



## **POLICY PAPER**

### *Homeland Security and NATO Policy*

Prepared for NATO Allied Command Transformation

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## Overview

As targeted states, the member countries of NATO must adapt to the current threats, which are transnational in nature, and require the protection of the territorial homeland of NATO. The evolving threats necessitate transformation of policy within crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crises stability initiatives. NATO's role in homeland security will always be in support of national governments, but nonetheless there is a significant role for the Alliance to play using its infrastructure for intelligence cooperation and best shared practices. These changes will require analysis of existing structures, identifying areas of specialization, and enacting policy changes. Given the current structure and the current international security needs, NATO can excel in several policy areas discussed below.

In the post 9/11 security environment, the US has concentrated on the development of a comprehensive approach to homeland security, primarily in response to terrorist attacks. European countries and Canada have developed a similar capacity for homeland security with a strong emphasis on civil involvement and an integrated response. The devastation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina broadened the purview of homeland security. Homeland security must encompass prevention and planning in response to the full spectrum of terrorist attacks, as well as the natural and accidental disasters. Each of these incidents requires a multi-lateral response in order to mitigate the volume of complications, thus requiring enhanced civil-military cooperation. In addition to the challenge of integrating civil and military responses, the diverging perspectives on organizational security culture on either side of the Atlantic provide an obstacle. However, cooperative steps and harmonious commitments within NATO have been underway in the years following September 11, and must continue to do so.

Several conditions limit the role that NATO can play in homeland security. The two primary conditions are NATO's structure as a supranational organization, and its desire to avoid unnecessary replication of the European Union's integration of national capabilities in civil-military crisis management. These conditions force NATO to focus on trans-Atlantic integration by building upon specific capabilities that are already within core competencies. NATO is well positioned to develop a comprehensive networked defence to moderate threats in the areas of international maritime trade, possible attacks on offshore oil and gas infrastructure, interference with cyber-defence programmes, response to civil emergencies and consequence management and biological threats. Within these areas, NATO has achieved some level of success in response to recent attacks, but policies must be modified to keep up with ongoing requirements of international security. NATO should capitalize on its existing capabilities for integrated assessment of global threats, risks and potential security measures.

Development of comprehensive homeland security must be considered on a global level, as such NATO must focus on projecting resilience to critical regions on the surrounding the trans-Atlantic area. While focusing on these connections outside NATO's territory, particular attention must be paid to interconnections of vital infrastruc-

ture. The protection of interconnected areas necessitates improved coordination at the nexus of the private and public sectors.

Consideration given to policy development in trans-Atlantic homeland security should be evaluated in tandem with analysis of current capabilities as well as gaps in those capabilities. Adaptive capacity of existing Alliance structures should be focused on, rather than risk the negative impact on flexibility and deployment that would result from the creating of new institutional structure. The direction of the policy changes will dictate the changes to the institutional structure. However, it is essential that the adaptation of current competencies do not affect NATO's ability to fulfil its core mission or availability for overseas deployment.

It is essential that NATO respond to the changing threats to international security by focusing on crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crisis stabilization. Attached please find a series of policy recommendations directed at shaping NATO into an organization that will be able to address contemporary threats to trans-Atlantic homeland security.

What follows is a brief review of the policy recommendations contained within this report. By addressing the dimensions of each proposal in turn, this section puts forward a sustainable vision for Alliance cooperation in an otherwise underdeveloped mission area.

ACTIVITIES	OBJECTIVES	COMPETENCIES
<b>LEAD</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extend shared surveillance and interstate ship-boarding agreements within a geographically extended <i>Active Endeavour Operation</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detect and interdict CRBN threats in the pursuit of secure regional shipping.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enhance regional security cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue partners and littoral states of the Black Sea region.</li> <li>Ensure shared situational awareness with expanded preparatory route surveys in “choke” points and important passages of the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adjust the resource profile of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Directorate and the embedded Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a robust all-hazards approach to HSR contingency planning as a core competence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Upgrade emergency response capabilities – Identify needs, means of cooperation, critical regional infrastructure protection requirements and investment priorities.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Designate a principal subordinate operational headquarters to coordinate HSR organizational efforts under the auspices of Allied Command Operations (ACO).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a comprehensive Alliance strategy for coordination of HSR-related activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fully integrate strategic planning, budgeting and evaluation processes to maximize performance.</li> <li>Integrate legacy services to improve the organization’s HSR efficiency and effectiveness.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Issue priority alerts and early warnings for cyber threats; build resilience to major cyber-security incidents with in-house expertise and national-level recovery efforts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CD doctrine and concept development and their validation among NATO, PfP, and non-NATO nations; situational awareness and contingency planning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build on the insights of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) by standardizing signature- and behaviour-based cyber-defences.</li> </ul>

## SUPPORT

- Provide technical access to international security and health care databases to third country partners.
- Develop third country competencies in biological threat detection and neutralization.
- Share IT-related resources with third party countries to permit clinicians access to a database of symptoms, medical history and exposure that references diseases, drug reactions or infections with a cache of 10,000+ pictures.
- Place active units on heightened alert for catastrophic civil disturbance to be deployed at the behest of Allied states whose capacities are overwhelmed.
- Avoid the burdensome financial and logistical implications of training HSR rapid response units by only training select brigades in catastrophic disaster response as a secondary competence.
- Place active units on heightened alert for homeland security and resilience (HSR) emergencies on a rotating basis with two NATO standard brigades consisting of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 troops trained to respond to potential actions involving military assistance to civil disturbances.
- Coordinate and deploy the contributions of the public health and national security communities to manage the effects of bioterrorism or a CDC category 5 pandemic.
- Develop response plans for the coordination of a NATO infectious disease surveillance and response system.
- Effective response requires epidemiologic investigation, distribution of antibiotics, provision of EMS, continuing health care services delivery, and managing mass fatalities.
- Introduce the private sector's civil society building capacity to out-of-area hotspots.
- Buttress otherwise weak civil society structures in some participating states to address root causes of terrorism.
- Expand development-related investment with cross-sector forums for information exchange (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers for example).

## **ENABLE**

- Establish a Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) among allies to ensure an effective multi-lateral response to major incidents.
- Ensure Alliance-wide support for a jointly defined HSR mission to facilitate collaborative planning of operations.
- Organize regional workshops to aggregate diverse perspectives on homeland security issues.
- Mobilize the Joint Experimentation, Exercises and Assessment (JEEA) subdivision within NATO Allied Command Transformation to conduct regular joint exercises with directorates within the European civil-military planning cell in the EU Military Staff, the European Commission, emergency responders from NATO and EU countries, academic research institutes, and the private sector
- Coordinate consequence management specializations among NATO allies within a joint NATO-EU Capabilities Group.

## **LEAD**

### ***Objective 1: Detect and interdict CRBN threats in the pursuit of secure regional shipping.***

As the Alliance refines its counter-terrorism role, NATO vessels of Standing NRF Maritime Groups 1 and 2 are contributing directly to regional security and stability in the Mediterranean. The increased NATO presence in these waters as part of *Operation Active Endeavour* has benefited local shipping by offering a credible tool to intercept, disrupt and deter criminal activity that otherwise threatens to exploit shipping lane vulnerabilities. In a nod to the operation's success, its scale and scope have been extended to encompass the whole of the Mediterranean. Today, political interest in confronting the activity of insurgent groups with an unmistakable presence in areas adjoining the territorial waters of a cluster of NATO littoral states, warrant's renewed examination of the operation's mandate and the likely extension of its geographic remit beyond the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. To quell the likely opposition from regional powers including Russia and Turkey, lead member states will be required to demonstrate the strategic benefits of the operation while likely deepening bilateral financial commitments. A cooperative NATO Training Center focusing on maritime interdiction exercises can then be considered as a means to cement strategic and operational gains.

### ***Objective 2: Develop a robust all-hazards approach to HSR contingency planning as a core competence.***

Natural and technological disasters that overwhelm the capacities of Alliance member-states are managed under NATO's Civil Emergency Planning Directorate. The embedded Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) provides scalable and robust all-hazard response capability in coordination with organisations such as EAPC and the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue programmes. To date, the Centre has guided consequence management efforts in more than twenty-five emergencies including Hurricane Katrina response and recovery and assistance to Pakistan in the aftermath of the devastating October 2005 earthquake. Since 11 September 2001, the EADRCC has also been tasked with coordination of international assistance from EAPC countries dealing with the

consequences of terrorist attacks. An all-hazards approach now requires the Centre to stand ready to react to incidents involving CRBN agents.

To manage these competencies, the Centre is staffed with five secondees from NATO and partner countries and three members of NATO's International Staff. During an actual disaster, the EADRCC can temporarily be augmented with additional personnel from EAPC delegations to NATO, or NATO's international civilian and military staffs. In addition, the EADRCC maintains a list of designated national experts that can be called up to provide the Centre with particular advice in different areas in the event of a major disaster.

While these staffing provisions serve a stop-gap purpose in times of emergency, a steep organizational learning curve renders inefficient any system of personnel rotation. For as long as the Centre continues to draw resources at levels commensurate with an otherwise peripheral agency, it will be cursed with a short organizational memory and costly inefficiencies resulting from inexperience. This trend can and should be reversed immediately with resource distribution reflecting the elevation of an all hazards approach to a core competence.

***Objective 3: Develop a comprehensive Alliance strategy for coordination of HSR-related activities.***

Effective management of a new mission area requires a senior level coordination entity with responsibility for strategic planning and resource allocation. Allied Command Operations (ACO) is the logical platform to host the designated principal subordinate operational headquarters responsible for charting NATO's future in the homeland defence arena. The command centre will be responsible for developing leading-edge information analysis, data warehousing and threat/vulnerability mapping tools. These can then be used to empower member-states, international partners and the public sector by removing roadblocks to the sharing and integration of all-source threat information. Integrating strategic planning and ensuring the effective stewardship of member-state contributions are essential to maximizing NATO's performance in the HSR mission area.

***Objective 4: CD doctrine and concept development and their validation among NATO, PfP, and non-NATO nations; situational awareness and contingency planning.***

NATO provides a natural framework in which to develop cyber defence interoperability as well as doctrine and concept development and their validation. Both the NATO Information Security Technical Centre (NITC) and NATO's Center of Excellence in Cooperative Cyber Defense have experience conducting CD focused training, awareness campaigns, workshops, and courses. Having honed best-practice cyber security strategies over time, the Alliance is now well positioned to contribute to development of CD practices and standards with NATO, PfP, and non-NATO nations.

## **SUPPORT**

***Objective 1: Develop third country competencies in biological threat detection and neutralization.***

Projected resilience and third nation security sector reform are concepts critical to the reduction of strategic threats to Alliance interests. Disseminating medical IT-related resources to clinicians in participating countries will aid in the early detection of suspected biological agents (anthrax, plague, smallpox, botulinum toxin, tularaemia, viral hemorrhagic fever). Programs such as Visual Dx, used by U.S. Army Medical Command and the Centers for Disease Control provide access to a database of symptoms, medical history and exposure that references diseases, drug reactions or infections with a cache of 10,000+ pictures. The benefits to those who otherwise lack appropriate training in detection and treatment cannot be overstated. NATO's role in disseminating this technology is tied to market access and existing organizational competencies in the distribution and coordination of information.

***Objective 2: Avoid the burdensome financial and logistical implications of training HSR rapid response units by only training select brigades in catastrophic disaster response as a secondary competence.***

Provisions for an expanded Alliance role in HSR should not restrict force deployment for core responsibilities in military contingency response. Instead of maintaining a standing force, trained and equipped to manage homeland defence tasks exclusively, active units contributed to NATO operations can be placed on heightened alert for homeland security and

resilience (HSR) emergencies on a rotating basis. Two NATO standard brigades consisting of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 troops should be trained in a secondary competence to respond to potential actions involving military assistance to civil disturbances. Training should be designed to augment extant capabilities in homeland defence among NATO member forces in the period immediately following a catastrophic attack/disaster (decontamination teams to respond to CBRN attack, local airlift assets, communications and intelligence assets, and Civil-Military Coordination Group capabilities).

***Objective 3: Develop response plans for the coordination of a NATO infectious disease surveillance and response system.***

Detection of a covertly released biological agent is an extraordinarily complicated task requiring a response unique to bioterrorism. This is likely to include elements of infectious disease surveillance, epidemiologic investigation, laboratory identification of biological agents, provision of emergency medical services, continuing health care services delivery, and management of mass fatalities.

In the absence of effective guidance and reliable access to pooled resources, any attack is likely to entail large-scale quarantine with severe economic, social and political repercussions for affected nations. Alliance experience with interoperability and corresponding competencies in centralizing and prioritizing information, positions NATO as a lead agency in the development of cooperative response plans that leverage the contributions of the public health and national security communities.

***Objective 4: Buttress otherwise weak civil society structures in some participating states to address root causes of terrorism.***

The Alliance may take the lead in introducing private sector, civil society building capacity to out-of-area hotspots. Sustainable economic growth requires mobilized funding strategies and expanded development-related investment. NATO has already demonstrated its willingness to involve the private sector by introducing Microsoft to Afghanistan. The Alliance must now build on this role by sponsoring business networks and cross-sector forums for data exchange. By promoting trade in a particular area of operations, NATO will sow the economic seeds for a prosperous future.

## **ENABLE**

***Objective 1: Ensure Alliance-wide support for a jointly defined HSR mission to facilitate collaborative planning of operations.***

In the absence of a unifying strategy, the transatlantic homeland security environment is characterized by divergent threat perceptions and varying levels of security. A common operational picture will facilitate collaborative planning and universal situational awareness. Mechanisms of coordination and a common situational picture are important to ensure an effective multi-lateral response to major incidents. A culture of increased cross-governmental cooperation should be actively promoted, with consideration paid to distinct organizational cultures that might otherwise undermine the effectiveness of joint structures.

NATO is uniquely positioned to promote an integrated assessment of global threats, risks, and existing/potential security measures. With information and intelligence centralized in a best-practice Alliance “clearing house”, threats can be prioritized and various governments coordinated. Institutional mechanisms to facilitate this level of cooperation already exist in NATO’s Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, and the EAPC’s Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

The process can be further expedited by setting up a joint NATO-EU Capabilities Group to parallel databases for civilian and military capabilities relevant for homeland security missions. While facilitating community awareness of respective capabilities, the corresponding deepening of intelligence ties is also likely to increase the chance of interdicting attacks.