider the role of the military. We have seen the command and organisational ability of our armed forces play a role in almost all our recent emergencies including the BSE crisis, foot and mouth and the 2007 floods. Of course there are specified functions they provide in

relation to terrorism. In the Conservative party policy group report 'An Unquiet World'⁴⁰, we have proposed the establishment of a small joint home command in order to have available a dedicated force on home soil – which is not the case at the moment – with homeland defence functions in mind and the capacity to provide armed force support as necessary to the civil power. We are most certainly not proposing the militarisation of homeland security but we do think that the combination of increased threats of all kinds, combined with the vulnerability of modern 'just-in-time' societies, makes this a prudent way of increasing our security.

Communication is crucial to the successful response and recovery. In an emergency it tests national leadership as well as the relationship between central and local command centres. It is the thread that should guide, inspire, engage and reassure. We need to look at the role of communication in the planning stage and openness about our state of preparedness is essential. It is wrong that we are allowed to know so little of the conclusions of the West report on crowded places⁴¹. Secrecy of this kind underestimates the common sense of the public and shuts us out of sharing responsibility for our own security.

⁴⁰ See, <<http://www.conservatives.com/pdf/securityreportfinal.pdf>>

⁴¹ See, <<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/news-speeches/PM-security-speech>>

PART II

International Models of Emergency Response

International Models of Emergency Response

From planning for war to crisis management – the Swedish experience

Bo Richard Lundgren⁴², Director of the Institute for National Defence and Security Policy Studies, Swedish National Defence College

Bo Richard Lundgren follows the development and evolution of Sweden's national security strategy from the First World War to the present day, through threats including blockade, invasion, terror bombing, the Cold War and natural disasters.

Bo Richard Lundgren has held the position of Head of the Swedish Institute for National Defence and Security Policy Studies at the Swedish National Defence College since 2004. He has had different chief positions within the area of Civil Emergency and Crisis Management both at the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning and the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, SEMA. At SEMA he served as a Senior Advisor to the Director General.

He holds a Master of Laws from Stockholm University and is also a Captain in the Swedish Army Reserve (Armoured Troops). He has held a position in the Supreme Commanders Staff as an Analyst and at the Swedish Army Staff as Head of the Education Unit of the UN Department. He has experiences from Service in UNEF (1973-74) as a Platoon Commander. Bo Richard Lundgren has been a Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences since 1995.

Security concepts typically have three components. The first component comprises goals for security. This concerns defining and agreeing upon what is to be protected or defended. The second component is threats to security. Amongst other things, this involves risk assessment and here it is important to stress that this concerns perceptions of threats and risks, i.e., what is usually called the 'threat picture'. The third component comprises the resources with which to strengthen security. Here, the issues are which actors are responsible, what patterns of co-operation must be developed, what measures need to be taken or planned and what resources are required to this end.

Further discussion and arguments presented here are based on the above model and the assumption that it is possible to identify three different security concepts that have existed in Sweden since the outbreak of the First World War. On the basis of this historical experience, the Swedish Government and authorities are now in a position to develop a modern national security concept, which can also make an active contribution to common European security measures.

The Swedish national security concept has changed considerably over the last century, laying emphasis on three time periods that were pivotal in evoking a cognitive shift and response: the First World War, Second World War and the end of the Cold War.

⁴² This article is based on a presentation of Bo Richard Lundgren of the Swedish National Defence College given at the RUSI workshop, Emergency Response and Civil Defence 11 December 2007 in London and is a contribution to the post-workshop report. The presentation at the workshop was limited to twenty minutes and consequently the content and subject matter were by necessity condensed. This article further develops the presentation; the main themes and message are the same while the content is elaborated.

The period 1914-1939

During this period, Swedish security activities were primarily aimed at keeping the country out of the First World War and maintaining an adequate degree of self-sufficiency to allow society to function as normally as possible under the circumstances. The main threat to Swedish national security was blockade: any blockade of shipments to and from Sweden or other hostile action would have been severely detrimental to the supply of strategic commodities such as fuel and food. Therefore, the means of strengthening security during this period was the stockpiling of strategic supplies, partly to meet industrial and transport needs, and partly for agriculture and the food industry. Rationing, as well as stockpiling was important in maintaining adequate supplies.

When the Second World War broke out, the Swedish Prime Minister at the time, Per Albin Hansson, maintained that Swedish preparedness was good. What he was referring to was the readiness outlined above, which at the time was termed 'economic defence'.

The period 1939-1989

During the Second World War, military power was widely demonstrated, by both sides, through attacking and controlling the opponent's territory. Invasion was the predominant means of forcing an opponent into submission and achieving dominance and control. Several countries also established significant air forces, which could support invasion or carry out terror bombing. Hence, the goals of security activities focused strongly on the protection of territory on the ground, at sea and in the air.

Sweden was directly affected by this development. The means of strengthening security in Sweden was what came to be known as a system of 'Total Defence' – a concept based on the idea that all the necessary resources in Swedish society could be mobilised in times of war or increased alert. The term 'Total Defence' was a response to what in German propaganda was known as 'Total War'. The Swedish Total Defence concept had, for a long time, five constituent parts: military defence; civil defence (today – Protection of the Population and the Rescue Services); economic defence; psychological defence; and 'other total defence'. The latter category included transport, healthcare, electricity, telecommunications and administrative readiness.

By the end of this period, the division of responsibilities had become more detailed and sophisticated. Society was divided into war-critical functions and some twenty responsible authorities were designated. These authorities had responsibility for emergency planning in their own particular area. A single authority, the National Board for Civil Emergency Preparedness, was formed in 1986; however, this was closed down in 2002 when the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) was formed.

The Swedish total defence concept was based on civil-military cooperation at all levels of society. This meant that local, regional and central authorities were all involved in emergency planning. However, Total Defence had but one mission in war and times of increased alert and no peacetime role. Therefore, both novel threats and risks and new threats and risks of a 'traditional' nature brought about different measures and patterns of co-operation for peacetime threats and risks.

The Swedish government now considers that a military armed attack on Sweden is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Total Defence planning has been drastically reduced and can today be considered dormant. However, rules and regulations remain in the form of emergency

powers acts, rules for authority and other relevant emergency plans. Exercises undertaken today by civil agencies are very rarely based on a scenario involving a military attack on Sweden.

The period since 1989

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact drastically altered the security-political situation for Sweden. The military threat, which had previously been the basis of Swedish defence planning, now plays a completely different and much reduced role in the Swedish national security concept. The Swedish authorities now talk about a wider concept of security and consider that other threats, such as those to core values and critical infrastructure, are of vital importance to security policy. This wider notion of security has brought about a new approach to national security activities. National security is seen as the responsibility of many actors and covers several different political areas. The international dimension has become increasingly important, which in turn has meant that Swedish membership in the European Union is seen as an important factor in the shaping of national security.

How then can one describe security goals? Today's security goals for Sweden have been formulated as: to safeguard the life and health of the population; the functioning of society; and the ability to preserve fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, civil rights and human liberties. It is notable that these goals include both 'soft' and 'hard' values. Societal functions include vital infrastructure such as electricity supply, telecommunications, transport and financial transactions. Soft values include the way of life and welfare of the population and, of increasing importance, idealistic values that place more and more focus on a properly functioning legal system. These values feature in the security concepts of many western states.

The Swedish Government has described the threat to these values in relatively imprecise terms. The reason behind this lack of clarity is that the threats and risks are constantly changing and new ones are emerging. Furthermore, the threats are complex, have no boundaries and can have consequences in many sectors of society. The threat can be actor-related, e.g. terrorism, or have no deliberate actor, e.g., natural catastrophes. The international community has an increasingly unified picture of what constitutes common threats and, therefore, what requires joint action. The EU's European Security Strategy⁴³ is one example of this common understanding.

Against this background it is difficult to provide an unequivocal, succinct overall description of the means on offer to preserve national security. A broad range of security activities are involved; measures that cover everything from cause prevention and vulnerability reduction to preventive, management and reconstruction measures. These comprise a chain of measures that has an impact on a number of political and societal sectors, i.e., it is of a cross-sectoral nature.

International level

At an international level, preventative activities involve efforts to reduce the risk of regional armed conflicts, terrorist action and natural catastrophes. These activities also include measures aimed at the root causes of crises within a framework of just and sustainable global development. Other measures are political co-operation to strengthen democratic institutions and promote long-term economic development worldwide. Further measures include aid to countries in need of security sector reform and assistance to war-torn countries through the disarming and demobilising of troops and reintegrating the former soldiers into society. Measures to prevent

⁴³ *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World* was drafted under the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003.

the spread of weapons of mass destruction are of the utmost importance, as is limiting the availability of so-called light weapons. Preventative measures also include reducing the vulnerability of essential societal infrastructure and making technical systems more robust. Meeting and managing the consequences of the threats and risks outlined above requires extensive work, which includes developing laws and the establishment of crisis management organisations at different levels of society. There is a requirement for a clear delineation of roles for the various actors involved, as well as training and education for key personnel and regular exercising of crisis management agencies.

At present a national crisis management system is being developed in Sweden. A state authority has been formed as the co-ordinating agency and engine for the development of national crisis readiness – the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA).

A political debate is currently taking place about how the challenges of new threats can best be met. A decision has recently been made to provide the entire Swedish population with vaccines against dangerous pandemics. Another current debate concerns the formation of a Swedish equivalent of the FBI with the aim of improving the fight against organised crime. A parliamentary committee is currently working on the development and clarification of a national security concept.

Conclusions

In conclusion, every security concept has three essential components: goals for security activities; threats to security; and the means to preserve security. There must be a clear connection between these three and the direction and development of the means must be logically explained by the assessment and formulation of the goals and threats.

It is not uncommon to find discrepancies in security concepts. The Swedish national security concept is no exception in this regard. Perceptions of goals will vary and views of the official threat picture will not be shared by all. Many people have an outdated notion of what constitutes a threat to the nation. Others argue for alternative security solutions divergent from the goals of security activities set by the government.

Sweden is in the midst of a process of change in formulation of its national security concept. The primary explanation for inertia in this process is that change challenges the power of interest groups and authorities and it also challenges their influence, status and access to financial resources.

International Models of Emergency Response

Hurricane Katrina's disaster relief: lessons learned for foreign assistance's design

Dr Sara Ulrich, Simulation Director, Simulstrat Ltd

Dr Sara Ulrich uses the example of Hurricane Katrina to highlight important lessons that need to be learned in planning for and accepting mutual and horizontal aid in times of emergency, especially when that aid comes from international sources.

Dr Sara Ulrich is the Simulation Director of the King's College London spin-out firm Simulstrat, which designs and runs simulations based on war-gaming methodology. Previously she has been a lecturer on International Crisis Management, Negotiation and European Defence Studies at the Paris University XI and Secretary General of the research centre CADMOS. In 2006, Dr Ulrich conducted a post-doctorate research funded by the EU Commission at the European Union Centre of Excellence, Texas A&M University on hurricane Katrina's impact on transatlantic relations and subsequently received post-doctoral award in crisis management simulation from Harvard University.

Hurricane Katrina was defined by superlatives. It was the most intense Atlantic hurricane recorded at the time as well as the strongest ever recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. Katrina was the eleventh named storm, fifth hurricane, third major hurricane and the second category five hurricane of the 2005 season. It was the deadliest hurricane since 1928, resulting in 1,836 deaths and leaving 2,096 people missing. Katrina also resulted in the largest migration of people within the United States since the 1930s, with more than 770,000 displaced, and was the costliest hurricane in US history, destroying or rendering uninhabitable 300,000 homes and causing property damage alone that totalled \$100 billion.

The most damaging effects of Hurricane Katrina resulted mainly from the storm surge that caused extensive damage along the Gulf coast, and most of all in New Orleans, the thirty-fifth largest city in the United States of America. Eighty per cent of New Orleans was flooded, with some parts under 6.1 meters of water for more than six weeks, due to the breaches of the levees after the storm surge. The proportions of this storm alone were reason enough to prompt further study on the topic. When one takes into account that Hurricane Katrina devastated 233,000 square kilometres of land – an area almost the size of the United Kingdom – the scale of this disaster becomes even more evident.

This article will focus on giving a clearer picture of the foreign assistance to the US post-Katrina with a particular emphasis on an overview of the foreign aid (using as an example the European and transatlantic countries), the management crisis of the handling by the US and the local and global lessons learned.

Overview of foreign aid

Foreign aid can be divided into that coming from the public sector and that from the private sector. Both kinds of aid can be subdivided into 'in-kind' assistance and cash assistance. Focusing on the foreign aid from the public sector, the in-kind assistance provided by the European/transatlantic countries included barrels of oil; food; different sorts of emergency material aid; technical assistance with water engineering teams; and military aid.

The first official request made by the US Government to Europe was that it release two million barrels a day of emergency oil reserves to help alleviate the fuel crisis threatening the US. Up to 40 per cent of the US's crude oil production was affected by Hurricane Katrina and the raising of oil prices above the psychological line of \$70 per barrel triggered fast action on the part of the transatlantic and international communities. European allies, under the leadership of Germany, were prepared to back up the demand to the International Energy Agency (IEA) to dip into their stocks. On 2 September, the IEA decided to dip into the strategic reserves at the level of 2.1 million barrels a day over thirty days (sixty million barrels). This was the first time since the first Gulf War that the twenty-six member states of the Agency had decided to tap into their emergency stocks.

Bilateral assistance

Washington made requests for food and material assistance bilaterally to some targeted allies, including Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Russia. These countries, the closest North American and European allies, were the most able to provide a significant amount of help under logistical and financial constraints. For example Germany airlifted 45 tons of meals ready to eat (MREs) – enough for 45,000 people – in three flights (on 3, 5 and 7 September) to Pensacola, Florida. Another example is that of Canada's Public Health Agency, which contacted Health and Human Services in the US to offer supplies from the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS).

Technical assistance

Another type of aid sent to the US included technical assistance in the form of water engineering teams from Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. For example, 128 engineers from the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) worked to pump out the water in New Orleans from 9 September to 21 October with fifteen high-capacity pumps over 165 key strategic locations in New Orleans. This assistance was considered the most valuable German assistance to the relief effort by several German officials, not only for the scale of the help – which was not so visible in the media – but also for pinpointing the possibilities of what could be done in terms of co-operation in technical disaster relief.

Military aid

Military co-operation with the US was possible only with a previous agreement. This explained why just a few countries were involved in the relief operation with the US military, for example Canada, the Netherlands and France. It should be emphasised, however, that each of those countries had specific reasons for their involvement. Canada has a specific military NAFTA⁴⁴ agreement with the US and so launched *Operation Unison* in the stricken Mississippi area, involving 1,000 personnel, three warships, a coastguard ship and four helicopters. The main reason for the fast acceptance of the Dutch ship by the US military was that it had just finished an assignment in the international anti-drug force off the coast of the US when Katrina hit. So, being in the area already, it was diverted for the relief assistance.

Apart from this material and human assistance, another type of aid was widely favoured by the US since it gives much more freedom of use: cash-donations. Several countries preferred to help America by wiring money. In total, the European/transatlantic countries offered almost \$9.5 million, all of which was accepted. From this amount Canada, Norway and Turkey contributed

⁴⁴ North American Free Trade Agreement – see <<http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org>>

86 per cent, Ireland 13 per cent, and Iceland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta and Hungary the remaining 1 per cent. This amount, offered by the transatlantic countries, represents only 7.5 per cent of the total amount of foreign cash assistance received by the US (\$126 million) and 2.4 per cent of the foreign cash assistance promised to the US (\$400 million). Nonetheless, the material assistance described previously, though difficult to convert to a specific cash amount, represents an important contribution to the relief efforts.

The aid from the public sector came not only from countries but also from international organisations also. The United Nations (UN) bodies contributed mainly in providing expertise in logistical liaison and technical support (World Food Programme, WHO⁴⁵, UNHCR⁴⁶) and some material aid (ex: UNICEF⁴⁷ with the 'school in a box' kits). But what was particularly striking was the backseat approach taken with OCHA⁴⁸ in the foreign aid management, because the US domestic agencies were not familiar with this international crisis response system and did not see the role that the UN could play the post-Katrina relief efforts.

The Red Cross was also involved on the same level, with the ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) setting up a web page helping to locate missing persons and the IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross) providing disaster experts as well as co-ordinating fundraising.

Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre

The main involvement of NATO in this disaster management was the operational framework of NATO's civil emergencies planning, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Capability, which includes the Euro-Atlantic Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC). The efforts made by NATO can be divided into two distinct operations: the co-ordination by the EADRCC of the requests for aid coming from US and the offers of aid by the EAPC countries, and the air transport of this aid to the stricken areas in the US. It was decided in the end that the air bridge would comprise two operations in one. The first task was to transport European and NATO aid from their capitals to the German air base in Ramstein using either road transportation – as did Austria, Finland and Slovakia– or NATO Response Force-assigned tactical airlift under the command of Joint Command Lisbon, as did the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Norway and Romania. This first half of the operation was completed on 19 September 2005 and required ninety flight hours by French, British, German, Greek and Italian cargo planes⁴⁹.

The second part of this NATO operation, held from 12 September to 2 October, set up an air bridge from Ramstein's air base to an air base in the US close enough to the stricken area of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama to facilitate delivery, yet far enough away so as to be able to have a non-damaged landing site. Little Rock, Arkansas, was chosen for this purpose. The NATO Response Force (NRF Air component), the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) and some additional cargo aircrafts were approved to deliver the relief aid. A naval component of the NRF, including up to three roll on/roll off ships able to carry 600 trucks and food containers, was ready to be sent into the area but ultimately was not put to use. In total, twelve NATO cargo flights were used to carry 189 tons of relief supplies from nine EAPC countries in addition to Canada, Ukraine & Turkey, which provided cargo planes.

⁴⁵ WHO – World Health Organisation

⁴⁶ UNHCR – The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

⁴⁷ UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund

⁴⁸ OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

⁴⁹ Fifteen C-130 and C-160 cargo planes

The European Union-Monitoring & Information Centre

The European Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM), operated by the DG Environment of the EU Commission, was created in 2001 to co-ordinate assistance such as search and rescue equipment, medical services, temporary shelter and sanitation equipment from thirty European countries to disaster-stricken areas inside or outside the EU. The CPM is run through a Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) accessible 24/7, which has the task of informing decision-makers and European crisis centres of emerging and ongoing natural or man-made disasters.

In a crisis period, the MIC acts as a communication platform for the exchange of requests and offers of assistance, provides information and early warning alerts to the thirty participating states, supports co-ordination and facilitates European assistance by matching offers to needs, pooling common resources, and appointing EU field experts. Once the requesting country accepts the assistance, the MIC initiates direct communication between the offering and requesting states and usually dispatches a small team of experts to ensure the efficiency of the operation.

For the first time in the CPM, all thirty countries offered assistance, and the US accepted twenty-one of those offers. The MIC appointed two EU civil protection co-ordination experts on site. A total of 150 European civil protection experts operated in the area of New Orleans, and the thirty member states provided 200 tents, 3,000 beds, 77,000 blankets and 500,000 MREs among many other items. The operation ended on 21 September.

Foreign aid from the private sector

The corporate philanthropy by foreign and multinational companies was overwhelming. The total amount of assistance is very difficult to evaluate since, like the foreign countries and international organisations' aid, the private sector provided in-kind as well as cash assistance. But just looking at the number of US corporate donations (including multinational and American-based headquarters of foreign companies) climbs to an excess of \$677 million: \$445 million cash donations and \$232 million in-kind donations. But several other sources number it at exceeding the \$1 billion mark.

The in-kind assistance reflected the same pattern as for the countries/international institutions: oil, emergency aid and technical assistance but with the addition of some support for affected employees.

Oil was provided for example by Total (gasoline to emergency units) and BP (diesel fuel). Emergency aid covered the wide range of medicines (for example Bayer sent Aspirin and vitamins, GSK provided antibiotics and vaccines), food and beverages (Sodexo sent meals, Perrier sent water), goods (furniture from IKEA, cell phones from Nokia and vehicles from Daimler-Chrysler).

Another very important contribution was made by offering technical assistance directly useful for the disaster response. EADS provided helicopters, Air Canada provided planes, Zodiac donated speed-boats and Ericsson gave a satellite communication set. In addition, the corporate sector took an important part in offering its support to employees in setting-up call centres.

The cash assistance mentioned above was the favoured aid tool as for the public sector but more often the cash was directly given to key NGOs and funds such as the American Red Cross (for example by AXA, Michelin and Toyota) or the Bush-Clinton Katrina fund (for example by Suez).

The handling of the foreign aid by the USA

On the morning of 1 September 2005, President George W. Bush gave an interview on ABC-TV in which he initially refused the outpouring of foreign aid. He set the tone by saying, 'I'm not expecting much from foreign nations because we hadn't asked for it. I do expect a lot of sympathy and perhaps some will send cash dollars. But this country is going to rise up and take care of it. You know, we love help, but we are going to take care of our own business as well, and there's no doubt in my mind we'll succeed'.

By the noon the same day, the State Department's spokesman Sean McCormack said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had spoken to the White House and decided by reversal that 'we will accept all offers of foreign assistance. Anything that can help to alleviate the difficult situation, the tragic situation of people of the area affected by Hurricane Katrina will be accepted'.

The world's largest humanitarian donor had already received assistance from abroad in the past, for example after the attacks on 9/11 or after Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992, but never at this scale. Some comments underlined that 'Americans typically have been reluctant to accept aid, in part because the US already has much of the equipment that countries intend to give and because co-ordinating the aid is complex and laborious'. Even so, this media coverage of a first refusal and then a global acceptance by the US unsettled many foreign countries.

***Ad hoc* management**

The *ad hoc* system put into place was based on the National Response Plan⁵⁰, which contains procedures for accepting offers of international aid in response to a domestic incident of National Significance. The plan's International Co-ordination Support Annex sets directives to the State Department to:

- co-ordinate and facilitate US requests for aid as conveyed by the Department of Homeland Security or 'other federal agencies';
- act as an intermediary for foreign offers of assistance to the US Government, including those from law enforcement and intelligence services;
- work with US Government departments and agencies to respond appropriately to such requests;
- work to expedite delivery of such assistance if an offer is accepted; and
- work with DHS to expedite visa issuance and US entry to foreign experts needed for event response and/or mitigation.

Furthermore, International Affairs offices within other government agencies are to act as 'primary partners' with the State Department for such situations. Under this Annex, the State Department can also engage the Red Cross and the US Agency for International Development but in reality, the details of such a hands-on implementation of receiving foreign aid were nonexistent. As such, a completely new scheme had to be started from scratch in a short period of time. The procedure agreed upon was that the State Department, 'was the focal point for receiving and responding to offers of assistance from foreign governments'; USAID/OFDA⁵¹ 'worked with FEMA to determine whether specific offers were acceptable and could be used'. When FEMA identified a potential requirement that could be addressed by an international donation, it communicated acceptance and specifics for that offer to the Department of State,

⁵⁰ National Response Plan – see <<http://www.dhs.gov/nrp>>

⁵¹ OFDA – Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

which in turn 'communicated the US Government's acceptance of the resource to the donor country'. Then USAID/OFDA, along with the DOD, 'managed logistical operations for incoming international donations...with a US Government team (led by USAID/OFDA with representatives of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA))'.

Nonetheless, the US Government received offers from 139 countries and fourteen political entities or international organisations, of which 105 were accepted. \$400 million worth of oil and \$454 million in cash assistance were pledged by thirty-six countries and international organisations. Out of the \$126.4 million effectively received, only half has been used. \$60 million has been given for schools rebuilding, but only \$10.4 million has been received and (as of April 2007) only \$30 million had been spent out of \$66 million going to a contract with United Methodist Committee on Relief (a consortium of ten faith-based charity groups) to provide social services to displaced families. As a result, many offers were withdrawn and redirected to NGOs and the Red Cross in the hope that the money will find a more direct way to the needy people in the stricken areas.

Lessons learned on the management of foreign assistance

Lesson 1: Crisis planning

Focusing on the lessons learned for the USA (rather than analysing the global lessons learned), the main lesson was a definitive 'need for a pre-crisis planning' and part of that would be the enhancement of the *ad hoc* inter-agency system.

Several sub-working groups were formed to tackle the whole scope of revising the crisis response mechanism. One group was established to create a manual on the processing of offers of assistance, one to develop procedures for handling cash donations, another to help enhance communication with the foreign media, one to elaborate a prioritised list of anticipated disaster needs and a final group to provide a database for tracking all donated in-kind goods from the moment of receipt to their disbursement. The main goal, therefore, was not to create a completely new agency, but to enhance the procedures of the *ad hoc* system that were created to receive foreign donations. This highlights the important institutional lesson learned that only a national structure has the ability to respond effectively to catastrophic disasters, especially when foreign nations are involved.

Lesson 2: Getting to 'no'

The second lesson for the United States was the need to reduce the critical delay in responding to offers of assistance from foreign countries. This delay was explainable by two arguments. First, the evaluation of needs and matching needs to offers takes time. Therefore a 'prioritised list of anticipated disaster needs for foreign assistance and a list of items that cannot be accepted' would have been useful. Furthermore, this process was first and foremost a question of 'getting to no', or actually being able to say 'no thank you' diplomatically to the offering countries.

This process was severely delayed for different reasons, from the initial shock of having to receive aid, with too many institutions involved in the decision-making process, to several other red tape issues. For example, many offers of assistance were first accepted but then rejected. This was the case for the forensic expert aid issue and also for several different items from offering countries.

Lesson 3: Red tape issues

The third lesson learned for the US was the discovery of several red tape issues that severely slowed the process of receiving incoming foreign in-kind donations. These red tape issues ranged, for example, from problems with transport clearance and food and drug regulations to visa issuance problems. Several donor countries waited several days, if not weeks, before receiving transport clearance for their cargo flights. For example, Sweden offered material assistance (water purification equipment, electric power generators and a telecom package) on 2 September, to be delivered as soon as a Swedish plane was ready (on 4 September) to any location the US Government specified. On 7 September, the Swedish embassy in Washington received initial American acceptance, at least in principle, of their relief assistance. The plane finally arrived on 13 September but with only the telecom package, since the other aid offers were no longer needed.

Lesson 4: Failures of the tracking system

A fourth lesson learned was based on the failures of the tracking system for foreign assistance put into place by USAID/OFDA upon its arrival at the Little Rock airbase. USAID contracted delivery services DHL's disaster response team to oversee all arriving international relief aid flights and to assist in unloading and sending the ground shipments to several distributions points. One problem involved recording assistance from planes that arrived from NATO for which the organisation would not provide reliable manifest information. The other issue, and the most compelling one, was the loophole in receiving confirmation of the receipt of international assistance at the FEMA distribution points.

Lesson 5: Military aid

A fifth lesson should be targeted to the military side of the crisis management effort, where the focus is on three major issues: personnel, material and procedure. The personnel issue refers to the lack, at first, of sufficient National Guard troops and equipment. The US Army, overstretched by its interventions overseas, had to recall 3,000 personnel from the Louisiana National Guard and 3,800 from the Mississippi National Guard who were stationed in Iraq. Those two states were deprived of 40 per cent of their contingent. The situation did improve after 3 September, however, with the arrival of 7,000 additional National Guard troops to the stricken area.

The material issue arose due to the lack critical equipment such as amphibian vehicles and pumps, which were being used in international operations. Furthermore, the Department of Defence (DoD) has reviewed its role in foreign assistance management and is implementing eleven critical actions. One of the main lessons learned for the DoD was the necessity of taking on a more direct involvement in the decision-making process. This relates to the confusion that arose between the DoD and FEMA on who was supposed to formally accept foreign military assistance.

Lesson 6: Handling of cash donations

Last, but not least, several points could be enhanced regarding the handling of cash donations as a sixth lesson learned. First and foremost, more communication is needed to encourage cash donations, preferably to recognised non-profit voluntary organisations with relevant experience, which provide much more flexibility. Secondly, the principle of US treasury regulations is that the accounts are non-interest bearing, except when there is a specific statutory authority allowing it. The \$126.4 million pledged should have brought more than \$1 million in interest fees, which could have helped to further alleviate the needs in the Gulf region. The third important lesson is the delay in utilising funds. It took seven months to reach a decision, during which this money could have made a real difference to immediate reconstruction efforts and to local people who were still waiting for insurance money to come through.

Global lessons learned

Lesson 1: The MREs scandal

The MREs (Meals Ready to Eat) issue was the one that took over most of the front page news in the US in mid-September. A plane coming from Germany loaded with 15 tons of MREs was refused permission to land during the week of 6 September and was forced to head back to Cologne. Several other countries had likewise been banned since the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) had rejected the rations out of fear of mad cow disease (BSE). However, those rations had previously been certified by NATO as BSE-free and the same types of meals have been used in common deployments in Afghanistan and consumed by American troops. What is more surprising is that Germany had previously sent 20,000 MREs which the victims of Katrina had already consumed.

One week later the MRE affair struck again, this time with the UK's delivery of 400,000 rations. This British food aid arrived in Little Rock, Arkansas and was transported to New Orleans to be dispatched but had to be re-transported to Arkansas where it was held for inspection by the USDA, which declared part of the shipment unfit for human consumption for fear of BSE under regulations relating to the import and export of meat.

According to US officials, the NATO Standards agreements do not waive the US domestic requirements for those products to be screened for sanitary and phytosanitary measures, so on 8 September the USDA issued an approved list of products for MRE shipment. The USDA then sent an additional twelve inspectors to a private warehouse near Little Rock on 13 September to separate the vegetarian meals from the non-vegetarian meals. On 14 September, US officials even considered breaking down the MRE packages and removing the meat products to avoid having to burn them. The USDA said 'it [was] prepared to provide sufficient manpower at the Little Rock warehouse to perform this function, and that it [was] a feasible, if labour-intensive, job'.

The same day, Washington decided to issue a press briefing to refuse any additional donations of MREs and to 'develop plans for the disposition of those foreign food donations that have been received and are not immediately required'. On the other hand, the need for MREs was still confirmed, especially in Louisiana, to be at least 1 million a day. Other nations, including Italy and Spain, faced the same problems. Some argued that today BSE is much a much larger problem in the US than in Britain and that the reason for this red tape move could be explained by a desire to avoid the embarrassing images of Europeans making food relief deliveries to the States.

In the end, the MREs were first stored at great cost by FEMA and then finally never used or consumed. Some of them were destroyed or sent to other needy countries. In total, 'USAID/OFDA received 359,000 rations of MREs that could not be distributed within the US. As of 1 February 2006, FEMA and DOS had paid the warehouse \$62,000, with an additional \$17,600 contract pending for the month of February. As of 3 February 2006, approximately 40 per cent of the MRE rations had been forwarded to two other countries. The DOS plans to forward an additional 21 per cent to other countries by 28 February 2006'. Those facts brought a chilling effect to the transatlantic disaster relief effort and reminded everyone of the necessity of improved communication on laws and regulations in this area.

Lesson 2: Medical licensing problems

The legal licensing regulations are another lesson learned. The US has strict rules regarding the practice of medicine; medical professionals require a specific license, which has different requirements from that of other countries. As a result, this issue prevented a certain number of

nations from sending or even proposing medical teams in their offer of aid to the States. Others were quickly reminded of this fact by the Department of Health and Human Services, which determined that enough volunteering US doctors would be dispatched to the stricken areas. Nevertheless, some precious time could have been gained through better information sharing on those legal issues regarding the ability to provide medical supplies and personnel and field hospitals. European countries could have avoided offering such aid at all.

Lesson 3: Military aid in civil emergency

A third important lesson learned addresses the legal restrictions existing in the US and in some other countries regarding the use of the military in civil emergencies. Those restrictions were time consuming and could limit the use of the NATO Response Force as well as national military equipment on the territory of certain countries in the future. An improvement could be made, therefore, to enhance civilian-military cooperation in the US and in international institutions.

Lesson 4: Compatibility of equipment

Another issue was the problem of compatibility of equipment between the transatlantic countries and the US. For example, Russia offered 50 hertz generators with 220-110 volt transformers, but FEMA accepted only 60 hertz transformers and other examples of electrical equipment problems also arose that could have been avoided. Furthermore, some equipment directions were in foreign languages and were not translated, as was the case with some Russian tents.

Lesson 5: Unnecessary behaviour problems

Not only were red tape and material problems an issue, on an attitude level some unnecessary behaviour could have been avoided. This could be considered a lesson learned for developing an enhanced communication plan. Several foreign diplomats not taking part in any rescue mission wanted to be able to travel to the affected areas in order to fulfil their home country's communication needs and to provide visibility for its foreign aid. Furthermore, other diplomats attempted to seize the opportunity provided by the meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 2005 by bringing large quantities of supplies with them on the plane. This was strongly discouraged by the Katrina Task Force, which already had to deal with an immense flow of foreign aid coming from governments and the private sector. If, in addition, some individuals from the public sector decided to bring freelance donations, the whole receiving system that was finally up and running would have been jammed.

The most interesting attitude adopted by foreign donor countries was the undercover competition to be among the first to dispatch their aid to the victims of Katrina. One example, among others, was Italy's Prime Minister, who wanted to 'be among the first foreign countries to deliver assistance to the US'. No EU assistance, as such, was being conveyed. Bilateral interests prevailed despite several trials, for example, Ireland, who wanted to send an EU assistance package to Katrina victims.

Lessons learned for EU & NATO co-ordination

The fundamental lesson learned for both the EU and NATO is not only to avoid duplication in the field of disaster relief response but also to shape a necessary path to co-operation. Several officials confirmed that no co-operation or exchange of information was taking place between NATO and the EU during the entire Katrina disaster relief effort. Each institution sent a co-ordination team to the site, but no communication took place between them. For example, the lack of communication became so severe that one NATO official had to search the internet to get the EU's list of foreign donations made by the Member States. Furthermore, on the part of

the US, some officials were lost between the EU and NATO lists of offers because of several overlaps, since several European and Transatlantic countries did not inform both institutions of their offers of assistance. There is a strong need to either enhance the distinction between these organisations in the disaster relief response, or, more favourably, to try to work together to combine both institutions' strengths.

Another lesson learned for both organisations is to implement procedures to avoid the 'garage sale effect', or the tendency of some countries to send whatever they had in their reserves, even if it did not match the needs of the US. It is the quality and not the quantity of foreign donations that is important. So, not only should the US be setting up a list of the goods that could be needed from abroad and those which would be refused but the offering nations should create or enhance their own lists of giveable goods for future civilian crisis management, especially through a combined list of available assets from EU and NATO countries.

Conclusion

The final amount of foreign assistance received after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina reached \$854 million, which was pledged from 139 countries and fourteen political entities or international organisations. Of these, 105 offers were accepted. Out of the \$854 million, \$400 million worth of oil and \$454 million as cash assistance was promised to the US Government. In the end, out of the \$454 million pledged, \$126.4 million has been received from thirty-six countries and international organisations.

The global lesson from this disaster response has been the realisation by the affected nations that they should not waste this opportunity to initiate a common approach, using the bilateral Hurricane Katrina diplomacy as a base and transforming it into multilateral hurricane diplomacy. The USA may have realised the difficulty of relying solely on bilateral agreements for emergency disaster relief support. This lesson should serve as a window of opportunity for political decision-makers to push towards a stronger American involvement in international organisations such as the UN and NATO in order to discuss a deeper future collaboration in their homeland disaster relief response.

Unfortunately, after this step forward, two steps were taken back during the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief response from the EU and NATO. The European Union's failures in shaping a united answer to the hurricane disaster underlined the too-long postponed dialogue with NATO. Also, NATO's effective air bridge relief highlighted a conflict in inner doctrine between enhancing its civil protection tools and the main objectives of the military and gave strong incentives for a deeper exchange with its European counterpart.

The fight, be it against terrorism or natural disasters, cannot be handled alone. The need for a multilateral approach has never been stronger and the transatlantic link would only be enhanced through such a common response. As Hurricane Katrina's crisis management proved, it is time to reinvent the transatlantic ties to tackle future catastrophes together and with common tools so as to never take the precious transatlantic link for granted.

International Models of Emergency Response

Other Nation's Volunteers

Lt Col Brent C. Bankus, US Army College

Brent Bankus examines the role played in emergency response by volunteer military organisations around the world, with particular reference to models used in North America and Scandinavia. Historical perspective is considered as well as modern usage.

Brent C. Bankus retired on 1 January 2005 as a promotable Lieutenant Colonel from the Army National Guard Active Guard Reserve Program with over 25 years service in the United States, Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, the Sinai, Eritrea, Guam and Hawaii. Since his retirement, he has worked with the United Nations; SERCO, North America; Blackwater USA; Northrop Grumman's African Contingency Operations Training Assistance programme; Metro Productions; and Excalibur Associates. He is currently a consultant and works in the National Security Issues Branch, US Army War College, focusing on the United Nations, Stability, Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations, Homeland Defense and Security, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations.

With the high Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) in the current world environment, nations are again calling on their 'Home Guard'. In the US, along with the federally sponsored US Coast Guard Auxiliary and US Air Force Civil Air Patrol, there are twenty states with an active Home Guard or State Defense Force (SDF) and four with an active Naval Militia. Puerto Rico also has a State Defence Force. Not to be confused with the national army's reserve component, Home Guards train voluntarily and are paid only when they are called into national service. They are trained only for homeland defence or security purposes and, most importantly, such units are not designed for overseas deployments. Volunteer Military Organisations (VMOs) have a specific focus on homeland security and other skill sets that enable them to assist the first responder community in times of civil emergency.

The home guard concept in the US began before the First World War, when a preponderance of National Guard units were called to Federal service. Beginning with the Dick Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916, each organised state militia was transformed from a strictly state-funded and equipped force to the official second line of defence of the United States⁵². As such, the organised militia was now called the National Guard and was both a state and Federal asset. So, beginning in 1916 then again in 1917, the National Guard was activated for Federal service first for the Mexican Border Campaign and then for the First World War.

When activated for Federal service, the absence of the National Guard effectively left states without the ability to cope with natural or man-made contingencies, as most state police forces were relatively small in number. Denied access to Federal troop strength, governors re-constituted replacement units and renamed them the Home Guard. Legal authority to do so was provided by the Section 61 of the 1916 National Defense Act.

The high point for the use of VMOs in the US was the Second World War. As National Guard units were federalised in 1940, states were again left to their own devices. However, President Franklin Roosevelt passed the Home Guard Act in 1940 to help these state sponsored

⁵² Col Edmund Zysk, 'Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?', unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 3

organisations and, after Pearl Harbor, at least 13,000 Home Guard troops were on active state duty⁵³.

As National Guard units returned from Federal service, Home Guard units were disbanded in all but a few states⁵⁴. The US Home Guard was renamed SDF and experienced a resurgence, beginning in the 1970s as a result of Defense Secretary Laird's implementation of the Total Force concept. Today, approximately 22 states and Puerto Rico still utilise SDF units and they have been used in a variety of contingencies including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. To give an example, in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks on the US, the New York Guard medical detachment staffed a chiropractic centre – the only one available for military first responders – at Camp Smith. New York's cost saving was substantial, as the medical detachment cadre, although paid, provided the service at a much reduced rate than would have been charged by contracted private sector professionals.

The Canadian Rangers

The Canadian armed forces also had a Second World War version of the Home Guard. They began as the Coastal Defense Guards and were finally recognised as the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR), formed in early 1942 to protect British Columbia (BC)⁵⁵.

Another group, the Canadian Rangers, was formally established in 1947 and since then has been responsible for protecting Canada's sovereignty; their mission includes reporting unusual activities, collecting local data of significance in support of military operations and conducting surveillance or presence patrols. They also assist the Canadian forces by providing local expertise, guidance and advice, conduct Northern Warning System patrols, and assist in local search and rescue (SAR) missions⁵⁶. Currently there are 4,000 Rangers in 165 communities across Canada and the organisation is active in all provinces and territories except for Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. They provide a military presence in Canada's sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas⁵⁷.

All told, the Canadian Rangers comprise five patrol groups and are organised as follows:

- 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is located in northern Canada with a total of fifty-eight patrols in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Alberta, Saskatchewan and northern British Columbia;
- 2nd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located in Quebec, with twenty-three patrols;
- 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located in northern Ontario, with fifteen patrols;
- 4th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located on the Pacific west coast and Prairies, with thirty-eight patrols; and
- 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is located in Newfoundland and Labrador, with twenty-nine patrols⁵⁸.

Training for Canadian Rangers is not mandatory past an initial ten-day orientation or 'boot camp' for new members which includes basic drill, rifle marksmanship, general military knowledge, navigation (map, compass and global positioning systems), search and rescue,

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ *The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine*, November 1948, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA

⁵⁵ Canadian Rangers, Chief of Rangers and Cadets, see <http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/intro_e.asp>

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

wilderness first aid and radio communications⁵⁹. Common task training includes flood and fire evacuation planning, area patrols and major air disaster assistance. Periodic maintenance inspections of the North Warning System (NWS) is another invaluable mission, as is conducting presence patrols in the remote and coastal areas of Canada.

The Norwegian Home Guard

Norway utilises volunteer military forces called the Heimevernet. Founded in 1946, the organisation is used to protect the local infrastructure and population but could also be utilised as a conventional force. As many original members were in the resistance during the Second World War, these volunteers secured infrastructure sites, were a local and decentralised force and had the ability to mobilise quickly.

Like other nations, Norway is transforming its military from one with a Cold War focus of invasion to one prepared for asymmetrical operations, attack by non-state actors and unpredictable short-notice contingencies. Once completed, the transformed Home Guard will have the responsibility to man thirteen districts with 50,000 troops. The current structure of the Norwegian Home Guard is divided into three components: Army (80 per cent of the Home Guard Force), Navy (10 per cent) and the Air Force Home Guard (also 10 per cent)⁶⁰. Their mission essential tasks include critical infrastructure protection, force protection, and surveillance and control. The naval component is responsible for surveillance, maritime control, supplying boarding and coastal spotting teams and security divers, while the air component is focused on integration within their air force base structure⁶¹.

Under the new quality reform structure the Norwegian Home Guard is categorised into three components: The Rapid Reaction Force, The Reinforcement Forces and Follow on Forces. The Rapid Reaction Force is composed of between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel who train regularly (up to sixty days a year) and who are responsible for force protection and counter-terrorism. This force is postured to be mobile and flexible with priority on new weapons, equipment and training. The Reinforcement Force is the second category of 25,000 personnel and is responsible for sustainment operations. A second priority is for training, equipment and weapons issue and its members are required to train from three to five days a year. The final category, the Follow on Forces, is proposed to number 20,000 and is responsible for securing critical infrastructure sites, for which it trains for between three and five days every six months.

Danish Home Guard

Denmark also uses a Home Guard, the Hjemmeværnet; the Danish Parliament passed the first Home Guard Act in 1948. Today, there are four branches of the Home Guard open to both men and women. These are: the Army Home Guard (49,000), the Naval Home Guard (4,400), the Air Force Home Guard (5,700) and the Infrastructure Home Guard (3,000).⁶² In addition, the Home Defense Guard forces provide a volunteer force of approximately 61,000 personnel (including 800 civilian employees) and forty naval patrol vessels during peacetime, under the command of the Home Guard Command.

⁵⁹ Third Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, *A Proud History and Important Role*, see <http://www.army.dnd.ca/3crpg/English/history/history_e.shtm>

⁶⁰ Christine Huseby interviewed by author via email, 25 October 2006, Carlisle Barracks

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Hjemmeværnet, the Danish Home Guard, see <http://www.hjv.dk/Eng/forside_engelsk.htm>

The Home Guard is organised into territories which contain home defense companies that become part of the regional force in time of war. Simply stated, the primary mission of the Danish Home Guard is to reinforce and support the federal force e.g., the Army, Navy and Air Force in fulfilling their missions. Specific mission essential tasks include surveillance and reporting, static guarding and securing, and protection activities, limited and uncomplicated combat operations⁶³.

Although focused on military operations, the Danish Home Guard can also be activated to support the private sector. They have rendered assistance during natural and man-made disasters, such as offering assistance to the police during national disasters and search-and-rescue operations⁶⁴. These fundamental principles form the ideological concept of the Home Guard which is: 'A citizen, as a member of the Home Guard, is able to demonstrate his right – voluntarily and unpaid – to participate in the defence of his country and its democratic values'.

Swedish Home Guard

Sweden's Volunteer Military Organisation, called the Hemvärnet, was established May 1940, during the Second World War. Like similar organisations in other states, the Swedish Home Guard is presently experiencing a transformation. In Sweden's case, this is a reduction in force to sixty battalions containing 325 soldiers each, with each company having a strength of 100 soldiers. In addition, each battalion is slated to have a 'ready reaction company' with a higher readiness level than the rest of the battalion.

The mission essential tasks assigned to the Hemvärnet include: guarding critical infrastructure sites e.g., power supplies, command and communication systems, communications and other installations; guarding critical installations e.g., airfields and naval bases; guarding ammunition and mobilisation depots and sensitive entry points; assisting in incident preparedness, surveillance of territory and in civilian disaster/rescue readiness; and providing water-borne presence patrols of local archipelagos and along the Swedish coast⁶⁵.

There are established policies and procedures to join the Hemvärnet, including background checks and Swedish citizenship. Once accepted, soldiers are required to complete an introductory course lasting up to forty hours and are obligated to undertake at least twenty training hours per year. Officers are required to complete between forty and one hundred hours of annual service. Commanders of the Home Guard are trained in the Swedish active forces and can be conscripts, reserve officers or former career officers.

The transformation process will also include establishing new units such as search and rescue, clearance and rescue, field engineering, medical, NBC and observation/surveillance. Also, Home Guard training will have increased emphasis on support to the civil authority during peacetime⁶⁶.

Indian Territorial Army

The volunteer Indian Territorial Army has a long history, being established by the British through the Indian Territorial Act of 1920. After India gained independence, the Independence Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and the Territorial Army (TA) was formally inaugurated

⁶³ Denmark, Official Denmark Defense and Military, see <<http://www.um.dk/Publikationer?UM/English/Denmark/kap 1 / 1-13-7.asp>>

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Swedish Armed Forces, History, see, <<http://www.hemvarnet.mil.se/article.php?c=art&id=13702&do=print>>

⁶⁶ Swedish Armed Forces, NHG Today, see <<http://www.hemvarnet.mil.se/article.php?id=13706&lang=E>>

by the first Indian Governor General Shri C Rajagopalachari on 9 October 1949. The Indian TA is part of the active Indian Army and its primary role is to relieve the army from static duties and assist civil authorities with natural or man-made contingencies, and provide units for the active army when required⁶⁷. Presently, the Indian TA has a strength of approximately 40,000 which includes Departmental TA units e.g., Railway, Telecommunication and General Hospital and non-Departmental TA units of Infantry Bn (TA) and Ecological Bn (TA) affiliated to various Infantry Regiments.

Units of the TA have been involved in national contingencies, in particular in 1962, 1965 and 1971. Additionally, the TA has also taken part in a variety of other operations e.g., Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, Operation Rakshak in Punjab & J&K, and Operations Rhino and Bajrang in North East India. TA Departmental units have aided civil authorities during labour unrest and natural contingencies, the most notable being earthquakes in Lathor and Uttarkashi, and a cyclone in Orissa. Ecological units of the TA have also been active in stemming the tide of environmental degradation by planting trees over 20,000 hectares of land in Mussoori Hills & Pithoragarh (UP), Bikaner & Jaisalmer (Rajasthan) and the ravines of Chambal in Madhya Pradesh.

The future of volunteer forces

Given that many countries are experiencing downsizing in their respective militaries due to a variety of financial issues but with an increase of mission responsibilities – particularly in the area of homeland defense and security – fully utilising and integrating VMOs of all types indicates an intelligent and well thought out, economical method of augmenting Federal forces. Those who utilise VMOs have learned that one can never have enough troop support for all contingencies and given the volatility and uncertainty of today's environment, using VMOs is a step in the right direction that should be encouraged worldwide.

⁶⁷ Indian Army

PART III:

Emergency Response and Civil Defence Discussion Forums

Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop: Discussion forums

Discussion Forum 1: Active citizenship vs. volunteer force

Chair Councillor Janey Comber, North Cornwall and District Council
Secretary Christopher Lewis, Coventry University

Aim

To debate the advantages and disadvantages of different models for community participation in surge capacity response, using the personal experiences of discussion forum members as reference. Options to be discussed ranged from the creation of a single emergency response volunteer agency, similar to the United States DHS/FEMA/Citizen Corps model, through to a completely 'hands-off' Government approach where help is offered only when requested and is never imposed. In the latter case, communities would be expected to help themselves and organise their own response wherever possible.

Delegates

The discussion forum included fourteen delegates (not including the chair and secretary) representing local government, the emergency services, other Category 1 responders (predominantly local authorities), a parliamentary researcher, the military, the private sector, representatives of two foreign defence colleges and members of volunteer agencies. Some delegates represented private sector companies but also had operational experience gained through the Territorial Army and volunteer agencies as well as through their professional roles. Some of the delegates had been personally affected by the 2007 summer floods; others had taken part in the response to various flooding events and some had been involved in the response to the 7 July 2005 London bombs.

Introduction

Janey Comber, the chair for this discussion forum, is the elected member for the Valency Ward of North Cornwall District Council, which includes the village of Boscastle. On 16 August 2004, the area suffered a devastating flood after eight inches of rain fell in just a few hours.

She explained that emergency plans were immediately brought into play as residents and visitors had to be airlifted to safety. More than eighty vehicles were washed out of the car park, causing major damage on their way to the sea. Thankfully (and amazingly) there was no loss of life and only one injury required hospitalisation. Three-and-a-half years after the flood, major reconstruction and flood prevention work is still taking place in the village.

One of the main problems experienced at the time of the event was the influx of media representatives and how to manage them. Councillor Comber stressed that while it is important to work with the media and to use them effectively, in a small village their presence was often overwhelming and very intrusive.

The village could not have managed without the RAF airlifting people to safety, but in all other ways the community response was very much in evidence and essential; it is still ongoing. Councillor Comber felt that from her experience, there would be definite benefits from keeping up-to-date information about what skills are available in an area and how to access them.

The Boscastle example and experience was offered as a basis upon which to focus the group's discussions.

Question 1: The current model

How well do participants feel that current models are working? How could any shortcomings be improved upon and what can be learned from models currently in use in other countries?

The group was asked to consider that one way of helping communities to become more proactive would be the creation of an emergency first responder agency, designed to equip volunteers from the community with basic life-saving skills, knowledge of risks and an understanding of the steps they can take to reduce these risks. This led on to discussions of whether such a 'surge capacity' response from within a community can best be achieved through a hands-off Government approach that leaves the community to make its own arrangements (with some financial help and minor administrative help where requested) or through a more formalised model.

The example given to the group of a model that could potentially be adopted in the UK was that of the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programme used successfully in the United States as part of the volunteer organisation Citizen Corps, co-ordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The aim of this model is to engage the public in taking an active role towards crime prevention, emergency preparedness, disaster response activities and the support of the emergency medical community, thus making communities stronger, safer and better prepared. Citizen Corps brings together the US National Neighborhood Watch Program; FEMA's Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programme; Volunteers in Police Services (VIPS); Fire Corps; and the Department of Health community-based Medical Reserve Corps.

The delegates felt that the US model is very useful as an example and that it has many benefits in community preparedness, sustainable hazard mitigation and organisational structure. The fact that the model encompasses five 'departments' covering different areas of an emergency response was seen as a positive: having an umbrella organisation running composite branches of a similar UK model would guarantee a certain amount of control and accountability, providing a positive direction for such an agency.

The group felt that it was also important to consider that communities are often left waiting for assistance from local government and emergency services, particularly if they are in remote or very rural areas, such as those affected during the North Cornwall floods in 2004. A formalised structure in which local groups – or even a single individual – had links to a national organisation could help to prevent remote communities from feeling forgotten or left out, would provide a focus for the community in times of emergency and would be an obvious point of contact for the emergency services when they did arrive.

Question 2: Recruitment and retention

How can willing volunteers be recruited and administered to enable them to play an active part in the response – whether they are joining an informal parish council group or a national volunteer organisation? Who recruits them, how is the group kept together and informed of what is needed of them? How do its members get access to information, equipment and training? How does it learn from the experience of other volunteers?

It was noted that in the Citizen Corps model, the sponsorship and endorsement from FEMA⁶⁸ towards the CERT programme has decreased the resistance from emergency services, who had traditionally rejected interference from the public in emergencies⁶⁹. Whether taken on by the Local Authorities, central government or another agency, some official sponsorship of the concept may help to validate any such volunteer organisation in the UK.

While the CERT programme has numerous benefits to both community and government, it did however raise some concerns. Adopting this model or a similar one in the UK may result in additional work for local authorities, NGOs and CBOs⁷⁰ who, it was generally felt, are already at full capacity. Unless extra resources could be met to take on a community participation model, the correct set-up and commitment would not be achieved.

The forum recognised that public engagement and public participation of volunteers in general has increased since the National Curriculum has incorporated Active Citizenship in schools, supported by funding initiatives from the Government. This positive push could enable a strong response from the public towards emergency response, ensuring that subsequent generations maintain and continue to offer their support.

The forum was familiar with numerous Citizen-Based Organisations (CBOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in the UK, with and without emergency response capability. These organisations draw a large of capacity of volunteers with skills and knowledge that would benefit and add value to a single emergency response volunteer agency. Adopting the USA model, which takes an umbrella approach, would have the benefit of using

⁶⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency

⁶⁹ David M. Simpson, 'Community Emergency Response Training (CERTs): A Recent History and Review'; *Natural Hazards Review*, Vol. 2 No. 2, May 2001 pp 54-63

⁷⁰ Citizen Based Organisations

current CBOs and NGOs in forging links and support, and could also help to promote the agency to existing volunteers. Building relationships within the community through these existing organisations could help in the recruitment, advertisement and delivery of messages to vulnerable groups.

Before recruitment begins, it was considered important to establish a clear set of aims and objectives for a citizen-based agency, identifying levels of training, community skills and capacities, age range of members, ways of keeping members involved and a consideration of the potential duplication of efforts with regards to already established NGOs and CBOs. For example, once such a group was set up in a community, would local government take a supervisory role, with the councils formulating a strategy for recruitment and retention?

The group felt that a membership-access website with new and current material would be a good way of keeping volunteers engaged, and would provide a central point for discussion forums, support and concerns. It was felt that once established, such a website would require little maintenance and could reach out to a wide range of groups as long as they had basic computer access. It was appreciated that other means of accessing information may be needed, however, and it was suggested this could be enabled through local authorities, NGOs and CBOs.

Once an individual had become a volunteer, and a member of a local community response team, he or she should then be allowed to determine for themselves the level of responsibility and commitment they could commit to. As an emergency responder, a little time would be required for initial training and they would be required to attend meetings and perhaps an annual exercise. Events such as picnics and sponsored walks, organised and run in communities in America, have proved successful in retention of volunteers and publicity of the CERT programme.

A strategy discussed by the group identified key issues regarding the selection of the community members. One suggested approach consisted of selecting key members of the community in order to enable promotion and dissemination of information to a diverse range of community groups. The group did however question what selection criteria would be used to determine 'key' members of the community and recognised that this would need to be decided carefully.

Question 3: First responder training

What first responder training is available with volunteer organisations and how are records kept of skills available to the community, such as first aid qualifications and language skills, and records of people who have passed Criminal Record Bureau Checks? What emergency planning exercises do they take part in?

The first approach to training public emergency responders is to establish and tailor the training to the needs of the community so that it reflects the hazards and associated risks present, and addresses the role of the responders during the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours and also during long-term recovery actions. Each community will have a different set of criteria, behaviours, culture, community make-up and level of preparedness. Through existing local networks, they should be able to disseminate information to the responding emergency agencies.

If the UK adopted the basic approach and principles of the US Citizen Corps model, training would consist of a series of basic level training courses in the volunteer's chosen field (police, medical, CERT, fire, and Neighborhood Watch). The basis for most of these branches is already

in place in the UK – for example, St John Ambulance⁷¹ operates with 43,000 first-aid trained volunteers. Volunteer aid to the police service is provided by Special Constables⁷² while Neighbourhood Watch⁷³ also enables a community response to crime prevention. Volunteer programmes within the Red Cross⁷⁴ train members in first aid, fire and emergency support, emergency response, health and social care. Some fire services also run fire support volunteer programmes⁷⁵. Therefore, the UK organisations that would come under an umbrella organisation such as Citizen Corps already operate, and it is only the co-ordination level that is currently missing.

Each year in the USA, CERT volunteers take part in community drills aimed at developing awareness of their neighbours, practicing core emergency response skills, and gaining a better understanding of local hazards and risks. These drills have proved positive amongst community members, maintaining retention levels and interest in the CERT programme. An added benefit is that emergency response agencies gain a greater understanding of the community and are better able to anticipate what response community members can deliver.

The group questioned what UK emergency planning exercises such volunteers might take part in. It was discussed that in order to allow communities to participate in emergency exercises, they would need to be supervised through the planning stages with key members of the community involved. Community exercises would need to be run at a local level, as is done throughout America.

Exercises already being run by the local authorities and emergency services are solely beneficial for these agencies and rarely involve members of the community. The group felt that the community should be consulted in these plans. The resulting strategies and consultations could then be used as part of the exercise process, especially in tabletop exercises.

Involving the community in the early stages of exercise planning and development was considered important. The group felt it necessary that in any realistic responder framework, community responder responsibilities and community consultation would need to be meticulously discussed and finalised.

Other issues regarding training that were raised could not be answered from within the group. These consisted of what could realistically be achieved by the public in training and what would they be trained for, in terms of responder responsibility? If training and exercises were run, who would be responsible for the health and safety of the participants and for any necessary Criminal Record Bureau checks? Who will decide what level of training is appropriate for community first responders?

Question 4: Accessibility

Do the participants feel that the existing UK volunteer organisations are equally welcoming to all ethnic and faith groups? Do members of the general public feel that they are sufficiently empowered to play the part they would like in a response? If not, what more can be done?

⁷¹ St John Ambulance <<http://www.sja.org.uk>>

⁷² Special Constabulary <<http://www.policemales.com>>

⁷³ Neighbourhood Watch <<http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/neighbourhoodwatch/nwatch>>

⁷⁴ British Red Cross <<http://www.redcross.org>>

⁷⁵ Cumbria Fire Service is currently trialling a Community Volunteers Team to help with community preparedness and to promote awareness of fire risks. Similar schemes also operate in UK regions such as Cheshire and some areas of Scotland. The Red Cross also has fire and emergency support service (FESS) volunteers.

Establishing a website, with information on community response groups around the UK and with key contact details, training manuals and materials, would provide accessibility for all members of the community with computer and internet access. Examples in the US have shown that undertaking this approach not only reduces costs but also increases the success of the public adopting the programme⁷⁶.

It was acknowledged however that the most vulnerable members of society tend to be the ones who will have less accessibility to such material. They may also have less regard for an official agency. One member of the forum gave the example that in Los Angeles, while 20,000 members of the public have been trained through the CERT programme, most of these are from the white middle-class. This does not reflect or include vulnerable groups that often feel neglected in times of crisis.

Participants did feel, however, that there was a diverse range of current organisations aimed at all ethnic groups in society. In order to make the first responder model successful, close liaison with these groups would be needed to allow a true reflection of local community make up.

Question 5: Self-reliance

Where some self-reliance is inevitable (for instance, in taking out adequate insurance, buying bottled water, evacuating in your own vehicles), are the public well enough aware of this and of what role they need to play? Are they happy about the access they have to resources, training and information? If not, what can be done to improve this?

The notion of self-reliance is not a new concept in emergency response. The recent publication of the interim Pitt Review⁷⁷ highlighted many accounts of individual and community involvement in the response to the 2007 summer floods. The examples highlighted in the interim Pitt Review tallied well with the experience of the delegates present. In general, they had found that affected communities not only demonstrated a willingness to help each other but also initiated an active citizen response without the need for Government or outside agencies to interfere. However, they also felt that any positive response by the public tended to be overshadowed by the lack of their preparedness and resilience towards flooding. Examples given of measures that could be taken, but generally are not, included checking the flood warnings given by the Environment Agency, which are readily available on its website; risk perception; and protection measures for individual homes. More is needed to address these issues and to develop a more proactive community response that does not rely so heavily upon Government.

The delegates' experiences suggested that communities are often reactive to disasters, unprepared and unaware of the hazards that are present in their environment.

The US CERT programme draws together many positive aspects. It highlights the importance of self-reliance (for example, taking out insurance, buying bottled water and maintaining disaster kits) and these benefits are promoted through drills and local community CERT meetings. American citizens who have undertaken the CERT course have a greater awareness of hazards and risks and the need for self preparedness⁷⁸. Implementation of a similar first responder

⁷⁶ David M. Simpson, 'Community Emergency Response Training (CERTs): A Recent History and Review'; *Natural Hazards Review*, May 2001, Vol. 2 No. 2 pp 54-63

⁷⁷ Cabinet Office 284668/1207, Sir Michael Pitt, *The Pitt Review: Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods*, December 2007. <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/thepittreview/interim_report.aspx>

⁷⁸ <<https://www.citizen corps.gov/cert/>> , 11 January 2008

programme in the UK could enable the empowerment of community members. It was also noted that such community resilience had been in evidence during the summer floods in any case, and so external organisation and administration is not necessarily needed.

The group felt that the key aspects needed to ensure that citizens have access to information, training and resources in an emergency response capacity are local knowledge, awareness of coping mechanisms, good publicity and community partnerships. Delivering these aspects to meet the expectations of the community is crucial. Both CBOs and NGOs understand the importance (and often precedence) of volunteers' other commitments and could be used to provide easy and convenient access to information, resources and training in the best way to ensure the retention of volunteers.

The forum also believed that while delivering a message of self-reliance to members of the community was important, issues such as the financial ability to take out insurance and having access to a vehicle impacted on a community's capability to take out effective mitigation and preparedness measures and that this needed to be considered. The group was also aware that not all members of the community will perceive risks in the same way, which highlighted the need for a citizen-based agency to disseminate relevant information and messages. The group saw no easy answers to how the correct messages on self-reliance can be communicated to vulnerable groups, and the forum was undecided on whether this should be the responsibility of the citizens involved in the community emergency responder agency or the Government.

Summary

The 2007 summer floods demonstrated the capabilities and willingness of communities in responding to others affected by disasters. There is no doubt that, when caught up in an emergency, the majority of people do help themselves and their community. The issue is whether some kind of national organisation and a more formal structure would enable such a community responses to be more effective. Adopting a model like the US's Citizen Corps might not only provide a community response but also improve levels of preparedness and increase understanding of the risks present within the community. It could also potentially improve relationships within the community and between the community and the emergency services. In general, the group thought there was a need for some kind of formal structure through which information, planning and training could be shared, and that an umbrella organisation sitting above the existing volunteer agencies was a viable consideration. The benefit of an internet-based portal on which information could be shared and accessed was also recognised, with the caveat that it must be remembered that the members of society who lack access to the internet are also often the most vulnerable.

Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop: Discussion forums

Discussion Forum 2: Co-ordinating horizontal and mutual aid

Chair Dr Sara Ulrich, Simulstrat
Secretary Thomas Oldfield, Coventry University

To discuss examples from participants' personal and professional experience of how resources – including skilled personnel from other regions or comparative organisations, volunteer agencies and spontaneous volunteers, as well as equipment and materials – have been co-ordinated and utilised in emergency response and recovery.

Delegates

The discussion forum included ten delegates (not including the chair and secretary), representing international emergency response agencies, international NGOs, Category 1 responders and representatives of volunteer agencies operating both in the UK and internationally. Some of the delegates had personal experience of responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the July 7 2005 London bombings and the severe UK floods of summer 2007.

Introduction

Dr Sara Ulrich, the chair for this discussion forum, is an expert in simulation design and the political implications of international disaster relief. In particular she has looked at the problems that arose during the response to Hurricane Katrina, both in terms of the difficulties that were encountered in being able to accept donations due to bureaucracy, and the politics involved in accepting aid from other countries on which the US did not want to appear dependent.

Several of the delegates taking part in the discussion forum were representing aid organisations that operate internationally and so had personal experience of offering help to countries other than the UK.

Question 1: The importance of processes

The participants were asked to give examples from their personal and professional experience of how smoothly (or not) surge capacity has been fed in to emergency response through the movement of personnel and equipment from other areas; the use of available volunteers and volunteer organisations that are already known to the Category 1 and 2 responders; and the use of spontaneous volunteers and/or donations. Where they feel there have been problems, they were asked to provide suggestions for solutions to these problems.

Experiences of surge capacity during the 2007 floods were described by two individuals working for different local authorities. One of the examples given focused on the flooding caused by surface water run-off in London. This situation caused little damage but responding to it was hard work for the local authorities, as they needed a lot of resources to manage the response effectively. There were no formal procedures in place for managing these resources but, once they were made available, they were integrated into the response well. The other example focused on the floods in York. Again, there were no systems in place for mutual aid but the delegate believed that the integration of surge capacity had ultimately been a success and that resources requested were received in a timely manner with good communication between those involved. Despite this, the fact that there seems to be no system in place for mutual aid is a major concern, as when emergencies take place across geographical and administrative borders the situation becomes much more complex. The two examples did however highlight positive outcomes of potentially troublesome situations.

One participant felt that when their agency had been called upon to help in an emergency, their personnel were badly integrated into the effort because the people working in Silver Command rotated frequently with little consistency or knowledge transfer. At times it seemed that Silver Command did not know how to effectively make use of the additional personnel who, as a result, were not used to their full capacity.

Another issue that was discussed in relation to surge capacity was the problem faced by emergency responders when dealing with 'spontaneous' volunteers from the affected area. Such people can provide much needed manpower and in-depth knowledge of the local area but they are sometimes hard to manage as they do not necessarily have an holistic appreciation of emergency response and are not regulated in any way, which creates a difficulty in planning for their use. It is also difficult to predict whether or not the local community will want to be involved in the response effort and therefore this particular surge capacity should never be taken for granted. One participant felt that the local community can sometimes be more of a hindrance than a help.

Briefly the group touched on the fact that in London there are thirty-three local authorities, all with limited resources. In London particularly, but also elsewhere, authorities can be reluctant to provide surge capacity resources in the form of mutual aid. Neighbouring authorities or those in close proximity may also feel the need to retain the resources available to them in the eventuality of the emergency situation escalating and also affecting their area.

Question 2: Checks and qualifications

The participants were asked to discuss how, in emergency situations, it was possible to check the skills, qualifications and identities of the surge capacity personnel. Was this sufficient and could it be improved in future? Were potentially useful personnel turned away because their abilities and identities could not be sufficiently checked and verified and if so, what could help to prevent this?

The issue of having to be accredited in order to be part of an emergency response arose frequently throughout the discussions. The forum participants were aware that UK policy will not allow mutual aid from an organisation or individuals who are not accredited.

One question that arose after much discussion was why the need to validate volunteers exists in emergency response situations. One participant gave an example from during the response to the London bombings on July 7 2005, of when a great number of the people helping were actually victims themselves, helping those more seriously affected. If such surge capacity assistance was accepted in that situation with no negative outcomes, why is there the need to validate volunteers in other emergency situations?

The group discussed examples in which unaccredited volunteers had been turned away from emergency response situations even when surge capacity had been desperately needed. One delegate gave an example of a situation where, during the summer floods of 2007, drivers were badly needed but it was insisted that any drivers used had to be police checked through the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB). It was felt that the man-hunt for properly accredited personnel had wasted valuable time and resources that could have been put to better use elsewhere during the response. If it is essential to use only accredited personnel, the simple solution to this issue would be to have a nationwide database of such people that can be accessed from anywhere at any time.

Whilst some participants believed that help from members of the (unaccredited) community is a burden in emergency response, others believed that community support is an essential part of the response and should be actively encouraged. One example given to highlight the important part played by the unaccredited community was an example in which Category 1 responders asked all unaccredited members of the local community to move out of the affected area. This meant that victims who were being comforted by local residents were left alone and some later suffered post traumatic stress, which was thought to have been directly affected by this decision.

The group felt that the examples given showed a need for a less stringent set of rules (or at least of the relaxing of some rules) in times of emergency and the need for response agencies to accept that members of the local community may not be accredited but can still be of beneficial use.

Question 3: Command and control

The participants were asked how they feel command and control is being handled in terms of integrating the surge capacity personnel with the other responder agencies. Where they felt there was room for improvement, they were asked to describe what they think this could be.

One participant felt that command and control is not being handled in the most efficient manner in London as the thirty-three local authorities all act individually in times of emergency. One suggestion put forward to ameliorate this situation was the appointment of a single Chief Executive to co-ordinate mutual aid in all thirty-three local authorities. Each operations room in each of the local authorities could then consolidate their information and pass it to the single Chief Executive, who would be able to have a more holistic view of the situation that would enable him to co-ordinate surge capacity personnel in a more effective manner.

As well as considering this issue from a local London-based perspective, the question was raised as to how well do we co-ordinate nationally? If simultaneous emergencies arose in two different locations in the UK and both local authorities needed resources, they might both contact the same authority in order to request mutual aid to provide surge capacity. Currently there is no single body that co-ordinates mutual aid nationally and it was felt that the creation of one would improve communication and command efficiencies by providing one central focal point which could distribute aid evenly across the UK. Although the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) was mentioned as a national body which is implemented in times of national emergencies, the participants felt that COBR was more interested in political implications than operational issues. One suggested solution to this problem of national command and control of mutual aid might be the creation of a 'Platinum Command' which would sit between Gold Command(s) and COBR.

One participant talked about how a joint operations centre works well for co-ordinating command and control within the Armed Forces. This allows key individuals from each of the three services to communicate easily and ensures joined-up thinking. This led to an admission that a joint operations centre for the three main blue light services has been discussed for the last twenty years but, despite suggestions that it would improve command and control in emergency situations, there are no current plans to convert these discussions into actions.

Question 4: The speed of the response

The participants were asked to discuss whether they thought the available surge capacity organisations are brought in to help as quickly as is needed? Would it be better to put them on stand-by earlier, even if they weren't used and, if so, how could this be co-ordinated?

As discussed earlier, there are no formal systems in place for mutual aid. The delegates felt that this needs to be addressed so that agencies know how quickly surge capacity can and should be brought in. One organisation present gave the example of how, four days into the summer 2007 floods, they decided to offer their services as no formal request had been received.

Delegates also described experiences of when the Territorial Army was used as a surge capacity organisation during the floods of 2007. The TA has a system where soldiers are asked to join the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force (CCRF), and additional role above and beyond their core duty and training requirements. However, during the 2007 floods, the TA asked for volunteers rather than mobilising the CCRF, which the delegate felt had resulted in the available surge capacity not being brought in to help as quickly as it could have been had CCRF been used⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ It is important to note that the CCRF must be mobilised by ministerial decision before it can be utilised. It is mobilised under the Reserve Forces Act 1996, which is likely to take at least thirty-six hours to implement. Therefore it is not necessarily accurate to say that not mobilising the CCRF delayed the use of Territorial Army personnel in flood response.

It was suggested during the conference discussions that the Territorial Army could be used as the lead agency in emergency response in the future. This was countered by a reminder that members of this organisation are volunteers and have other commitments. A better suggestion therefore would be to put this surge capacity resource on standby earlier, so that TA personnel can make arrangements to be able to respond when needed. It is also worth noting that the Territorial Army is an entirely separate and different entity from the Regular Army and, as a voluntary workforce, they may not always be available when needed. The organisation cannot therefore be relied upon to be the sole source for surge capacity in the event of any emergency.

Summary

In the experience of the delegates, there are few robust arrangements for mutual aid in the UK that adequately address the provision of necessary equipment in times of emergency. However, it is important to stress that the *ad hoc* arrangements that have been made when needed have generally been adequate and that a more formal system may only streamline the processes rather than necessarily improve them.

It was noted that mutual aid is best sought not from the neighbouring region but from further afield, as adjacent jurisdictions can be reluctant to release resources in case the emergency spreads to their area. It was also suggested that some kind of national database of resources and properly accredited personnel could help in the location and provision of mutual and horizontal aid, and would prevent two affected areas from requesting mutual aid from the same source. The group also acknowledged that spontaneous volunteers who lack official accreditation should not necessarily be excluded from local response efforts even if this required a relaxation of the usual rules.

The group felt that the co-ordination and management of mutual and horizontal aid often lacks oversight and that where several regions are affected, the appointment of a single co-ordinator to manage the movement of the available resources would be advantageous. A national resources co-ordinator, who could be co-located with COBR but who would act on an operational, rather than strategic, level, was suggested as a solution.

Emergency Response and Civil Defence Workshop: Discussion forums

Discussion Forum 3: Community engagement in emergency preparedness

Chair Sidney Shipton, Three Faiths Forum
Secretary Steve Harre-Young, Coventry University

Aim

To discuss how well the participants feel that messages about emergency planning and response are communicated to individual members of the general public and to identify any possible areas for improvement.

Delegates

This discussion forum included twelve delegates (not including the chair and secretary), representing faith communities, minority communities, private sector organisations delivering awareness training, academics researching the social aspects of emergency response, local authorities and one foreign embassy.

Introduction

The discussion forum was chaired by Sidney L Shipton OBE, Co-ordinator of the Three Faiths Forum, who opened the discussions with the following words:

‘This discussion forum, which I have the privilege of chairing, is to discuss the all important topic of getting the message out. The first question of course, is what is the message? I would suggest it is a message of information and education relating to communities other than one’s own. Secondly, and equally importantly, I would suggest that the message is the dispelling of ignorance within one’s own community.

‘Communities do not understand each other because there is ignorance of each other and this ignorance leads to fear of the unknown. The Three Faiths Forum⁸⁰ was formed in 1997 to bring Muslim, Christians and Jews together in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

‘Often when I speak to faith groups or indeed to groups which consist of several faiths, I always ask a simple question: how many friends or acquaintances do you have of other faiths? If you are polite, it may well be that you say good morning or good evening to your Muslim, Christian or Jewish neighbours, but you may not have Muslim, Christian or Jewish neighbours because all too often people live in their self-imposed ghettos. I believe that this is changing so far as the younger generation is concerned, particularly because they mix with each other in schools and colleges, but it is not always the case. I believe that we must urgently consider how each community can put its own house in order.

‘I suggest that our discussion should consider how to get the message out to communities other than our own and to get the message out to our community too, so as to put our own house in order’.

Question 1: Quality and quantity of information

Do the participants feel that the general public are happy with the level of information they are receiving about possible emergencies that may affect them? For instance, are flood warnings sufficient, does the public understand them (e.g., if the flood warning is ‘severe’ is it clear what difference this should make compared to when it is ‘less severe’), and do they trust the messages they are being given?

How is information communicated and is this sufficient to reach all members of the community, including the elderly (who may not use the internet), non- or poor-English speakers and elements of society that may be suspicious of, or hostile to, authority?

In his opening brief, Sidney Shipton raised two questions: *what is the message we want to get out?* and *what about faith communities?* Another question raised was whether everyone living or working in the UK should be made to learn English and whether this would lead to increased integration and quality of information, while also potentially reducing a wide range of costs.

The forum was then opened up to comment from the group. Suggestion was raised that we should be promoting individual responsibility and informing people (of all ages) through education. Structures for disseminating information are already in place – although these may need to be re-engineered to make sure all sectors and groups are engaged. There should be a

⁸⁰ The Three Faiths Forum <<http://www.sternberg-foundation.co.uk>>

focus on putting the information into context so that those reading it know what we are trying to protect, why it needs to be protected and what we are protecting it from. We must also appreciate that in some cases, faith communities know their own ways forward and these need to be understood. Engaging with the faith communities can help to address the issues they may have.

Communities are often part of the solution in times of emergency, but in order to be able to respond to events themselves they need to be supported – not ruled over or constricted. Emergency events often bring communities together, and may even create new communities, or a new sense of community that can have lasting benefits. The suggestion was raised that engaging communities needs to be a-religious, dealing with the impact on human beings without trying to define those human beings by their religion, as 'bombs ignore faith'. One delegate pointed out that people may not know their neighbours until a crisis happens and that taking an active part in the response (or in the planning and preparedness in advance of an event) might be an opportunity for people to get to know one another in a common context. A new and more cohesive community may emerge as a result.

It was however also acknowledged that some events hinder community cohesion, increase unease and therefore do not always result in communities coming together. It was also stated that there is a threshold for the responses made by the communities themselves during events. At some point, more professional help must become available.

Delegates pointed out that when it comes to engaging with potentially vulnerable sectors of the community, there are many existing frameworks and structures already in place that are fit for purpose; an example would be using Age Concern, Social Service carers and Meals on Wheels to contact the elderly. The communication process needs to be simplified to encourage community and individual responsibility.

Another example raised in regard to existing structures was that information could be put in phone books, including the Yellow Pages, as this will give everyone who has those publications easy access to emergency preparedness and response instructions. An emphasis was made on making sure that the quality of information within the sources was high and had been verified. It was felt that implementing this would take little more than an advertising campaign alerting everyone to the sources and the information within. It was questioned whether the lack of a national strategy for warning and informing the public was a factor in none of the currently available channels being utilised to their full advantage.

It was also suggested that public-friendly versions of Community Risk Registers should be used to engage communities and alert them to useful and appropriate information. Mobile phone technology can be used as a means of alerting some communities – particularly the younger generation – to imminent events or to disseminate information about, for example, transport infrastructure closure. It was again pointed out that there are many resources available already but that these are not being used. The group generally felt that the main focus should not be on response but on preparation and preparedness, which is the ethos of the Fire Service. The same kind of initiatives could be used: where the Fire Service fits smoke alarms, emergency planners could distribute and promote emergency planning advice and material. A national strategy or policy on this would benefit any such education and awareness campaign.

It was also suggested that communities need to be kept at an 'excited' level, where they keep a keen interest in issues and this is also a factor that would need to be considered in any education and awareness campaign.

Members of the forums asked whether approaches being taken in neighbourhood policing could be used in regard to emergency planning, an example of which was quarterly meetings that could be held in order to discuss issues with the communities themselves.

One delegate gave an example where, during the floods that occurred in 2007, Radio Humber blanket-broadcasted emergency planning information. This shows the importance of engagement with the media and getting relationships going prior to events and also shows the use to which existing frameworks and structures can be put. It was noted that there is a tendency to call the media only after an event, resulting in broadcasts being focused on news – it was felt that more could be done beforehand, so that when an incident occurs public information messages can be sent out that can aid response rather than just the ‘news’ being broadcast.

In general, however, it was clear that while several examples could be given illustrating that the channels necessary for communication are already in place, in the main they are not being properly utilised.

In regard to educating the public, it was suggested that an education programme should be introduced, relevant to all age groups, covering all potential civil contingency matters. The education needs to be appropriate and relevant, not based on perceptions and must also be proportionate to the risks that are present. Two simple phrases that are already in use were given as good examples, the first being ‘Go out, stay out, get the Fire Brigade out’ (used by the Fire Brigade) and the second being ‘Go in, stay in, tune in’ (used in flooding scenarios). With regard to the issue of proportionality and perception, it was recognised that we live in a more ‘risk aware’ culture and the group questioned whether the talk and reporting of heightened risks was accurate or was it simply down to everyone being more aware of the risks, rather than the risks themselves changing? The proportionality of the risks is also important: the media often portrays terrorism as being the biggest threat, but this is not necessarily the case.

A final point raised was that the Government needs to be cohesive, which includes agreement between all parties. It was felt that there is a need for more top-down policy in areas such as social care during the recovery phase and that communication and education programmes could be made into or included in Government initiatives and policies. Such formalisation may increase the chances of the message getting through.

Question 2: Recovery

Is there enough post-emergency support available to communities that have been effected (e.g., by this summer’s floods) and if the participants feel that this is not the case, how could this be improved? What kind of support is most needed?

In regard to recovery, it was stated that primary care trusts exist, which brings back the issue of levels of awareness of existing structures and organisations and the need to raise this within communities. It was also stated that there needs to be some top-down focus through policies on social care following events.

Question 3: Emergency planning exercises

What provision is there at present for the public to understand the processes of how a response would work? Can they (and do they?) take part in exercises and read available information

*(including public awareness of the UK Resilience⁸¹ website and other available information)?
Would more knowledge make the response easier, smoother or better co-ordinated?*

It was noted that the public has no involvement in emergency planning exercises and that there ought to be a strategy for consultation, as there is for the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH)⁸², where information must be distributed to the general public within a certain distance of the potential hazard.

Two points were raised following this – one being that there could be too much information being released and in relation to this point, the second was that are the public actually interested? The delegates agreed that a balance needs to be met (although no suggestions were made as to how the point of balance can be identified).

Question 4: Engaging hostile communities

What examples can participants give of situations where the response and/or recovery phase has been hampered by hostility from those caught up in the response (for example, either because they do not think their needs have been catered for sufficiently or because it is not felt that the emergency services are 'doing enough'). How can this be improved in the future – if indeed it needs to be?

It was stated that hostility results in, and from, there being no communication or strong relationships between parties. One delegate raised the point that in their experience, the main reason for hostility in communities affected by an emergency was down to a feeling that 'no-one came' (and by extension, one assumes, that no-one cared). It is therefore important to focus on building relationships in advance of a civil contingency, so that community resilience can be promoted and help can come from within the community until the emergency services and other Category 1 responders arrive. It was raised that this should be carried out progressively; there is no point in trying to achieve everything at once.

One delegate also raised the issue that during the 2000 Foot and Mouth epidemic, a huge amount of hostility and suffering occurred because of differences in levels of compensation offered. The issue of compensation and how it is distributed also needs to be considered very carefully.

The group agreed that overcoming these issues is down to focussing on the basics. It was also reiterated that in emergency situations, faith is irrelevant and that the community is affected as a whole, not as the individual faith communities that may comprise it. At the end of the discussion, examples were given of faith communities coming together in emergency situations, showing that cases of co-operation and cohesiveness can and do occur. These successes should be promoted.

Summary

The group felt that there would be definite advantages to be gained from an educational and/or promotional campaign to inform members of the community of the potential risks they face from floods and other threats; a model similar to that used by the Fire Service to raise awareness of fire risks was suggested as a way forward. The group also recognised that relevant information

⁸¹ UK Resilience <<http://www.ukresilience.info>>

⁸² Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH), see <<http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah>>

must be available through channels other than the internet, as the most vulnerable members of society are also the ones least likely to have internet access.

Existing initiatives could and should be utilised to spread emergency preparedness messages – agencies such as Age Concern and Meals on Wheels could be used to engage the elderly, for example, and information on flood preparedness could be passed out by the Fire Service at the same time as information on fire prevention. It was felt that using groups with which the community is already familiar would help messages to be taken on board but that a national strategy or initiative was needed in order to ensure that such a campaign would succeed.

It was also felt that engaging the entire community in community preparedness awareness and planning could be used as a way to build relationships within communities between groups who do not otherwise mix socially, such as across faith groups and ethnic groups, as emergency events affect everyone, regardless of religion or ethnicity.

Emergency Response and Civil Defence workshop: Discussion forums

Discussion Forum 4: The role of the private sector in community resilience

Chair Paul Beaver, Beaver Westminster Limited
Secretary Greg Smith, Coventry University

What resources (in terms of personnel, skills and equipment) held within the private sector could enable a more efficient response to an emergency situation? What systems could be introduced to make access to these resources more readily available to C1 and C2 responders?

Delegates

This discussion forum comprised eight delegates, split between the private security sector and academics. Several of the delegates were involved in training and/or providing consultancy to the private sector and some also had Territorial Army experience.

Introduction

This discussion forum was chaired by Paul Beaver, an independent defence and security consultant and author. As well as being a security expert, he is also a lieutenant colonel in the Territorial Army, a Specialist Advisor to the House of Commons Defence Committee and a member of the Defence Manufacturers Association. His task in chairing this forum was to ensure that discussions centred around the help the private sector could offer to the affected community and to Category 1 and 2 responders; the aim of forum was not to discuss business continuity plans that helped individual businesses to continue to operate in an emergency but with few benefits to anyone other than their own staff and shareholders. The largely private sector participants were asked to consider the resources they had that might be of use to emergency responders and the affected community, how these resources could be made available on the day, and how arrangements for their release could be put in place before an event happened.

Question 1: Resources

What can local private sector businesses offer to resilience planning and emergency response? Examples might include:

- a. Offices powered by emergency generators which, if the local electricity supply had been cut off, might offer a heated place to sleep overnight to residents of an adjacent housing estate with no power.*
- b. Trained security guards/crowd stewards who may be able to help maintain order at a cordon or amongst evacuees at an emergency rest centre.*
- c. Access to contact lists of owners of mobile catering units that could provide temporary kitchens for evacuees.*

The group identified that there were a number of private sector commercial businesses whose services and products could be of significant use to resilience planning and emergency response.

In terms of products, it was agreed that resilience planners and emergency responders could make specific use of hire centres and outdoor/camping shops. In a large-scale incident, one of the biggest problems faced is that of the effective and efficient management of displaced communities. Both hire centres and outdoor/camping shops can readily supply products that would be of huge benefit to the Category 1 and 2 responders involved the management of the displaced people.

Hire centres in particular often hold a great deal of essential equipment which may be of use to the Category 1 and 2 responders at the scene of an incident, whose own resources may become significantly overstretched. Such equipment would include:

- Pumps to supplement Fire and Rescue Service pumping equipment in flooding incidents.
- Skips to aid in the removal of debris from the scenes of incidents.
- Generators to bolster power supplies in effected areas or supply power to evacuation centres.

Leisure centres generally have large spaces and interlinking rooms ideally suited to use as survivor reception centres, evacuation centres or responder rest centres. In addition, these sites often have backup power supplies, catering facilities, toilet and washroom facilities, communications facilities as well as the ability to provide entertainment to younger members of the community. In a similar vein, hotels should also be considered. Food suppliers, including

fixed restaurants and cafes and mobile catering contractors can help in maintaining the welfare of both those affected by the incident and those responding to it.

Pharmacies and chemists are essential in providing basic medicines directly to those affected and displaced by an incident but also in supporting medical centres and voluntary sector medical organisations in the distribution of more specialised drugs. In addition, they may also be able to supply first aid equipment directly to the scene of an incident. As many pharmacies run home delivery services to more vulnerable members of the community, they have not only the infrastructure in place to deal with this but also some familiarity with the concept.

The groups also felt that charity shops, by their very nature, exist to support projects to relieve suffering. Often they are in possession of large quantities of clothing that may be of use to displaced communities in the event of an incident⁸³. Veterinary clinics and animal homes can also play a significant part in assisting with the relocation. Experience has shown that many people refuse to be evacuated unless they can be sure that their pets will be safe; in most cases this involves taking them to the evacuation centre. This is not an ideal situation, as hygiene may become an issue over time. The possibility of utilising veterinary clinics and animal homes to care for pets should not be overlooked.

Many members of the group mentioned Project Griffin, a Police-led operation that now exists in several UK cities. The basic theory involves the training of members of the public and the business community to be able to work with the police in the fight against terror and in the response to terrorism in the UK but the practice can be utilised just as effectively in response to non-terror related incidents. Primarily, retail and entertainment security staff (i.e., SIA⁸⁴ authorised persons) are involved in assisting the police in security duties at cordons. This same project or a variant of it could be utilised to assist in maintaining security at evacuation centres.

Question 2: Co-ordination

To what extent is the private sector involved in emergency planning and local resilience forums? Should they be more involved and, if so, how? What provision, if any, is there for the private sector to feed into Gold, Silver and Bronze command during an incident?

The group felt strongly that the private sector is not involved heavily enough in emergency planning and local resilience at present. The scope of support they can offer, as previously identified, is vast but is largely untapped so far. It is essential that businesses become more involved in the process as they are, in many cases, part of the community and the benefits of getting them on side at an early stage – i.e., before their services and products are actually required – is massively beneficial.

By engaging the private sector in resilience planning, it will be easier to utilise their products and services in times of emergency; if they are not involved in the planning process, then they cannot be expected to have planned to provide assistance. In addition to this primary benefit, many private sector businesses will have a substantial percentage of their workforce living locally. Involving the private sector in the emergency planning process could act as a vehicle through

⁸³ However, it is important to point out that experience shows that displaced persons in the UK are extremely reluctant to accept second-hand charity goods, particularly in the case of clothing, furniture and household goods, and that such supplies are better sourced new from the cheaper supermarket chains. Large donations of second-hand goods generally go unused and become a storage burden to the organisation or authority to which they are donated.

⁸⁴ Security Industry Authority, <<http://www.the-sia.org.uk>>

which to promote information on Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) and Community Risk Registers and could also assist in the communication of relevant information into the local communities.

At present there is little co-ordination of the resources available from the private sector to Category 1 and 2 responders. Some members of the group were aware that there is a London database available but its existence is widely unknown and the group were unsure as to whether it is used by all boroughs. It was, however, agreed that a database is the key to the successful and efficient co-ordination of resources available to responders but there is a requirement for clarification on a number of issues:

- How should the data be collected? A postal questionnaire is a cost-effective method but its passive nature means that it may not have the desired effect. An alternative would be telephone questionnaires or personal visits. Both are much more financial and resource intensive but are also more likely to provide positive results.
- How should the data be used? Who should be responsible for the activation of the private sector in terms of providing resources? There is a requirement for a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) to ensure that the resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible, and to keep track of accounts, but who should the SPOC be? One suggestion was that the LRF should be responsible for accepting and prioritising offers of assistance, but are they, as a group, capable of acting fast enough?
- How will the database be funded? Given the relatively small budgets often provided to the emergency planning departments of local authorities is it realistic to expect this work to be done on a 'good will' basis? This is particularly so if there is a requirement for specialist resources in its construction, such as web developers or call centres.
- How should the database be stored – electronically or in hard copy? There are pros and cons to both. IT enables rapid access and distribution but is vulnerable to power failure. Hard copies are vulnerable to water, fire etc, and are slow to access and distribute but can be more secure and do not rely on technology.

The importance of ensuring that private sector businesses are capable of supporting Category 1 and 2 responders was also highlighted. It would not be acceptable for a business to support incident response and, as a result, fail financially. For this reason there would need to be a process by which 'pledges' were monitored to ensure that they were feasible as the consequences of reliance on unrealistic 'pledges' could prove damaging to any response.

It was also identified that many private (and voluntary) sector organisations have a real wish to assist where they can but are unable to do so due to a lack of co-ordination. It is essential that a responsible position or organisation be identified in order to collate offers of assistance prior to and during an incident. The key to success in this aspect is identification of a responsible party, followed by their publicity as such. This publicity issue has been proposed as a primary reason why the LRF is not a suitable responsible party at this stage: put simply, people either do not know of them and/or do not understand them. However, the collation of the data could in itself assist in solving the LRF's publicity issues.

In essence, any concept of implementing a system by which private sector resources can be utilised by Category 1 and 2 responders needs to conform to a number of key principles:

- Awareness: there must be awareness of the procedure for offering resources.
- Simplicity: any procedure and system must be simple.
- Commonality: there must be a network of common, interoperable systems. In addition, the procedure for offering services must be common. i.e., a common telephone number.

- Liability: liability must be accepted by a Governmental organisation and not fall on those offering the assistance.
- Behavioural understanding: there must be understanding of organisations at all levels of the system, be it the responders or the suppliers.
- Willingness: there must be a willingness to make and receive offers. Politics must be put to one side.
- Resilience: 'donor' organisations must be resilient to being deprived of the resources they have supplied for an agreed period of time.
- Recovery: care should be taken to ensure the recovery of private sector organisations and their contributions recognised, particularly with recovery support.
- Lowest common denominator: through remaining simple and ensuring commonality, the system must equally appeal to and be usable by the smallest of private sector organisations.

Question 3: Remuneration

What mechanisms are in place to compensate the private sector (e.g., hotel chains providing overnight accommodation; supermarkets providing food and provisions) to members of the public affected by a disaster? Is there a need for more formal arrangements? How much remuneration should Government be responsible for providing, and how much should come direct from the members of the public who are benefiting?

The group felt it essential that 'donor' organisations, unless otherwise pre-arranged, are not seen to be out of pocket post-disaster. Small companies are, by their very nature, the most vulnerable likely 'donors' and, as a result, it is essential that they be paid for their resources as soon as possible, possibly even immediately, upon supply of their resources.

Larger brands and chains may be willing to supply resources free of charge in order to promote their own brand with an overt display of good will and generosity. However, the process of arranging this pre-incident is potentially a political and logistical nightmare. With no financial arrangement and no contract, the 'donors' have no obligation at all to fulfil their pledges which, given the scale of the businesses may be substantial and therefore relied upon for the success of the response. Charities, by their nature are unlikely to expect remuneration, this, however must be clarified prior to the receipt of any resources.

Realistic consultation must occur with the communities in order to establish the percentage, if any, of the cost of the additional resources they will be responsible for supplying.

In any case, it is likely that much of the resources will be employed by or on behalf of the local authority, and as such local authority emergency budgets are essential for the rapid acquisition of resources. Tying in with the issues raised under 'Co-ordination', there should be a single organisation responsible for remuneration that should ensure that donor businesses are remunerated in accordance with pre-incident arrangements. Funding from Category 1 and 2 responders should be sought after the private sector has been remunerated.

Question 4: Skills sharing

What role can the local business community play in providing trained first aiders, for example, as well as other emergency response volunteers, to the community? Could this be facilitated through tax breaks or similar schemes to encourage businesses to allow their staff time off to take

part in emergency response training as volunteers with organisations such as Red Cross, St John, WRVS or Salvation Army?

Immediately, it was identified that in general, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will not have sufficient staff to both continue functioning as a business in the aftermath of an incident and to support the incident response through the provision of staff.

In order to enable this, SMEs that wish to support the incident response should ensure that they are capable of doing both activities. If the business wishes to support the response then they should ensure a number of key factors:

- Essential staff should not be excluded from such activities but equally should not be encouraged to participate in activities which will place an actual or perceived obligation on them to assist in the response to an incident. There are, however, substantial benefits to be gained from the additional skills which members of voluntary organisations can obtain through their activities. To this end, all businesses that have staff members who are involved in voluntary support to incidents should have arrangements to ensure their role is filled effectively in their absence.
- It should be emphasised that there is no obligation for SMEs to release staff to participate in the incident response.

The group felt that there were significant issues surrounding the use of staff from SMEs in incident response. SMEs are unlikely to find exercising a financially viable activity and as a result their ability to operate efficiently without significant supervision is likely to be poor. This, combined with the fact that many SMEs may suffer, if not completely fail, in the aftermath of an emergency event is enough to suggest that SMEs should, in some situations, be encouraged not to participate in incident response.

Large private sector businesses, on the other hand, should be encouraged to support incident response through the release of staff members who are appropriately trained or part of voluntary organisations. In order to encourage this level of participation, there are a number of activities that could be undertaken by the local and national government:

- Tax breaks may be an appropriate option for businesses that have a certain percentage of voluntary sector and first aid trained staff.
- Public recognition should be made of the contribution businesses make to resilience planning and emergency response, particularly in the case of smaller businesses.
- Central government should assist businesses in their preparation for incidents, including what part they may play in the response.

Summary

The group identified a number of resources located within the private sector that could be of use to Category 1 and 2 responders, and to the affected community, in the event of an emergency. They felt that greater engagement of the private sector in local authority emergency planning would be of benefit to both sides. It was also noted that involving local businesses in emergency planning would give resilience messages to their workforce, who could then help to cascade these messages throughout the community via friends and family.

There was, however, a strong feeling that while the private sector would be willing to release useful resources in principle, companies would expect to be compensated and may be unwilling to provide help unless they were sure this would be forthcoming. SMEs in particular simply may

not be able to afford to release resources unless financial remuneration was guaranteed. Systems for compensation and remuneration should therefore be built into emergency plans.

The group was largely familiar with Project Griffin, which provides businesses with information on what to do in the event of a terrorist attack, and thought that a similar initiative focusing on flooding (or an all-hazards approach) would be of equal benefit.

Like many of the other forums, the group raised the need for some kind of national database of resources that would help to locate and allocate resources during emergencies. They also felt that there needed to be a single point of contact managing and co-ordinating all resource allocations and requests.

Conclusions from the workshop discussions

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Despite the very different remit of the topics under discussion by the groups, a number of common themes emerged.

1. Individuals and businesses are willing to play a part in resilience

In all of the forums, it was taken for granted that members of the general public and private businesses do want to take an active role in emergency preparedness and response. None of the groups questioned that this was necessary, nor suggested that responsibility for preparedness and response lies only with the Government or the emergency services. Everyone felt that in emergency situations, individuals, the community and local businesses have some responsibility to help themselves and those around them.

2. More awareness of emergency planning and response is needed

The groups all felt that greater awareness of the risks would bring with it an understanding of how to reduce vulnerabilities and that more awareness of resilience plans already in place would help those potentially at risk to feel more secure.

Involving communities and businesses in emergency planning from an early stage could help to spread resilience messages in a proactive way: currently, although there is a wealth of emergency preparedness information available to the public, few people without a professional interest take much notice of it. Suggestions for engaging the community and businesses in resilience included running Project Griffin-style workshops on threats other than terrorism, holding community meetings to explain risks from threats such as flooding, and disseminating emergency preparedness information through other community information schemes such as alongside fire prevention information.

It was generally felt that any such national awareness campaign would need Government backing and support, although at a local level messages could be disseminated through existing community projects and channels of communication. Vulnerable groups could be reached through organisations with whom they are already familiar – an example given was using Meals on Wheels to engage the elderly.

An awareness campaign that engaged the private sector could help to cascade information out to the community, as employees would be able to pass awareness on to friends and family. Legislation may be needed to ensure that communities and businesses are adequately informed of threats likely to affect their area, for example to let people know if their home or business is located on a flood plain. The Control of Major Hazards Regulation 1999 (COMAH) was suggested as a model.

3. There is a desire for national oversight and co-ordination

In many areas under discussion, the groups felt there was a need for greater national co-ordination in wide-area emergencies. The two elements that are seen as particularly necessary are a single point of contact co-ordinating and allocating mutual and horizontal aid, and a national database of available resources, aid organisations and suitably qualified/accredited personnel.

It was generally felt that the single point of contact needed to sit between Gold Command(s) and COBR and to deal with operational rather than strategic issues; an operations cell co-located with COBR could fulfill this function. If COBR was not activated, a national operations centre or co-ordinator could still be used as a single point of contact for Gold or Silver Commanders to manage requests for, and the allocation of, horizontal and mutual aid sourced from a national database of all available emergency response resources. Such a database could also be used to verify the credentials of spontaneous volunteers, who may for example hold a first-aid qualification or be CBR checked but not aligned with a particular volunteer organisation.

4. A better means of sharing best practice and lessons learned is needed

It was also felt that a national means of sharing best practice, past experiences and lessons learned is needed. This need only be a web portal, but would provide a way for emergency planners and responders to share exercise scenarios and outcomes, best practice and lessons learned from personal experiences. It could also be used to ask for, and share, advice.

It is interesting to note that in points three and four above, this national input into the response was discussed as being needed only as a co-ordination tool, and as a way of building up awareness of the national picture when more than one region is affected: there was no strong feeling that a new organisation operating across all levels of the response is needed. Existing first responder agencies and volunteer organisations were largely considered to be sufficient but it was felt that when an emergency happens, there needs to be greater co-ordination between agencies and regions who do not usually work together. This fits neatly into the current Civil Contingencies Secretariat model: what is being discussed is essentially an operations and logistics arm of Gold Command(s) and COBR, which at present are felt to be too focused on strategic decisions only.