Counter-insurgency

Defined by the British military doctrine as ‘an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constitutional government through the use of subversion and armed conflict’, insurgency has become a seemingly pervasive mode of conflict.

The post-Cold War withdrawal of superpower buttressing from many inherently weak states has led to a proliferation of conflict. Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo are just some examples highlighting the regional concerns these emergencies can generate, as their effects pay little attention to formal boundaries. Yet insurgency cannot simply be considered a reaction to or product of 'failed states': Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the techniques of asymmetric warfare are also the resort of actors who would seek to thwart the designs of global powers and impose their own political ambitions, but do not have the means to do so in a conventional manner. Elements of the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies may also be more usefully conceptualized as 'global insurgency' tying together various strands of jihadist ideology in common opposition to globalization and its attendant changes.

RUSI recognizes the urgency and criticality of this area of study. Even a cursory understanding of counter-insurgency operations through history reveals the importance of non-military action in undermining the insurgent's base. As General Templar said of the Malayan Emergency over fifty years ago, 'the shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble'. To this subject RUSI brings expertise, analysis, and an open venue for debate to improve understanding of the complex relationships underlying insurgency, and how best to ensure peace and security in such environments.